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Abstract
The recent surge in the popularity of smartphones has shifted the focus of malware
attackers from the desktop platform onto that of the smartphone platform. Smart-
phones, which are hand-held devices with signiﬁcantly more computational power
than traditional mobile phones, store a wide range of personally identiﬁable infor-
mation about their users in order for smartphone applications to function properly.
As a result, malware authors are able to acquire private and conﬁdential information
about the victims by successfully deploying their attacks. Such information could be
later used for blackmailing or trading in underground markets.
Thus, the challenge of smartphone malware detection is directly related to the
increasing number of smartphone users and applications available. As the number
of smartphone malware continues to rapidly increase, there is an urgent need to
deploy detection and classiﬁcation frameworks that can cope with the large volume
of suspicious applications and eﬃciently detect and classify malware.
In this thesis, I consider the Android platform as a case study because it is an
open-source platform and has the highest number of malicious applications. I begin
by proposing a pattern mining algorithm to generate contrasting permission patterns
that can distinguish clean from malicious applications. The permission patterns were
then used to identify malware. I propose a linear classiﬁer that uses permission
patterns as features. These patterns are unique to malicious applications only and
can also be used to conduct a high-level malware triage. The proposed classiﬁer was
consistent in generating prediction rules and the highest output accuracy was 97%,
which is comparable to the best existing results.
i
ii
Furthermore, while identifying malware is a high priority and also a challeng-
ing problem, the issue is further exacerbated by unauthorised disclosure of personal
information by clean applications, behaviour which cannot be detected by antivirus
software. In my study, I examined the causes and impact of information leaks by clean
applications in order to identify the motivation behind accessing users’ personal in-
formation without their knowledge. The empirical results indicate that third-party
advertising libraries are responsible for privacy breaches. I further extended my re-
search by investigating the built-in tracking settings made available to users by the
smartphone operating system.
In summary, the three main contributions of my thesis are:
(a) The discovery that existing mechanisms for identifying malware on smartphones
are insuﬃcient in detecting all types of threats to them.
(b) An improved malware detection procedure for smartphones.
(c) A set of proposals for preventing identity theft on smartphones.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
In the technology industry, the 21st century is considered by many as the smartphone
era. The advent of high powered and aﬀordable devices has redeﬁned the way mobile
phone users carry out their day-to-day activities. From checking emails to doing
online banking, mundane tasks once conducted on a personal computer (PC) only
are now being executed “on the go”. In 2011, smartphone sales surpassed that of the
PC for the ﬁrst time [22] and consequently, the security and privacy of smartphone
users was also aﬀected. As the user base for smartphones continued to expand,
attackers moved their focus from deploying malware on the PC platform onto that
of the smartphone. Moreover, the inter-operability between smartphone applications
installed on the device, and between the smartphone applications and the device
itself, has negatively inﬂuenced the privacy of smartphone users.
Smartphone applications can be downloaded and installed from oﬃcial and non-
oﬃcial markets. Oﬃcial markets, such as Google Play and App Store, are maintained
by the host operating system, Google’s Android and Apple’s iOS, respectively. On the
other hand, non-oﬃcial markets are owned and maintained by third-parties. While
oﬃcial application markets regularly check for the presence of malware, there is no
1
2oﬃcial documentation suggesting that non-oﬃcial markets also do the same. Even
though smartphone users are warned not to download applications from non-oﬃcial
markets, they continue to be attracted to these markets because of the diversity of
applications, which are often free of charge [97].
To tackle the repercussions of smartphone malware, the security industry and
research community have proposed antivirus solutions that are capable of mitigating
malware proliferation. Generally, antivirus applications use a single feature or small
set of features that have been extracted using signature- or behavioural-based malware
detection methods. Features from these two detection mechanisms can be obtained
statically, dynamically or by applying both methods. Given an unknown application,
the anti-malware framework should be able to use the extracted features and apply
prediction algorithms to determine if the application is cleanware or malware.
Unlike on the PC platform, malicious applications are not the only major concern
for antivirus companies and smartphone users. While antivirus applications are ca-
pable of preventing unauthorised access by malware to a user’s personal information,
they still lack a mechanism to detect unauthorised disclosure of personal informa-
tion to third-parties by applications that have been otherwise classiﬁed as clean. To
further complicate the issue of privacy regarding a user’s personal information, ap-
plications make use of a plethora of third-party libraries, for instance, displaying
in-application advertisements. Such libraries communicate conﬁdential information
about smartphone users to external parties without the knowledge of users.
In the next section, I formulate the research questions related to security and the
privacy of users’ personal information, which are later addressed in this thesis.
1.2 Research Questions and Contributions
The Android platform is the ideal case study to evaluate my proposed solutions
because of the increasing numbers of Android users, the rapid propagation of Android
3malware and also because Android is an open source platform. I collected a set of
clean and a set of malicious Android applications to investigate the following research
questions in my thesis:
• Research Question 1: “How to generate patterns for clean and malicious
applications that comprise of one or more features in order to incorporate char-
acteristics that are extracted both statically and dynamically?”
Current malware detection and classiﬁcation frameworks do not give suﬃcient
precision for smartphone malware as the features used do not capture the essen-
tial characteristics of the applications. Moreover, current feature representation
methods are not resistant to obfuscation techniques, and thus enable new mal-
ware variants to bypass detection.
In addressing my proposed research question, I began with the aim of building
a feature representation algorithm that can extrapolate the underlying meaning
of a set of features to generate patterns resistant to obfuscation mechanisms,
and thus useful to the detection and classiﬁcation of malware instead of the
pattern components. I applied a data mining technique known as Contrast
Pattern Mining, which produced patterns that are present in clean or malicious
applications or both. The resulting work was published in [92,93].
• Research Question 2: “Having identiﬁed such patterns, is it possible to build a
classiﬁer that is able to handle the information they provide in order to perform
classiﬁcation of cleanware and malware while maintaining high accuracy?”
Generic classiﬁcation algorithms are known to handle feature vectors where
each entry corresponds to the presence or absence of a particular feature. Hav-
ing identiﬁed patterns comprising of feature components unique to clean and
malicious applications, I addressed my second research problem by designing
a linear classiﬁer that is capable of accommodating feature vectors comprising
4of patterns in feature sets (instead of individual features) while maintaining
comparably high classiﬁcation accuracy.
During my preliminary experimental work, I noticed that while antivirus applica-
tions are equipped to detect unauthorised access to conﬁdential and sensitive informa-
tion by malicious applications, they are unable to determine if clean applications are
misusing a user’s personal information, thus putting a user’s privacy at risk. Smart-
phone users are easily exposed to such attacks as they are required to provide an
array of conﬁdential and sensitive information which is stored on their devices and
can be accessed by smartphone applications. Access to such information is critical
for the applications to function properly. Additionally, even though application de-
velopers are required to abide by the application market host’s guidelines regarding
appropriate handling of users’ personal information, there are no checks conducted
by application markets to guarantee the correct implementation and storage of users’
personal information. The aforementioned privacy-related observation led me to for-
mulate the following two additional research questions, which are addressed in my
thesis.
• Research Question 3: “What are the causes of information leaks in clean
applications and what is the extent of their impact?”
I selected a subset of clean applications from the collected dataset to investigate
the causes of personal information leaks. The methodology I used, demonstrated
in [5,88], included reverse-engineering techniques and dynamic execution of the
applications in a sandboxed environment. The results showed that unique device
identiﬁers were the most leaked and were facilitated by the use of third-party
advertising libraries. In some cases, the same information was leaked multi-
ple times, which resulted in more revenue from advertisements for application
developers. Other information leaked without users’ knowledge included GPS
5coordinates and user credentials.
• Research Question 4: “How to prevent personal information leaks on smart-
phones?”
The experimental observations from research question 3 led me to my last re-
search problem, which was the eﬃcacy of built-in tracking settings provided
by smartphones. The Android platform allows its users to opt in and out of
tracking via advertising libraries and location services. By deploying a man-in-
the-middle attack and intercepting traﬃc to and from smartphone applications,
I observed that even though the advertising and location services settings were
turned oﬀ, applications still leaked personal information in clear text to outside
parties and were easily accessible to attackers. I found that weak SSL imple-
mentation contributed to this problem and I argued that by adding the secure
DNS (DNSSec) protocol, as explained in [90, 91, 100], external parties will not
have unauthorised access to personal information.
1.3 Thesis Outline
In this section, I present the overall organisation of my thesis, which comprises of
eight chapters.
Chapter 1 introduces the motivation behind the research problem investigated in
this thesis. The research questions and contributions are listed and described,
and an overview of the remaining chapters is provided.
Chapter 2 begins with a general history of smartphone malware and a description
of the diﬀerent types of malware that are popular on the smartphone platform.
A literature review on application analysis techniques is also provided, which
includes the diﬀerent feature extraction and representation methods, and also
6the prediction models that have been proposed for distinguishing malware from
clean applications. In addition, I introduce the Android platform, which I use
as a case study for addressing the research challenges presented in this thesis.
Chapter 3 tackles the ﬁrst research question. To generate contrasting permission
patterns, I present a pattern mining algorithm which takes as input both static
and dynamic features. I explain the data collection and pre-processing, and the
diﬀerent phases included in the proposed algorithm.
Chapter 4 investigates the usefulness of the permission patterns generated in Chap-
ter 3 by applying them for malware identiﬁcation. I propose a linear classiﬁer
which is scalable and, unlike traditional classiﬁers, can accommodate feature
vectors comprising of patterns. This chapter addresses the second research
question formulated in this thesis.
Chapter 5 deals with smartphone application privacy. The need for diﬀerentiating
between security and privacy of applications on the smartphone platform is
addressed and the avenues for privacy breaches are presented and described. I
also provide a literature review on the diﬀerent methods proposed to alleviate
the misuse and authorized disclosure of personal information.
Chapter 6 addresses my third research question by proposing a framework com-
prising a combination of reverse-engineering techniques and dynamic analysis
to investigate the causes and impact of information leaks in clean applications.
Chapter 7 extends the observations from Chapter 6 by analyzing the eﬃcacy of
tracking settings that are available on smartphones to allow users to control
disclosure of their personal information. For evaluation purposes, a man-in-the-
middle attack was deployed to intercept real-time traﬃc to and from smartphone
applications and external servers. I provide an extensive explanation on the
7framework of the attack and the captured traﬃc. This chapter addresses the
fourth research question.
Chapter 8 concludes this thesis by providing a summary of my research contribu-
tions and some ideas for future work.
1.4 Summary
In this chapter, I presented the motivation for this thesis, followed by a description of
my research questions and contributions. An outline of each chapter is also provided,
highlighting the research question addressed and methodology used.
Chapter 2
Smartphone Application Security
In this chapter, I discuss the evolution of smartphone application threats. I begin by
deﬁning application threats in the context of this thesis, followed by a brief history
on smartphone malware and the types of malware present in the wild. I describe the
most commonly used application analysis techniques and summarise the related work
in the area. The shortcomings of existing techniques are outlined and my proposed
novel approach is brieﬂy stated. This chapter provides background knowledge for
Chapters 3 and 4.
2.1 Preliminary
The proliferation rate of security-related threats on the smartphone platform has far
exceeded those on the PC platform. This is partly due to the exponential increase of
the smartphone’s user base, which subsequently facilitated execution of attacks on a
large scale [42]. The primary attack vector mal icious software (malware) remains
the same on both platforms and has been largely exploited. Due to the severity of
this type of threat and its repercussions on smartphone users, in this thesis I focus
primarily on security threats imposed by malware.
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92.2 Smartphone Malware
In this section, I begin with the history of pre-smartphone malware that has helped
to shape the development of the ﬁeld of smartphone malware. I then describe the
evolution of smartphone malware and elaborate on the most popular types of malware
present on the smartphone platform.
2.2.1 History of Pre-Smartphone Malware
The term malware originated from the work of Fred Cohen [26] which was carried out
under the supervision of Professor Len Adleman at University of South Carolina in
1986. While John von Neumann developed the theory of self-reproducing automatons
in 1949, it was Cohen who proposed an initial deﬁnition for a computer virus : “A virus
may be loosely deﬁned as a sequence of symbols which, upon interpretation in a given
environment, causes other sequences of symbols in that environment to be modiﬁed
so as to contain (possibly evolved) viruses.” More importantly, Cohen picked up
on Neumann’s idea of self-reproducing automatons and was able to demonstrate the
practicality of his research by successfully implementing and executing a computer
virus. This was the stepping stone which later gave rise to the appearance of new
variants of viruses, with evolving complexity. In 1990, Yisrael Radai1 put forward
the generic term ‘malware’ to refer to malicious programs such as viruses, worms and
trojans.
Since the 1990s, the word malware became synonymous with infectious, hostile
and intrusive software designed to cause harm to one’s computer without the user’s
knowledge. From the early days of malware, together with the advent of the Internet,
those with malicious intent realised that they no longer needed physical access to
1http://tinyurl.com/jw8r3mb
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computer devices and could propagate malicious code via the inter-connected net-
work to deploy their attacks. This led to the rise of a plethora of malware-related
crimes. Initially, thrill-seeking script kiddies used malware as a resource for getting
the media’s attention, which in return contributed to their fame. However, the wide-
ranging impact of malware soon became apparent to criminal organisations and they
started using it as an attack vector for carrying out sophisticated crimes (such as
credit card fraud, identity theft, stealing government intelligence) [19] and trading
illegally acquired information in black markets to seek ﬁnancial compensation.
2.2.2 History of Smartphone Malware
Several decades later, the emergence of smartphones brought about the re-invention
of traditional PC malware, which gave way to a surge of malware on the smartphone
platform. The security community applied the same terminology, proposed by Radai,
when the ﬁrst smartphone malware, Cabir [121], was discovered in 2004. Cabir,
believed to have been written and released by a hacker group known as 29A [130],
is a proof-of-concept malware that targets infected hosts running on the Symbian
operating system (OS) with Bluetooth capability. It is propagated by scanning for
other Bluetooth-enabled devices to send itself to, and upon successful execution it
displays the message ‘caribe’ on the device’s interface.
In subsequent years, there were major malware breakthroughs on other popular
smartphone platforms. As reported by Castillo from McAfee Labs [23], the ﬁrst proof-
of-concept Android malware was designed by a Chinese security research group, Blitz
Force Massada, in 2008. The malicious program consisted of a combination of 30
attacks and was not written to cause any damage but rather to demonstrate the
vulnerability of the platform. The following year, the ﬁrst worm, Ikee.b (also known
as Duh) [118] targeting the iOS platform was released. The malware propagated on
jailbroken iPhones and converted the devices into zombies which were ready to receive
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commands from the remote central server to carry out attacks.
Based on the exponential increase in the number of smartphone malware since
2004, it is undeniable that the smartphone platform has witnessed a similar growth as
PC malware, but at a much faster rate [48]. The advanced capabilities of the handheld
devices coupled with their fast adoption rate have provided malware authors with
a compelling incentive to write sophisticated attacks for the smartphone platform.
These attacks can be deployed in multiple forms, including worms, trojans, spyware
and are often aimed at stealing personal information, monitoring user’s behaviour for
targeted advertising or taking over control of the user’s device. The ultimate goal is
to extort information from the smartphone users, without their informed consent, and
trade them for ﬁnancial rewards in the underworld market. In the next subsection, I
elaborate further on the diﬀerent types of smartphone malware.
2.2.3 Types of Smartphone Malware
Since the appearance of the ﬁrst smartphone malware to the present-day advanced
generation of malware, the antivirus industry and security researchers have inter-
cepted and collected a plethora of malignant applications, which were deployed on
application markets with the primary purpose of infecting users’ devices, resulting in
monetary gain.
In this subsection, I list and describe the diﬀerent categories of the most prolifer-
ating malware threats targeted at smartphone users.
(i) Worm
Worm [81] is a type of malware that propagates itself across the Internet, Short
Message Service (SMS) or Multimedia Messaging Service (MMS) by spreading
functional copies of itself. The ﬁrst smartphone worm, Cabir, was discovered in
June 2004 and targeted Symbian OS.
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(ii) Trojan
Trojan [81] (also referred to as Trojan Horse) is usually embedded in appli-
cations downloaded from non-oﬃcial application markets. A trojan does not
self-replicate and does not infect other applications. This type of malware is
well-known for providing backdoor access to attackers and waits for speciﬁc
instructions to perform malicious actions.
In August 2004, the ﬁrst smartphone trojan, Mosquit was detected in illegal
versions of the Symbian OS game, Mosquito. Each time the game was played,
the trojan would send a premium SMS message to a certain number, making it
the ﬁrst smartphone malware to take money from its victims.
(iii) Rootkit
Rootkit [81] is a piece of software that acts as a camouﬂage for a set of unautho-
rised processes running in the background. These processes, including keystroke
loggers and password sniﬀers, are designed to capture conﬁdential information,
such as address book details and SMS messages, and send it to hackers via the
Internet.
(iv) Spyware
Spyware [81], as its name suggests, is designed to collect and transmit sensitive
data to unauthorised third-parties without the user’s knowledge. The malicious
payload is piggybacked on a legitimate application and will self-execute once the
host application is installed. One common way to deploy spyware is to simply
decompile a popular application, embed the malicious payload, repackage and
upload it on several third-party application markets.
(v) Adware
Adware [81] is similar to spyware in the sense that they both share the same
purpose, which is to collect a user’s conﬁdential information. However, adware
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is mainly deployed through in-application advertising. Although it is not neces-
sarily malicious to display advertisements while the user is using an application,
the problem arises when sensitive information, such as the device’s International
Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) and International Mobile Subscriber Identity
(IMSI) information are leaked through the advertisements. Advertising compa-
nies thrive on collecting such information as it helps them to conduct targeted
advertising.
(vi) Ransomware
Ransomware [81] is a malicious payload which, upon execution, denies the de-
vice owner access to her own data, by encrypting the data, until a ransom is
paid. Ransomware can be deployed using a combination of phishing and social
engineering techniques or via email attachments. This type of malware is be-
coming more prevalent as attackers can now ask for ransom demands to be paid
either in conventional currency or with Bitcoin, a virtual currency [132].
(vii) Botnet
Smartphone bot [81] refers to an infected device, which is part of a large group
of compromised smartphones, botnet, and is remotely controlled by the attacker
through Command and Control (C&C) channels. Botnets are used to launch
large scale attacks, such as Distributed Denial of Service [66]. The ﬁrst malware,
SymbOS.Yxes [9], designed for smartphone botnet propagation was discovered
in early 2009. The malicious code targeted devices operating on Symbian OS
and was part of an HTTP-based C&C which sent SMS messages and retrieved
the device’s unique identiﬁers without the user’s knowledge.
According to recent predictions on smartphone security threats by leading an-
tivirus companies [36,82,141], malware is expected to grow in complexity and stealth
as smartphones become computationally more powerful and are able to store more
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information on the device. In order to bypass detection from antivirus engines, mal-
ware authors are exploiting this advancement in technology by bundling several types
of threats into one malware instance to maximise the success of the attack [104].
Apart from the fact that smartphone malware is a growing concern, the diﬀer-
ent avenues of attacks present on this type of platform put smartphone users at a
further disadvantage. Contrary to PC malware, smartphone malware attacks can be
either web- or client-based. Web-based attacks exploit vulnerabilities in smartphone
browsers and client-based vulnerabilities in the host application. Additionally, intrud-
ers can establish communication channels for information transfer over the cellular
networks or via the Internet. Hence, designing an eﬀective malware detection and
classiﬁcation framework that can incorporate malware features, which integrates the
aforementioned characteristics, becomes a challenging task.
2.3 Application Analysis Techniques
Since its appearance, the ﬁrst line of defence against malware propagation has always
been antivirus software. Industry and research groups in the security community
are constantly designing new frameworks to cater for zero-day malware and new
variants of existing malware. As for smartphone users, in addition to using antivirus
applications, the application market hosts conduct additional checks to ensure that
no malicious applications are uploaded on the oﬃcial markets. In order to cope
with the inﬂux of new applications, the antivirus industry and application markets
have to employ eﬀective anti-malware mechanisms that can manage large volumes of
information processing, while maintaining high accuracy.
Generally, the antivirus frameworks can be broken down into three phases: (i)
Feature Extraction, (ii) Feature Representation and (iii) Prediction - as shown in
Figure 2.1. The feature extraction phase can be accomplished using one of the three
malware detection methods - Static, Dynamic and Hybrid (a combination of Static
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and Dynamic). The second phase, feature representation, includes - but is not limited
to - feature vectors and control ﬂow graphs. Finally, the last phase is to predict,
using machine learning techniques, whether the application is malicious or clean. It
should also be noted that the number of samples in the experimental dataset play a
signiﬁcant role in producing an unbiased prediction accuracy. As such, it is generally
recommended to use the same number of clean and malicious applications to conduct
experiments.
In this section, I present a literature review on smartphone application analysis.
I note that due to a persistent rise in Android malware [132] and the fact that the
smartphone platform is open-source, the bulk of the work presented here is for the
Android platform.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Feature Extraction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Method 1: 
Static Analysis 
Method 2: 
Dynamic Analysis 
Method 3: 
Hybrid Analysis 
Feature Representation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Feature Vectors 
[1,0,0,1,1,0,0,0,1,0,0] 
[1,0,0,0,0,1,0,0,1,1,1] 
Control Flow Graphs 
Prediction 
 
 
   
         
                               
                            
  
   
   
 
 
Malicious Apps 
Clean Apps 
  
            
  
 
   
  
  
Malicious Apps 
Clean Apps 
Figure 2.1: General Malware Detection and Classiﬁcation Framework
2.3.1 Static Analysis
Malware detection and prediction techniques based on static analysis, as a method
of feature extraction, make use of application signatures (also known as ﬁngerprints).
These signatures may include features such as permissions to access restricted re-
sources, source code information or the application’s structural information derived
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in terms of data ﬂow graphs and control ﬂow graphs. The ensemble of features, ex-
tracted without executing the application, are helpful in implicitly deriving the overall
behaviour of the application and thus, conﬁrming if it is clean or malicious.
In [1], Aafer et al. proposed DroidAPIMiner, which is comprised of three pro-
cessing stages: feature extraction, feature reﬁnement and learning and generating
classiﬁers. The authors considered features extracted from low-level code instruc-
tions, information related to application package and permissions requests. During
the reﬁnement stage, any system calls that were requested by third-party libraries
were discarded to avoid adding additional noise to the classiﬁcation process. Four
popular classiﬁers were then applied to an experimental dataset of 16,000 clean and
3,987 malicious applications. The proposed work resulted in a classiﬁcation accuracy
of 99%, a high number which might have been inﬂuenced by the disparity in the sizes
of the datasets.
The methodology behind Dendroid [120] uses text mining as a feature extraction
approach to retrieve distinctive characteristics of an application from the code chunks
based on methods used in the source code. The authors stated that they were the
ﬁrst to apply this technique to classify Android malware; however, the main drawback
is the inability for Dendroid to cope with obfuscation methods that seek to defeat
classiﬁcation techniques by modifying code structures.
Arp et al. [10] built a tool, Drebin, which is capable of performing Android mal-
ware detection on the actual device within 10 seconds and which outperformed 9
out of 10 popular antivirus tools. The feature set considered in this work includes a
corpus of information extracted from the Manifest ﬁle (hardware-related information,
permission requests, components and intents) and disassembled Java code. It was
then converted into binary feature vectors, inserted into a Support Vector Machine
(SVM) classiﬁer which produced a classiﬁcation accuracy of 94%. PUMA [108] and
MAMA [110] are two other examples of using extracted features from the Manifest
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ﬁle for malware detection.
Huang et al. [65] proposed a similar methodology as that in [10], where they
considered a total of 20 static features and evaluated them using four common machine
learning algorithms. Their technique produced an accuracy of 81%. The malware
detection method, DroidMat, by Wu et al. [143] used a combination of clustering and
classiﬁcation algorithms on a dataset of 1,500 clean Android applications and 238
malware instances. The features considered in this work include permission requests,
information regarding Intents, and API calls.
DroidLegacy [30] and SCSdroid [77] addressed the problem of identifying clean
applications that have been repackaged with malicious payloads. Deshotels et al. [30]
argued that a better classiﬁcation model can be obtained by ﬁnding dependence links
amongst Java classes rather than directly extracting static features, without estab-
lishing possible links between diﬀerent blocks in the source code. Using a dataset of
48 clean and 1,052 malicious applications, DroidLegacy achieved a malware classiﬁ-
cation accuracy of 94% and a malware family-based accuracy of 98%. One downside
of this work is the large contrast in the number of clean and malicious applications,
which could have favored the high classiﬁcation accuracies produced.
While Lin et al. [77] addressed a similar problem as in [30], the authors proposed
SCSdroid, which is a tool that records “thread-grained” system call sequences. The
Bayes theorem was applied to diﬀerentiate system calls for clean applications from
malicious ones. The novel part of this work is the ability to detect malware without
knowing if the main part of the application was previously classiﬁed as clean. The
work by Schmidt et al. [115] is another example of using system calls, extracted from
disassembled code, to perform malware classiﬁcation.
The architecture of DroidMimer [146] employs a behaviour graph generator to
output the general structure of an application, including all possible execution paths.
To identify whether a suspicious application is malicious, the tool will compare its
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graphs with those from the training dataset to conﬁrm whether there is a match
for a clean application or malware. Feng et al. [146] used a similar approach in
Apposcopy by considering a semantics-based malware detection framework based on
control-ﬂow and data-ﬂow graphs. Zhang et al. [147] generated their feature set by
extracting ‘weighted contextual API dependency’ graphs and applied graph similarity
to diﬀerentiate semantics of clean applications from malicious ones.
2.3.2 Dynamic Analysis
Malware detection frameworks based on dynamic analysis as a feature extraction
method rely on real-time execution of an application to extract runtime behavioural
features. Such features are considered to be robust against malicious applications
using obfuscation techniques as part of their attack vectors.
Enck et al. [35] designed a sandboxing tool, TaintDroid, which uses dynamic
analysis techniques to monitor the data ﬂow of sensitive information in Android ap-
plications. TaintDroid carefully tracks the source of the information, known as taint
source, to its taint sink, where the information is possibly being leaked. The pro-
posed work is useful to observe if suspicious third-party applications are leaking sen-
sitive information such as contents of address books or the device’s unique identiﬁers.
However, the main drawback of Taintdroid is that it cannot diﬀerentiate between a
legitimate information transmission by a clean application from that of a malicious
one. Two other research groups, Yan and Yin [145] and Zhang et al. [148] extended
the work of [35] by proposing more ﬂexible dynamic analysis tools, DroidScope and
VetDroid respectively, which allow a malware analyst to incorporate external plugins
into the framework to facilitate interpretation of dynamic behaviours.
Isohara et al. [68] proposed a behavioural analysis framework that operates on
the kernel-level of the Linux OS. The architecture includes a log collector and a log
analysis component. By default, the Linux platform makes use of 300 system calls;
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however, in order to discard redundant information, the authors selected a subset of 21
system calls and recorded the events in which they are used. In the next step, the log
analyser then parses through the collected log ﬁles and looks for possible information
leaks by searching for sensitive information such as the device’s serial number. This
methodology was tested on a dataset of 230 applications and the authors observed
that 37 applications leaked information and 14 applications exploited low-level source
code information.
In [21], the authors tackled the problem of identifying applications that behave
anomalously, given that they have the same name and version number. Burguera et
al. developed an application, CrowDroid to collect application behavioral signatures.
Each user in the study was required to install the application, collect the low-level
system calls generated by other applications on their smartphones and send this
information back to a centralised server. Each set of behavioral information from an
application was converted into a feature vector which was later used as input to a
clustering algorithm to distinguish clean applications from malicious ones.
Robotdroid [149] also considered system calls that were collected by monitoring
each process during application execution. The behavioral traces were recorded in log
ﬁles, which were then sorted according to their timestamp information. Zhao et al.
applied an active SVM algorithm classiﬁer, as opposed to a passive SVM classiﬁer,
on the basis that a reasonably small feature vector space will yield equally good
results. The tool produced a classiﬁcation accuracy of 93% on a dataset of 100 clean
applications and 3 malicious samples.
Andromaly, presented by Shabtai et al. in [116], monitors a set of real-time ex-
ecution parameters including CPU consumption, number of running processes and
battery level. These features were then applied to a machine learning anomaly de-
tection algorithm to classify clean and malicious applications. Due to the lack of
availability of Android malware, the authors wrote their own malicious instances to
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test their methodology. A detection rate of 100% was achieved, although it can be
claimed that the dataset was highly biased in this case.
Zhou et al. [153] built, DroidRanger, which is made up of two detection engines:
footprint-based and heuristics-based. The ﬁrst detection engine performs application
selection based on the permission in the Manifest ﬁle and then extracts semantic-rich
information that is speciﬁc to a malware family. However, this engine works eﬃciently
only for known malware. In order to capture zero-day malware, the second detection
engine is used. The authors deﬁned two heuristics, related to behavioral features,
targeting Java binary code and native code to identify unknown malware. The last
step is to perform dynamic execution monitoring to conﬁrm the unknown malware.
Bayer et al. [13] and Lee et al. [74] proposed alternative solutions for detection of
Android malware using behavioral signatures. Both groups collected system-level calls
and their corresponding parameters to build a behavioral proﬁle for each application.
While Bayer et al. applied a clustering algorithm during the malware prediction
stage, Lee et al. used similarity metrics to calculate the similarity between any two
given samples and conclude whether they are clean or malicious.
Although most of the work in the smartphone malware detection area is targeted
to the Android platform, there has been some research development in malware de-
tection for the Symbian and iOS operating systems as well. Bose et al. [18] proposed
a detection method for the Symbian OS by arguing that the logical ordering of tem-
poral information of an application’s behaviours are vital in determining the intent
of the application. The authors used a dataset of 25 distinct families of smartphone
malware, including viruses and worms. The dataset was executed and the system
events generated and API calls were recorded. They applied the SVM algorithm for
classiﬁcation and achieved a classiﬁcation accuracy of 96%.
Damapoulous et al. [28] and Szydlowski et al. [123] made signiﬁcant contributions
within the iOS malware detection community by proposing architectures which can
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be used to dynamically analyse iOS malware. It is worth noting that Apple has a
strict vetting process when it comes to uploading new applications on the App store.
Nevertheless, there have been malware instances targeting iOS devices discovered in
the wild, as described in [49] and appropriate detection mechanisms are required.
Damapoulous et al. [28] proposed iDMA, a tool which dynamically monitors and
analyses the behavioral characteristics of an application based on the sequence of their
API calls. The architecture of iDMA consists of three main components: Dynamyzer,
iMonitor and CyDetector. Dynamyzer analyses new Objective-C frameworks and
libraries, as the authors observed from the literature that malicious applications use
dynamic libraries to carry out their attacks. iMonitor is responsible for monitoring
system-level calls and, lastly, CyDetector is considered as a signature-based detection
tool as it is able to detect unauthorised access to a user’s private data. iDMA was
evaluated using the iKee-B and iSAM malware.
The work of Szydlowski et al. [123] investigated and addressed the challenges of
conducting dynamic analysis on the iOS platform. The authors used the results from
Egele et al. [33] as the foundation of their proposed methodology. In [33], Egele
et al. constructed control ﬂow graphs to analyse the ﬂow of information requested
by an application and also, any potential leaks that could take place. The authors
of the current work [123] applied dynamic analysis to log the names of the invoked
method by forcing interactions with the user interface. They argued that most of the
application’s functionalities will remain unexecuted if there is not interaction with
the main interface presented to the user. Szydlowski et al. built a test application to
evaluate their proposed method and compared it with the results produced by PiOS
in [33].
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2.3.3 Hybrid Method
In the early days, malware detection and classiﬁcation mechanisms employed only
either static or dynamic analysis for feature extraction and malware prediction. How-
ever, as malicious programs continued to evolve in complexity and to deploy sophisti-
cated attacks, there was a need for more robust frameworks. Thus, applying a hybrid
method, which is a combination of static and dynamic analysis, when building the
feature vector space is considered as one way of dealing with this problem. It should
be noted that selecting a hybrid method when dealing with smartphone malware is
not a popular method as this technique requires high computational resources and
could impact negatively on the desired seamless interaction between the user and the
device.
At the time of writing, the top two leading smartphone platforms, Android and
iOS, have conﬁrmed that they both conduct ﬁne-grained vetting processes before
new applications are uploaded on their respective application markets.2, 3 However,
I could ﬁnd no mention of the types of analyses conducted by the platform owners to
mitigate malware propagation on the application markets. In order to have a better
understanding of the vetting process, security researchers have attempted to upload
malware that bypass detection based on both static and dynamic analysis.
In 2012, at a conference, Oberheide and Miller [95] presented the results of an
experiment they conducted on Google Bouncer [79]. Google Bouncer is the name,
assigned by Google, given to the technology used to perform malware detection on the
Google Play store. One of the questions that Oberheide and Miller investigated was
whether Google Bouncer used static or dynamic analysis or both. They proceeded
by uploading malicious Android applications that they had written, and observed the
analysis conducted by Google Bouncer. Oberheide and Miller conﬁrmed that Google
2http://support.apple.com/kb/PH14365
3http://googlemobile.blogspot.com.au/2012/02/android-and-security.html
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Bouncer dynamically executed the malware for ﬁve minutes and if no conclusion could
be reached, the suspicious ﬁle would be sent to a human analyst.
In 2013, Wang et al. [138] conducted a similar experiment on the iOS platform.
They submitted a custom written malware, Jekyll, for review with the aim of getting
it uploaded onto the App Store. The malware exploited techniques that could avoid
detection by static and dynamic analysis. The authors demonstrated that it was
possible to write an application that would be viewed as clean during the vetting
process and the attacker could then remotely launch the attacks once the application
is on the market and downloaded for use.
Petsas et al. [99] developed a set of heuristics, comprising information extracted
statically and dynamically. To test the eﬃcacy of their derived feature set, they
created malware samples to incorporate the developed heuristics. Of the 12 malware
analysis tools in their evaluation, none were able to detect all the proposed heuristics.
The authors pointed out that at least ﬁve of the tools failed to check for possible
leaks of the device’s unique identiﬁers.
AASandbox is another tool proposed by Bla¨sing et al. [17] that applies a hybrid
method to extract features for Android malware detection. To extract static features,
AASandbox performs a reverse-engineering step to decompile the applications and
dynamically execute them in a sandbox, by mimicking real user interactions, in order
to obtain the dynamic features.
2.3.4 Observations of Current Methods
From this literature review, it can be concluded that in order to obtain an optimal
prediction result, it is vital to have the most representative feature set by considering
a balanced mix between features extracted statically and dynamically. Additionally,
there is also a need to cater for instances where the malware detection and classiﬁ-
cation system is unable to conﬁrm if a suspicious ﬁle is malicious. This highlights
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the importance of providing human analysts with the correct tools to make the ﬁnal
decision, as pointed out in 2.3.3.
Smartphone malware classiﬁcation is a particularly challenging ﬁeld, compared to
its counterpart - PC malware classiﬁcation, as there exists a ﬁne line between what
can be classiﬁed as a legitimate access to information versus an unauthorised one.
Malware are well-known for stealing conﬁdential information, such as personal infor-
mation for impersonation, unique device identiﬁers for user proﬁling by advertisers,
or ﬁnancial information for money extortion. However, not all information leaks can
be classiﬁed as dangerous activities that are facilitated by malware. There exist appli-
cations that need to interact with the built-in functionalities of the smartphone and
have access to information stored on the device to operate eﬃciently (examples are
Google Maps and Messaging applications). Generally, antivirus software are trained
to ﬂag such behaviours as malicious. This leads to the fundamental question of how
to determine if access to a user’s conﬁdential information can result in a breach of
privacy. I address this problem in Chapters 6 and 7.
2.3.5 Research Challenges
This section presents the two main research challenges that I consider in this thesis
and that are prevalent in the smartphone malware research area.
(i) Feature Set
I observed that the feature representation techniques proposed in the literature
do not exploit the richness of underlying meanings of a set of features. Most
of the work extracts and uses individual features in the methodology. I argue
that by applying a data mining technique known as Contrast Pattern Mining,
I can extrapolate permission patterns that can represent the similarities and
diﬀerences between clean and malicious applications.
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(ii) Malware Classiﬁer
The observation in (i) led me to ask how to build a malware classiﬁer which will
consider whole patterns as features, instead of the pattern components. Tra-
ditionally, generic classiﬁcation algorithms take as input feature vectors where
each entry corresponds to the presence or absence of a particular feature. In
this thesis, I propose a prediction algorithm, which is capable of accommodat-
ing feature vectors comprising of patterns in feature sets instead of individual
features.
2.4 Case Study: Android
To address the research questions raised in 2.3.5, I present my research methodology
in this section. A brief description of my proposed method is provided, along with an
introduction to the smartphone platform, Android, that is used for my experimental
work. I selected Android because it is an open-source platform and is a suitable
candidate for conducting research on malware.
Android is a Linux-based OS that was designed and developed by the Open Hand-
set Alliance in 2007 [133]. The Android platform is made up of multiple layers con-
sisting of the OS, the Java libraries and the basic built-in applications [2]. Additional
applications can be downloaded and installed from either the oﬃcial market, Google
Play [56], or third-party markets.
Google provides the application developer community with a Software Develop-
ment Kit (SDK) [58] to build Android applications and it includes a collection of
Java libraries and classes, sample applications and developer documentation. The
SDK can be used as a plug-in for Eclipse IDE [134] and therefore allows developers to
code their applications in a rich Java environment. One particularly useful feature of
the SDK is the Android emulator, which allows developers to test their applications
in virtual devices on various versions of Android.
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An Android application includes two folders: (i) Class, (ii) Resources and one ﬁle
(iii) AndroidManifest.xml. The Class folder contains the application’s source code in
Java; the Resources folder stores the multimedia ﬁles; and the AndroidManifest.xml
ﬁle lists the required permissions that are declared by the developer. After the Java
source code is written, it is then compiled and converted into Dalvik byte code [127]
and bundled with the Resources folder and AndroidManifest.xml ﬁle to generate the
Android Application Package (APK). Finally, before the APK can be installed on a
device or emulator, the developer has to generate a key and sign the application.
Android developers can upload their applications to either the oﬃcial market or
third-party markets. To secure the privacy-relevant resources for its users, Google
provides automatic antivirus scanning, via Google Bouncer. Applications will be
rejected from Google Play if any malicious content is detected. From 2012, Google
has extended its antivirus service on the new Android 4.2 OS, which is claimed to be
able to scan applications before they are installed on the device [102].
2.4.1 Android Permission System
Google applies the permission system as a measure to restrict access to privileged
system resources. Application developers have to explicitly mention the permissions
that need a user’s approval in the AndroidManifest.xml ﬁle. Android adopts an ‘all-
or-nothing’ permission granting policy. Hence, the application is installed successfully
only when the user chooses to grant access to all of the required permissions.
There are currently 130 oﬃcial Android permissions and these are categorized
into four types [55]: Normal, Dangerous, Signature and SignatureOrSystem. Nor-
mal permissions do not require the user’s approval but they can be viewed after the
application has been installed. Dangerous permissions require the user’s conﬁrma-
tion before the installation process starts; these permissions have access to restricted
resources and can have a negative impact if used incorrectly. A permission in the
27
Signature category is granted without the user’s knowledge only if the application
is signed with the device manufacturer’s certiﬁcate. The SignatureOrSystem permis-
sions are granted only to the applications that are in the Android system image or
are signed with the device manufacturer’s certiﬁcate. Such permissions are used for
special situations where the applications, built by multiple vendors, are stored in one
system image and share speciﬁc features.
After an application is installed, a set of Application Programming Interfaces
(APIs) are called during the runtime. When an API call is made, Android checks
whether or not its associated permissions have been approved by the user. Only a
match result will allow the device to proceed to execute the particular API call. In this
way, the required permissions are able to protect the user’s privacy-relevant resources
from unauthorized operations. However, the procedure cannot fully stop the malware
developers who can declare any required permissions for their applications. For this
reason, several studies have tried to identify the common required permissions that
are frequently declared by Android application developers.
2.5 Summary
In this chapter, I presented the context of smartphone application security. I high-
lighted the history of malware, both on the PC and smartphone platforms and pro-
vided a list of the most popular smartphone malware currently in the wild. A lit-
erature review of the diﬀerent analysis techniques on the smartphone platform was
given, followed by a summary of the observations which led to the research questions
investigated in this thesis. Finally, I brieﬂy stated the proposed methodology, which
addresses the research challenges considered in my work.
Chapter 3
Contrast Permission Pattern
Mining
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I elaborate on our contribution for a novel feature representation
method based on permission patterns which can be used for Android malware identi-
ﬁcation (to be discussed in Chapter 4). I begin by introducing a set of new terminology
and the research problem addressed here; this is followed by a summary of the re-
lated work, along with an extensive description of the proposed algorithm. Finally, I
present the contrasting permission patterns and a discussion on the empirical results
is provided.
3.2 Deﬁnition and Problem Formulation
As mentioned in Section 2.4, the Android platform will be used as a case study because
it is an open source platform that is easily accessible. Additionally, Android has
witnessed an exponential increase in malware proliferation since its release, making it
a suitable candidate for malware research. For the purpose of my project, I focus on
Android’s permission system as the feature set in order to design an adequate feature
representation method.
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Google’s mobile platform employs a permission mechanism to restrict the access
of applications to users’ private information. At the start of application installation,
users are presented with a list of permissions to which they have to agree in order to
install the application on their smartphone. In this thesis, I refer to these permissions
(present in the AndroidManifest.xml ﬁle) as required permissions. However, whilst
the permission system is designed as a security measure to deter users from installing
rogue applications, its eﬀectiveness highly depends on the user’s comprehension of
permissions. As noted by Felt et al. [44], not all users read or understand the warnings
of required permissions shown during the application installation.
Several researchers have attempted to interpret required permissions and their
combinations [11,25,43,44]. Frank et al. [50] proposed a probability model to identify
the common required permission patterns for a given set of Android applications.
Zhou and Jiang [152] studied the evolution of Android permissions by listing the top
required permissions for both clean and malicious applications, however only individ-
ual permissions were considered using frequency counting. The problem of determin-
ing whether patterns in combinations of permissions can provide better performance
for malware detection remains to be solved.
Since both clean and malicious applications are allowed to use the permission
system to request access to restricted resources, antivirus engines do not attempt to
detect anomalies by going through the list of required permissions during install-time.
Thus, in trying to develop a malware detection methodology based on permissions, I
conjectured that those permissions actually invoked during execution might be useful.
I refer to such permissions as used permissions. A used permission is a permission
which is used by the application when it is executed. All used permissions appear in
the AndroidManifest. xml ﬁle and are therefore also required permissions. I note too
that although some malware does not require any permissions to deploy attacks, as
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demonstrated by [20,89], my work targets malicious applications that do use permis-
sions.
I hypothesize that by considering information about combinations of required and
used permissions, a pattern mining algorithm [101] can be applied to extrapolate con-
trasting permission patterns to distinguish between clean and malicious applications.
Given a set of features that include the required and used permissions, it may be the
case that malware detection engines will be better equipped to detect and classify
suspicious applications.
3.2.1 Problem Statement
Current solutions proposed to tackle Android malware proliferation will struggle to
keep up as the number of malware samples detected keeps increasing exponentially. As
explained in Section 3.2, Android relies heavily on its permission system to control
access to restricted system resources and private information stored on the smart-
phone. As demonstrated in [41,50,137], permissions requested by applications during
installation can be helpful to determine permission patterns.
I identiﬁed the following research problems in the existing literature:
• What combinations of required permission patterns can be used to detect ma-
licious applications?
• What combinations of used permission patterns can be used to detect malicious
applications?
• Can meaningful contrasting permission patterns be generated in order to dif-
ferentiate between clean and malicious applications?
To address these research problems, I extend the current statistical method used
for identifying permission patterns in Android applications [11, 50, 152] by applying
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pattern mining techniques to a set of clean and malicious applications in order to bet-
ter understand the similarities and diﬀerences between these two datasets. With the
help of visualization graphs, I establish possible connections between required permis-
sions and used permissions in order to extrapolate contrasting permission patterns
frequently requested by applications. I then apply Contrast Set Mining on permission
patterns from clean and malicious applications to identify which patterns are most
prevalent in each dataset.
The work presented in this chapter was a team collaboration (Shaowu Liu, Dr.
Jia Rong, Dr. Gang Li and Prof. Lynn Batten) and has been published in [93].
In order to clearly diﬀerentiate between my personal contributions and that of the
team, I make use of the singular form (I) and the plural form (we) of the ﬁrst person
throughout the chapter.
3.3 Literature Review
In this section, I present a brief overview of related work that considers Android
permissions as feature representation. It is worth noting that up until the completion
and publication of the proposed method in this chapter, none of the existing work
considered used permissions or contrast set mining in their feature representation
techniques.
Frank et al. [50] selected 188, 389 applications from the oﬃcial market and ana-
lyzed the combinations of required permissions using a probabilistic model. Bartel et
al. [12] proposed an automated tool that can statistically analyze the methods deﬁned
in an application and subsequently generate the permissions required by the applica-
tion. This, in turn, ensured the user did not grant access to unnecessary permissions
when installing the application.
In [109], Sanz et al. extracted the required permissions and the hardware-related
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information to be used as features. Their experimental work showed that clean appli-
cations required two to three permissions on average but some malicious applications
only required one permission and were still able to carry out attacks.
Rassameeroj and Tanahashi [103] used visualization techniques and clustering al-
gorithms to reveal normal and abnormal permission request combinations. They
evaluated their methodology on a dataset comprising 999 applications. After ana-
lyzing the required permission combinations, they claimed that nearly eight of the
applications were potentially malicious. One disadvantage of this method was that
the permission combinations were manually extrapolated from clusters and therefore
prone to human errors.
Sahs and Khan [107] focused on feature representation as one of the challenges
of malware detection. The features represented included: (i) permissions extracted
from AndroidManifest.xml ﬁles, and (ii) control ﬂow graphs for each method in an
application. Each feature was processed independently using multiple kernels, and a
one-class Support Vector Machine to train the classiﬁers was applied. However, the
evaluation results showed the common features present in both clean and malware
datasets were the primary cause of a high detection error rate.
After the publication of my proposed method in 2013 [93], the following year saw
Xiong et al. [144] apply the same contrast permission pattern mining algorithm to
generate permission patterns on a diﬀerent dataset that was collected by the authors
of the paper. Unfortunately, as Xiong et al. did not provide any details on the
patterns that resulted from their experimental work, it cannot be concluded that
they made any signiﬁcant contribution to the research community.
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Table 3.1: Malicious and Clean Datasets
Type of Dataset Number of Applications
Malware 1227
Cleanware 1350
Total 2577
3.4 Data Pre-processing
3.4.1 Dataset
The experimental dataset, given in Table 3.1, comprises a set of clean and mali-
cious applications. The malware samples were obtained from the Malware Genome
Project1. In 2012, Zhou and Jiang [152] published the ﬁrst benchmark dataset of ma-
licious applications comprising 49 malware families collected from both oﬃcial and
third-party markets between August 2010 and October 2011. This was an ideal mal-
ware dataset for my experiment as it included an extensive list of malware families
and variants collected over 15 months. I provide an additional description on the
types of malware families and their characteristics in Appendix A.1.
As for the clean applications, I collected a set of 1350 of these from various ap-
plication categories. They were downloaded from the oﬃcial market and from two
popular third-party markets, namely SlideME 2 and Pandaapp3. The clean applica-
tions were selected based on the number of downloads and ratings given by users;
only the most downloaded and highly rated ones were chosen. Each application was
then scanned by the antivirus engines on VirusTotal4, and only those that passed all
virus tests were considered “clean” and included in the dataset.
Once the experimental dataset collection was ﬁnalised, I then proceeded to extract
1http://www.malgenomeproject.org/
2http://slideme.org
3http://android.pandaapp.com
4https://www.virustotal.com/
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the required and used permissions using the Andrubis5 tool. First, the required per-
missions were statically extracted from the AndroidManifest.xml ﬁles followed by the
dynamic execution of each application to obtain the list of used permissions. Since
every used permission is a required permission (as explained in Section 3.2), I have
a global list of 133 Android permissions in total and to each of these permissions, I
assign a unique identiﬁer - as shown in Tables 3.2 and 3.3. In Section 3.6, I will use
the unique identiﬁers for the permissions in the global list when describing permission
patterns.
The individual lists of required and used permissions for the malware and clean
datasets were then used to conduct a statistical analysis in order to gain a better
understanding of the most frequent permissions that were either required or used by
the applications.
5https://anubis.iseclab.org/
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3.4.2 Statistical Analysis of Android Permissions
The most common methods to analyze Android permissions are statistically-based,
including frequency counting by Zhou and Jiang [152] or the probabilistic model by
Frank et al. [42]. Thus, I started by performing an initial analysis of required and
used permissions on the clean and malware datasets using frequency counting.
The analysis resulted in the following four sub-datasets, as presented in Tables 3.4
and 3.5:
1. Required permissions for clean applications,
2. Required permissions for malicious applications,
3. Used permissions for clean applications, and
4. Used permissions for malicious applications.
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After comparing the top 20 required permissions for clean and malicious applica-
tions listed in Table 3.4, we found malicious applications requested a total of 14, 884
permissions and clean applications requested a total of 5, 395 permissions. Among
these permissions, we found some only appeared in one dataset. In other words,
these permissions were only requested (or used) by clean applications not malicious
ones, or vice versa. We call these permissions the ‘unique permissions’ . Similarly, we
name those permissions that appear in both clean and malware datasets the ‘contrast
permissions’.
In total, there were 33 unique required permissions for clean applications and 20
applications with 70 contrast required permissions. Another ﬁve permissions were
never requested by any application during install-time. Additionally, there were nine
out of twenty required permissions that appeared more frequently in the malware
dataset compared to the clean one. From Table 3.4, it can be observed that only nine
out of the Top 20 required permissions were common between the clean and malicious
datasets.
For used permissions in Table 3.5, nine unique ones were requested for clean ap-
plications and only four for malicious applications. The number of contrast used
permissions dropped to 28, while 87 permissions were never used by any application.
Moreover, when comparing the top 20 used permissions in clean and malicious ap-
plications in Table 3.5, we observed that 16 out of the top 20 used permissions were
common in both datasets.
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Statistical methods such as direct frequency counting are suitable for identifying
which individual permissions are popular in each sub-dataset. However, we observed
that this method still required further manual veriﬁcation to identify similarities and
diﬀerences between the required and used permission lists for the clean and malicious
applications. The counting process is further complicated if permission combinations
are considered instead of individual permissions.
To extend the information generated from statistical analysis, we continued our
study of Android permissions by applying the Biclustering algorithm as the next
step in order visualize the relationship between permissions and applications - instead
of only counting permission frequencies. In addition, Biclustering provides an eﬃcient
way of depicting groups of permissions that are closely related to certain applications,
thus making it easy for an analyst to gain a high-level overview of the characteristics
of these applications.
3.4.3 Visualization of Permissions Using Biclustering
Biclustering [80] is a special cluster analysis method that simultaneously applies clas-
sic clustering to both rows and columns in a two-dimensional data matrix. In this
work, biclustering can help group applications that request or use diﬀerent permission
combinations as well as generate clusters of permission combinations depending on
which applications are associated with such combinations.
Biclustering is achieved by performingAgglomerative Hierarchical Clustering (AHC) [45,
122] on both dimensions of the data matrix. The AHC is ﬁrst applied along columns
of the data matrix and then applied along rows of the row-clustered data matrix.
Unlike common clustering methods that identify one single set of clusters, the AHC
is a bottom-up clustering method that seeks to identify clusters with sub-clusters. It
forms a multilevel hierarchical clustering tree, where lower-level clusters are joined to
form higher-level clusters. The steps can be described as follows:
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Agglomerative Hierarchical Clustering Algorithm
• Step 1: Generate the Disjoint Clusters.
The AHC starts with every single data object by assigning it to a separate
cluster.
• Step 2: Form a Distance Matrix.
The pairwise distances between the disjoint clusters are calculated usingWard’s
Linkage [139] and are used to initialize the distance matrix.
• Step 3: Merge two Closest Clusters.
Based on the distance matrix, each cluster is merged with the cluster which is
the shortest distance from it.
• Step 4: Update the Distance Matrix.
After the merge, the distance matrix is updated by calculating the new distance
between each pair of merged clusters.
• Step 5: Obtain the Hierarchical Clustering Tree.
Steps 3 and 4 are repeated until all clusters are merged into one large single
cluster, resulting in a complete hierarchical clustering tree.
We applied the above biclustering steps on two separate sub-datasets extracted
from the union of our clean and malicious datasets. One sub-dataset contained all
clean and malicious applications with required permissions (see Figure 3.1a). The
second sub-dataset contained all clean and malicious applications with used permis-
sions (see Figure 3.1b). To visualize the permission distribution in these two ﬁgures,
we used a white/grey/black color scheme where white denotes the absence of a per-
mission in an application. Grey and black represent the presence of a (required or
used) permission in a clean and malicious application, respectively.
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(a) Required Permissions
(b) Used Permissions
Figure 3.1: Visualization of permission distribution across the entire dataset of clean
and malicious applications based on type of permission: white for absence of permis-
sion; grey for presence of permission in clean application; and black for presence of
permission in malicious application.
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After applying the biclustering algorithm, we have two output matrices - required
permissions as shown in Figure 3.2a and used permissions as shown in Figure 3.2b.
From the statistical analysis presented in Section 3.4.2, we observed the presence
of unique and contrast permissions in clean and malicious applications. We used
the following four colors to depict the diﬀerent types of permissions present in the
bicluster maps:
• Green for Contrast permissions for clean applications;
• Brown for Contrast permissions for malicious applications;
• Blue for Unique permissions for clean applications; and
• Red for Unique permissions for malicious applications.
From Figures 3.2a and 3.2b, we observed that more permissions were declared
as required than those actually used, which further conﬁrmed our observations from
the statistical analysis from Section 3.4.2. Furthermore, malicious applications gen-
erally requested or used more permissions than clean applications. We also noted
that unique permissions performed better than contrast permission patterns as a
diﬀerentiator between clean and malicious applications. However, from the resulting
matrices, there were only a few unique permissions shown in bright red and blue com-
pared to the large set of contrast permission patterns. Furthermore, color blocks in
Figures 3.2a and 3.2b indicated that speciﬁc permission combinations had the poten-
tial to group applications in separate clusters. We conclude that when only statistical
methods were applied, it was very easy to ignore unique permissions because of their
low frequency.
The aforementioned observations gave rise to the following research challenge that
will be addressed in the next section: How can we ﬁnd contrasting permission
patterns that can be used for malware detection?
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(a) Required Permissions
(b) Used Permissions
Figure 3.2: Bicluster maps for permissions in clean and malware datasets
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3.5 Contrast Permission Pattern Mining
In order to tackle the research question raised in Section 3.4.3, Contrast Permission
Pattern Mining (CPPM) was proposed as based in [101]. The output permission
patterns are expected to have the ability to indicate the diﬀerence between clean and
malicious applications. CPPM was designed to process more than one dataset and
take unique and contrast permissions and their combinations into consideration. Two
major processes are involved in CPPM : (1) Candidate Subset Generation (Section
3.5.1), and (2) Contrast Subset Selection (Section 3.5.2). Figure 3.3 illustrates the
overall process of the CPPM algorithm, as applied in this thesis.
3.5.1 Candidate Subset Generation
The purpose of this process is to obtain a number of candidate subsets that are
most likely to be the expected contrasting permission patterns. CPPM is capable of
taking two or more datasets as input, in this case, two datasets are loaded - clean and
malicious, as shown in Table 3.1. They are further divided into four sub-datasets:
(i) Clean Required (CR) - Required permissions in the clean dataset,
(ii) Malicious Required (MR) - Required permissions in the malicious dataset,
(iii) Clean Used (CU) - Used permissions in the clean dataset,
(iv) Malicious Used (MU) - Used permissions in the malicious dataset.
We generated the candidate permission patterns for every sub-dataset using the fol-
lowing two steps. For explanation purpose, I focus only on the sub-dataset CR in
this section.
Step 1: Apriori-based Subset Enumeration
Let sub-dataset CR be the set of required permissions for the clean dataset.
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Figure 3.3: Architecture of CPPM
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The Apriori-based approach [4] enumerates interesting subsets from the simplest
structure starting with only a single element. Based on this single element, a
larger subset is then obtained by incorporating new elements. This incorpora-
tion operation is repeated continuously to increase the number of elements in
the subset. In each iteration, one new element is added to the existing subset.
The Apriori-based approach can generate a large number of subsets with high
computational cost. To counter this cost, a support-based pruning technique is
employed to reduce the number of subsets and subsequently, the experimental
time.
Step 2: Support-based Subset Pruning
Support is generally used to measure the occurrence of a particular element or
subset in a dataset. For a non-empty subset S of CR, the support of S can be
deﬁned as follows:
supp(S) =
number of applications containing all permissions in S
total number of applications
(3.5.1)
The subset S is considered as frequent only if supp(S) ≥ δsupp, where δsupp is a
user-speciﬁed minimum support threshold. In classic pattern mining methods,
only the frequent subsets are considered. Any subset with a lower support than
the pre-determined threshold is treated as infrequent and discarded. However,
in our case, both the statistical analysis and biclustering results showed most
of the unique permissions, as described in Section 3.4.2, were requested or used
by few applications, thus indicating a low support value. Hence, we used only
the frequent subsets to generate new interesting subsets and so reduce compu-
tational cost.
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3.5.2 Contrast Subset Selection
The subsets generated from Section 3.5.1 need to be reduced according to the pre-
deﬁned selection criteria. This process guarantees that the ﬁnal subsets highly diﬀer-
entiate between clean and malicious applications. The contrasting subsets reﬂect the
diﬀerent behaviors present amongst applications in the clean and malicious datasets.
The selection of a speciﬁc contrasting subset is based on the comparison of its support
in both datasets. The bigger the diﬀerence in support values, the greater the contrast
between two given subsets - as explained below.
Given non-empty subset S and its support values in clean and malware datasets,
supp(S)clean and supp(S)malicious, the diﬀerence is calculated as follows:
diff(S) = supp(S)clean − supp(S)malicious (3.5.2)
S is identiﬁed as a contrasted subset only if diff(S) ≥ δdiff , where δdiff is a user-
speciﬁedminimum support diﬀerence. All the generated subsets were tested using this
approach, and only the ones equal or greater than the minimum support diﬀerence
were selected.
3.6 Android Permission Patterns
In this section, I present the empirical results of the CPPM algorithm. In the re-
mainder of my thesis, I refer to subsets of the features as patterns since it is a term
commonly used when working with contrast pattern mining algorithms, and generally
accepted by the data mining community [101].
The usefulness of permission patterns for distinguishing between clean and ma-
licious applications relates to the support values. The results from the statistical
analysis in Section 3.4.2 showed that only a small group of permissions had support
greater than 0.1, therefore, I followed previous studies [73,78,105] to set δsupp = 0.05
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as an acceptable value for the minimum support threshold for all four sub-datasets
in Section 3.5.1. In Section 3.5.2, the minimum support diﬀerence threshold was set
to δdiff = 0.3 and was applied to ﬁlter out permission patterns highly contrasted
between clean and malicious applications. Table 3.6 describes the number of patterns
retained and discarded after applying the minimum support threshold. A breakdown
of the permissions associated with the patterns is also provided.
Table 3.6: Patterns and Permissions for the Four Sub-Datasets Used by the CPPM
Algorithm
Sub-Dataset
Patterns
Retained
Patterns
Discarded
Permissions
Retained
Permissions
Discarded
Clean Required (CR) 44 173 114 19
Malicious Required (MR) 5205 3181 90 43
Clean Used (CU) 107 66 45 88
Malicious Used (MU) 622 298 32 101
Among the generated permission patterns, I found 25 distinct permissions were
present in the highly contrasted patterns as listed in Table 3.7. I classiﬁed the per-
missions based on the following permission categories: Normal, Dangerous, Signature
and SignatureOrSystem (Section 2.4.1 of Chapter 2). I recorded six permissions that
belong to the Normal category, sixteen permissions for the Dangerous category, one
permission for the Signature category and two for the SignatureOrSystem category.
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Table 3.7: Permission Index (grouped by Permission Category)
Permission Category Permission ID Permission Name
Normal pms0004 INTERNET
Normal pms0006 VIBRATE
Normal pms0008 ACCESS NETWORK STATE
Normal pms0012 ACCESS WIFI STATE
Normal pms0028 RECEIVE BOOT COMPLETED
Normal pms0043 RESTART PACKAGES
Dangerous pms0003 WRITE EXTERNAL STORAGE
Dangerous pms0005 ACCESS FINE LOCATION
Dangerous pms0007 READ PHONE STATE
Dangerous pms0010 WAKE LOCK
Dangerous pms0013 READ LOGS
Dangerous pms0014 READ CONTACTS
Dangerous pms0026 WRITE CONTACTS
Dangerous pms0033 CALL PHONE
Dangerous pms0038 CHANGE WIFI STATE
Dangerous pms0049 ACCESS COARSE LOCATION
Dangerous pms0050 SEND SMS
Dangerous pms0051 GET TASKS
Dangerous pms0054 RECEIVE SMS
Dangerous pms0055 READ SMS
Dangerous pms0056 WRITE SMS
Dangerous pms0073 DISABLE KEYGUARD
Signature pms0009 FACTORY TEST
SignatureOrSystem pms0061 WRITE APN SETTINGS
SignatureOrSystem pms0069 INSTALL PACKAGES
According to the experimental results, I obtained a list of permission patterns
that were similar in both clean and malicious datasets, while unique permission pat-
terns were present in only the malicious dataset. This last fact will later be shown
to be useful in detecting suspicious applications. To facilitate the analysis of the
experimental results, I introduce and deﬁne the following four types of permission
patterns:
(i) Malware-Speciﬁc Required Permission Pattern (MSRPP): Required per-
mission patterns present only in the malware dataset
(ii) Malware-Speciﬁc Used Permission Pattern (MSUPP): Used permission
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patterns present only in the malware dataset
(iii) Contrast Required Permission Pattern (CRPP): Required permission
patterns present in both clean and malware datasets
(iv) Contrast Used Permission Pattern (CUPP): Used permission patterns
present in both clean and malware datasets
After applying the minimum support threshold, I identiﬁed 185 MSRPPs, 33
MSUPPs, 31 CRPPs and 19 CUPPs. The complete list of permission patterns is
provided in Appendix A.2. In the remainder of Section 3.6, I only present those
permission patterns which appear to be important in malware detection.
3.6.1 Malware-Speciﬁc Required Permission Patterns
(MSRPP)
In Tables 3.8 - 3.13, I present the permission patterns frequently required by the
applications in the experimental dataset. It can be observed that these required
permission patterns were only unique to the malware dataset, implying that the
support value for the patterns in the clean dataset was 0 and thus, the patterns were
discarded.
In Table 3.8, I list the top 25 MSRPPs where the ﬁrst permission in the listed
patterns belongs to the normal permissions category. The ﬁrst four permission pat-
terns in Table 3.8 with pattern ID, MSRPP1, MSRPP2, MSRPP4 and MSRPP5
were required by more than 60% of the malware, as shown by their corresponding
support values. In fact, it can be observed that the INTERNET permission (pms0004
from Table 3.2) was frequently requested along with other permissions whose support
values were relatively high. The permission combination of INTERNET (pms0004) and
READ SMS (pms0055) was present in 56% of the malware dataset.
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In Tables 3.9 - 3.13, I present permission patterns that can have an impact on the
following actions: access location information (pms0005 and pms0049), read/write/send
and receive SMS (pms0055, pms0056, pms0050 and pms0054), access to the contact
list (pms0014), write to external storage (pms0003) and access to the phone state
(pms0007).
Table 3.8: Required Permission Patterns Unique to Malware Dataset with at least
one Normal Permission
Permission Pattern Support Pattern ID
pms0004, pms0007, pms0012 0.6309 MSRPP1
pms0004, pms0055 0.6194 MSRPP2
pms0004, pms0008, pms0012 0.6031 MSRPP4
pms0004, pms0007, pms0055 0.6031 MSRPP5
pms0004, pms0007, pms0008, pms0012 0.5999 MSRPP6
pms0004, pms0008, pms0055 0.5624 MSRPP9
pms0008, pms0055 0.5624 MSRPP10
pms0004, pms0007, pms0008, pms0055 0.5542 MSRPP11
pms0004, pms0007, pms0028 0.5453 MSRPP13
pms0004, pms0008, pms0028 0.5168 MSRPP14
pms0004, pms0056 0.5143 MSRPP15
pms0004, pms0055, pms0056 0.5127 MSRPP17
pms0004, pms0007, pms0008, pms0028 0.5111 MSRPP18
pms0004, pms0007, pms0056 0.5078 MSRPP21
pms0004, pms0007, pms0055, pms0056 0.5062 MSRPP23
pms0004, pms0008, pms0056 0.4964 MSRPP24
pms0008, pms0056 0.4964 MSRPP25
pms0004, pms0008, pms0055, pms0056 0.4956 MSRPP26
pms0008, pms0055, pms0056 0.4956 MSRPP27
pms0004, pms0007, pms0008, pms0056 0.4899 MSRPP28
pms0004, pms0050 0.4312 MSRPP37
pms0004, pms0012, pms0028 0.4263 MSRPP38
pms0004, pms0007, pms0012, pms0028 0.4255 MSRPP39
pms0004, pms0008, pms0012, pms0028 0.4181 MSRPP42
pms0008, pms0012, pms0028 0.4181 MSRPP43
Table 3.9: Required Permission Patterns Unique to Malware Dataset which include
pms0005 and pms0049
Permission Pattern Support Pattern ID
pms0004, pms0007, pms0049 0.3562 MSRPP80
pms0003, pms0004, pms0049 0.3122 MSRPP146
pms0003, pms0004, pms0005, pms0007 0.3106 MSRPP153
pms0003, pms0004, pms0007, pms0049 0.3106 MSRPP154
pms0003, pms0007, pms0049 0.3106 MSRPP157
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Table 3.10: Required Permission Patterns Unique to Malware Dataset which include
pms0055, pms0056, pms0050 and pms0054
Permission Pattern Support Pattern ID
pms0050, pms0054 0.3701 MSRPP71
pms0050, pms0055 0.3627 MSRPP74
pms0054, pms0055 0.3383 MSRPP100
pms0050, pms0056 0.3138 MSRPP140
pms0050, pms0055, pms0056 0.3122 MSRPP148
Table 3.11: Required Permission Patterns Unique to Malware Dataset which include
pms0014
Permission Pattern Support Pattern ID
pms0004, pms0007, pms0014 0.3521 MSRPP83
pms0014, pms0055 0.3269 MSRPP116
pms0004, pms0014, pms0055 0.3252 MSRPP117
pms0007, pms0014, pms0055 0.3187 MSRPP124
pms0004, pms0007, pms0014, pms0055 0.3171 MSRPP127
Table 3.12: Required Permission Patterns Unique to Malware Dataset which include
pms0003
Permission Pattern Support Pattern ID
pms0003, pms0004, pms0007, pms0008 0.5624 MSRPP8
pms0003, pms0004, pms0012 0.4638 MSRPP31
pms0003, pms0004, pms0007, pms0012 0.4605 MSRPP32
pms0003, pms0007, pms0012 0.4605 MSRPP33
pms0003, pms0004, pms0008, pms0012 0.4475 MSRPP34
pms0003, pms0008, pms0012 0.4475 MSRPP35
pms0003, pms0007, pms0008, pms0012 0.4442 MSRPP36
pms0003, pms0004, pms0055 0.3896 MSRPP54
pms0003, pms0055 0.3896 MSRPP55
pms0003, pms0004, pms0007, pms0055 0.3823 MSRPP56
pms0003, pms0007, pms0055 0.3823 MSRPP57
Table 3.13: Required Permission Patterns Unique to Malware Dataset which include
pms0007
Permission Pattern Support Pattern ID
pms0007, pms0055 0.6048 MSRPP3
pms0007, pms0008, pms0012 0.5999 MSRPP7
pms0007, pms0008, pms0055 0.5542 MSRPP12
pms0007, pms0008, pms0028 0.5111 MSRPP19
pms0007, pms0055, pms0056 0.5078 MSRPP22
pms0007, pms0008, pms0056 0.4899 MSRPP29
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3.6.2 Malware-Speciﬁc Used Permission Patterns (MSUPP)
In Table 3.14, only the patterns of used permissions unique to the malware dataset
are presented. The combination of INTERNET (pms0004) and READ PHONE STATE
(pms0007) is a permission pair that appears frequently in the UUPs. Interest-
ingly, READ LOGS (pms0013) permission appears in one-third of the permission pat-
terns presented in Table 3.14; it is often combined with INTERNET (pms0004) and
ACCESS WIFI LOCATION (pms0012) permissions. The remaining patterns include com-
binations of location-related and SMS permissions.
Table 3.14: Used Permission Patterns Unique to Malware Dataset
Permission Pattern Support Pattern ID
pms0004, pms0007, pms0013 0.4687 MSUPP1
pms0004, pms0008, pms0013 0.432 MSUPP2
pms0004, pms0007, pms0008, pms0013 0.4312 MSUPP3
pms0007, pms0008, pms0013 0.4312 MSUPP4
pms0004, pms0006, pms0013 0.4149 MSUPP5
pms0004, pms0006, pms0007, pms0013 0.4133 MSUPP6
pms0006, pms0007, pms0013 0.4133 MSUPP7
pms0004, pms0006, pms0008, pms0013 0.3855 MSUPP8
pms0006, pms0007, pms0008, pms0013 0.3855 MSUPP9
pms0004, pms0007, pms0012 0.3855 MSUPP10
pms0006, pms0008, pms0013 0.3855 MSUPP11
pms0004, pms0007, pms0008, pms0012 0.3644 MSUPP12
pms0004, pms0008, pms0012 0.3644 MSUPP13
pms0007, pms0008, pms0012 0.3644 MSUPP14
pms0004, pms0007, pms0012, pms0013 0.3521 MSUPP15
pms0004, pms0012, pms0013 0.3521 MSUPP16
pms0007, pms0012, pms0013 0.3521 MSUPP17
pms0004, pms0006, pms0007, pms0012 0.3415 MSUPP18
pms0004, pms0006, pms0012 0.3415 MSUPP19
pms0006, pms0007, pms0012 0.3415 MSUPP20
pms0004, pms0050 0.3358 MSUPP21
pms0004, pms0008, pms0012, pms0013 0.3326 MSUPP22
pms0007, pms0008, pms0012, pms0013 0.3326 MSUPP23
pms0008, pms0012, pms0013 0.3326 MSUPP24
pms0004, pms0006, pms0008, pms0012 0.3318 MSUPP25
pms0006, pms0007, pms0008, pms0012 0.3318 MSUPP26
pms0006, pms0008, pms0012 0.3318 MSUPP27
pms0004, pms0007, pms0050 0.3236 MSUPP28
pms0007, pms0050 0.3236 MSUPP29
pms0004, pms0006, pms0012, pms0013 0.3171 MSUPP30
pms0006, pms0007, pms0012, pms0013 0.3171 MSUPP31
pms0006, pms0012, pms0013 0.3171 MSUPP32
pms0006, pms0008, pms0012, pms0013 0.3073 MSUPP33
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3.6.3 Contrast Required Permission Patterns (CRPP)
In Sections 3.6.1 and 3.6.2, I presented permission patterns (MSRPPs and MSUPPs)
unique to malicious applications only. In Table 3.15, I list the patterns appearing
in both clean and malware datasets. It can be further observed from the support
values that all permission patterns were more prevalent in the malware dataset, as
shown by the negative support diﬀerence values. Permissions, such as INTERNET
(pms0004), READ PHONE STATE (pms0007), ACCESS NETWORK STATE (pms0008) and
ACCESS WIFI STATE (pms0012), were present in diﬀerent combinations and appeared
in more than 40% of the malware dataset.
Table 3.15: Contrasting Required Permission Patterns in both Clean and Malware
Datasets
Permission Pattern Support Diﬀerence Pattern ID
Clean Malware
pms0004, pms0007 0.3185 0.9308 −0.6123 CRPP1
pms0007 0.3245 0.934 −0.6095 CRPP2
pms0055 0.0142 0.6211 −0.6069 CRPP3
pms0007, pms0012 0.0358 0.6309 −0.5951 CRPP4
pms0004, pms0012 0.0611 0.6349 −0.5738 CRPP5
pms0012 0.0625 0.6349 −0.5724 CRPP6
pms0008, pms0012 0.0506 0.6031 −0.5525 CRPP7
pms0007, pms0008 0.2515 0.7906 −0.5391 CRPP8
pms0004, pms0007, pms0008 0.2515 0.7898 −0.5383 CRPP9
pms0007, pms0028 0.0306 0.5453 −0.5147 CRPP10
pms0003, pms0007 0.1429 0.6553 −0.5124 CRPP11
pms0003, pms0004, pms0007 0.1422 0.6545 −0.5123 CRPP12
pms0056 0.0097 0.5159 −0.5062 CRPP13
pms0004, pms0028 0.0499 0.5542 −0.5043 CRPP14
pms0028 0.0566 0.5542 −0.4976 CRPP15
pms0008, pms0028 0.0358 0.5168 −0.481 CRPP16
pms0003, pms0007, pms0008 0.125 0.5624 −0.4374 CRPP17
pms0003, pms0012 0.038 0.4638 −0.4258 CRPP18
pms0050 0.0261 0.4418 −0.4157 CRPP19
pms0012, pms0028 0.0157 0.4263 −0.4106 CRPP20
3.6.4 Contrast Used Permission Patterns (CUPP)
Table 3.16 includes used permission combinations that I found in both clean and
malware datasets. Although the same permission patterns were in both datasets,
the patterns in the malware dataset had higher support values. Those patterns were
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mostly comprised of the following ﬁve permissions: INTERNET (pms0004), VIBRATE
(pms0006), READ PHONE STATE (pms0007), ACCESS NETWORK STATE (pms0008) and
READ LOGS (pms0013). The support diﬀerence for CUPP1 and CUPP2 indicates
the presence of these permission patterns in over 60% of the malware dataset. More-
over, although the READ LOGS (pms0013) permission did not appear in the CRPPs, it
was present in 6 CUPPs namely, CUPP7 - CUPP9, CUPP12, CUPP13, CUPP15 .
Table 3.16: Contrasting Used Permission Patterns in both Clean and Malware
Datasets
Permission Pattern Support Diﬀerence Pattern ID
Clean Malware
pms0004, pms0007 0.2977 0.9153 −0.6176 CUPP1
pms0007 0.3014 0.9169 −0.6155 CUPP2
pms0007, pms0008 0.2367 0.7719 −0.5352 CUPP3
pms0004, pms0007, pms0008 0.2367 0.7719 −0.5352 CUPP4
pms0004, pms0006, pms0007 0.2181 0.6512 −0.4331 CUPP5
pms0006, pms0007 0.2203 0.6529 −0.4326 CUPP6
pms0007, pms0013 0.0603 0.4687 −0.4084 CUPP7
pms0013 0.0759 0.476 −0.4001 CUPP8
pms0004, pms0013 0.0752 0.4711 −0.3959 CUPP9
pms0006, pms0007, pms0008 0.1816 0.5542 −0.3726 CUPP10
pms0004, pms0006, pms0007, pms0008 0.1816 0.5542 −0.3726 CUPP11
pms0008, pms0013 0.067 0.4328 −0.3658 CUPP12
pms0006, pms0013 0.0715 0.4181 −0.3466 CUPP13
pms0007, pms0012 0.0506 0.3855 −0.3349 CUPP14
pms0012, pms0013 0.0283 0.3521 −0.3238 CUPP15
pms0050 0.0268 0.3472 −0.3204 CUPP16
pms0004, pms0012 0.0707 0.3855 −0.3148 CUPP17
pms0012 0.0722 0.3855 −0.3133 CUPP18
pms0008, pms0012 0.0596 0.3644 −0.3048 CUPP19
3.7 Discussion
The Android smartphone has gained in popularity over the last few years. Two main
factors contributing to this change are the open-source nature of the platform and
the ﬂexibility provided to users and developers alike when downloading and develop-
ing Android applications. However, not all applications present on the application
markets, whether oﬃcial or third-party, are clean. Previous work has shown that
malware authors take advantage of the Android permission system to entice users
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into installing unsafe applications. As such, this chapter aims to understand the
required and used permissions of Android applications by applying data mining tech-
niques to ﬁnd permission patterns that can be used to contrast clean and malicious
applications.
In this section, I provide further discussion on the empirical results and their
implications.
3.7.1 Observations from Statistical Analysis
My proposed methodology considers the patterns of both required and used permis-
sions. From the statistical analysis in Section 3.4.2, it can be observed that the
INTERNET permission was both the most required (97.72%) and used (94.62%) per-
mission in the experimental dataset. I also found, as shown in Tables 3.4 and 3.5, that
there was a signiﬁcant diﬀerence in the frequencies of required and used permissions
for clean and malware datasets. This observation was similar with the one made by
Felt et al. [41] who demonstrated that both clean and malicious applications can be
over-privileged. To date, most of the proposed feature representation methods have
only considered required permissions extracted from the AndroidManifest.xml ﬁles.
From the statistical results, it can be argued that used permissions should also be
considered part of the feature set and as such, can further assist in the detection of
malicious applications.
In order to have a comparative distribution of required and used permissions, I
extended the basic statistical analysis by applying the biclustering algorithm to gen-
erate visualization maps. I applied biclustering mainly to visualize the distribution
of required and used permissions and as such, did not aim to identify clusters of per-
missions. Because applications generally requested more permissions than actually
used, the distribution of required permissions for clean and malware datasets was
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sparser than that of used permissions - as illustrated in Figures 3.2a and 3.2b, respec-
tively. The visualization maps can provide researchers and analysts with a ﬁrst-hand
overview of permissions unique to and common between clean and malicious applica-
tions. Furthermore, maps can be used as a substitution for frequency counting, which
is a time-consuming process and requires little or no margin of error.
As Zhou et al. pointed out in [151], the increasing number of malicious appli-
cations is mostly due to the ease of production of repackaged applications. These
repackaged applications often contain additional advertising libraries, malicious code
and most importantly, additional permissions not present in the original applications.
Maps can outline these diﬀerences in permissions for clean and malicious applications.
Subsequently, permission distribution visuals can also portray required and used per-
missions for diﬀerent variants belonging to the same malware family. Hence, maps
can be used for a preliminary analysis of zero-day samples detected by antivirus
companies.
3.7.2 Analysis of Permission Visualizations
According to the biclustering results, several applications, clean or malicious, had
more than one (required and used) permission in common. Conversely, similar ob-
servations for unique required and used permissions on the two datasets were also
obtained. In general, the work of [50,103,153] considered only individual permissions
when studying permission request patterns. Therefore, I put forward a method that
considers co-dependencies between permissions unique to and common amongst clean
and malicious applications. In my work, I applied a data mining technique known
as contrast mining to generate permission patterns that constitute multiple permis-
sions and which can be used to reinforce similarities and contrasts between clean and
malicious applications.
From the ﬁndings, I observed that 25 permissions extracted from the dataset (as
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shown in Table 3.7) out of a total of 133 permissions, appeared frequently in the
permission patterns. Two of the Dangerous permissions, pms0003 and pms0007,
can be implicitly granted to an application that utilizes a speciﬁc set of APIs, as
described in [55]. This indicates that if these two permissions are not recorded as
required permission patterns, they can still be present in used permission patterns.
Upon further investigation, I found that whilst the number of required permissions
for WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE exceeds that of used permissions, the same observation
cannot be made for the READ_PHONE_STATE permission.
3.7.3 Analysis of Contrast Permission Patterns
In Section 3.6, I presented the most signiﬁcant permission patterns generated by
contrast mining. Based on the experimental results, I found that a large number of
required and used permission patterns were only unique in malicious applications.
This was a good indication that permission patterns can be further applied during
the malware detection phase to identify malicious applications. For normal required
permissions, I observed from Table 3.8 that permission patterns, pms0004, pms0007,
pms0012 (MSRPP1) and pms0004, pms0008, pms0012 (MSRPP4) were required by
63% and 60% of the malicious applications in our dataset, respectively. This might
be the case due to the fact that 25% of our experimental malware samples (malicious
applications) belong to the DroidKungFu3 malware family. As demonstrated in [128],
malware samples classiﬁed under DroidKungFu3 attempt to extract the device ID
and any network-related information and then send all the information back to the
attacker’s server.
It can be further observed that for permissions related to SMS, the CALL_PHONE
(pms0033) permission was associated with the SEND_SMS (pms0050), RECEIVE_SMS
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(pms0054), READ_SMS (pms0055) and WRITE_SMS (pms0056), in over 30% of the ma-
licious applications of the dataset, as shown in Appendix A.2. The CALL_PHONE per-
mission allowed an application to make a phone call without going through the usual
dialer interface. Some malware samples exploited the aforementioned permission
combinations to make premium calls and send text messages to premium numbers.
As for the unique used permission patterns in the malware dataset (Table 3.14),
MSUPP1 was used by 47% of the malware samples. Interestingly, I observed the
same permission pattern present in the set of MSRPPs, with the only exception that
it was required by just 20% of the malware samples. The 27% diﬀerence can be
attributed to the observation made in Section 3.7.2 about the READ_PHONE_STATE
permission.
Furthermore, there are several permission patterns which appear in both clean
and malware datasets, as shown in Tables 3.15 and 3.16. It can be observed that the
frequency of occurrence of the contrasting permission patterns (CRPPs and CUPPs)
is higher in the malware dataset than in the clean one. Moreover, using these pat-
terns in an analysis to identify malware will end up producing high false positives
and therefore, in Chapter 4 I only use the MSRPP and MSUPP patterns in my
methodology.
3.8 Summary
In this chapter, I proposed a pattern mining algorithm for generating permission
patterns that can be used for malware prediction. I considered the usage of both
required and used permissions in determining their usefulness when extrapolating the
patterns from a set of clean and malicious applications. Based on the experimental
results, it can be observed there were several permission patterns that did not appear
in the required permission patterns but were present in the used permission patterns
(as shown in Tables 3.15 and 3.16), thus reinforcing the usefulness and importance
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of used permissions in identifying suspicious applications. Additionally, since obfus-
cation methods cannot be applied to Android permissions, the generated permission
patterns can be used to distinguish clean from malicious applications. In the next
chapter, I propose a linear classiﬁer which is capable of taking as input the permission
patterns generated to carry out malware identiﬁcation.
Chapter 4
Android Permission Pattern
Classiﬁer
4.1 Introduction
In Chapter 3, I presented the Contrast Permission Pattern Mining (CPPM) algorithm
to generate permission patterns that can identify similarities and diﬀerences between
clean and malicious Android applications. The patterns comprised of required and
used permissions (recall from Section 3.2). Required and used permissions are ex-
tracted using static and dynamic methods, respectively. In this chapter, I extend the
CPPM approach by applying the generated permission patterns to produce a method
of classifying Android applications into clean, malicious or suspicious.
According to the literature, existing techniques on Android malware identiﬁcation
and classiﬁcation can be categorised into two groups: signature- and behavior-based
methods. For the signature-based methods, distinct features (also known as signa-
tures) are used to identify malicious applications and their variants. As demonstrated
in the following work [17,74,104,143], popular signatures can take the form of permis-
sions. These features are extracted during static analysis of the Android applications
and stored in a repository. On the other hand, the features extracted in behavior-
based classiﬁcation represent the behavioral characteristics of the application. The
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following work [21, 116, 153] considered additional features such as system calls in
their classiﬁcation frameworks.
Although the aforementioned techniques have proven to be very successful on
both the PC and smartphone platforms, they nonetheless carry several drawbacks.
Malware authors can apply obfuscation methods to thwart detection from antivirus
scanners. Moreover, the features used for detection require frequent and recurrent
updates in order to detect zero-day malware out in the wild. One common observation
is that existing detection techniques are unable to eﬃciently detect malware whilst
maintaining an updated version of the signature repository. Therefore, I now propose
a classiﬁcation algorithm which makes use of features extracted both statically and
dynamically. I extend my CPPM algorithm to incorporate the contrasting permission
patterns for feature representation and I propose a novel classiﬁcation algorithm that
can accommodate such patterns.
In spite of the numerous studies on Android permissions and malware classiﬁca-
tion, I identiﬁed the following issues that have been overlooked in existing work.
• Issue 1: Current work only considers single permissions as part of their feature
set. Given that Android malware is currently increasing exponentially, this type
of feature will soon become inadequate for malware detection.
In contrast, I use the malware-speciﬁc permission patterns, MSRPP and MSUPP
generated in Chapter 3 to identify clean applications from malicious ones. I also
propose a linear classiﬁer which is able to handle permission patterns as input
and whose output (based on a single dataset) achieved detection accuracy com-
parable to that achieved by existing classiﬁers.
• Issue 2: It is well-known that malware signatures require frequent updating
in order to prevent newly released malware from bypassing detection. Current
classiﬁers lack the capability of retaining those features critical for malware
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detection.
Existing anti-malware methodologies use feature vectors comprising of individ-
ual permissions and these vectors need to be re-generated when new features are
incorporated into the framework, a task which is time-consuming and reduces
the eﬀectiveness of the anti-malware service.
My proposed permission patterns use support values to indicate their usefulness
during malware detection. In order to update the existing patterns, only the
support values need to be re-calculated which is computationally less expensive
than re-generating feature vectors.
Due to its popularity amongst smartphone users, the Android platform remains
the target of choice through which malware authors can propagate malicious appli-
cations. In order to cope with the increasing number of malware, there is a need for
an eﬃcient and reliable detection mechanism. Although current methods proposed
several techniques to combat malware proliferation, the features used can be easily
bypassed through obfuscation methods.
My Permission Pattern Classiﬁer (PPC) algorithm aims to address the aforemen-
tioned research gaps by using the contrasting permission patterns generated by the
CPPM algorithm (Chapter 3) and applying them to a linear classiﬁer which considers
permission patterns as feature vectors.
4.2 Related Work
Unlike Apple’s application vetting process, Google conducts cloud-based malware
detection after new applications have already been uploaded on the market. In addi-
tion, the company has implemented a mechanism within Android that allows remote
uninstallation of any malicious application after it has been uploaded on the oﬃcial
market [71]. However, it should be noted this does not apply to Android applications
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downloaded from non-oﬃcial markets. As reported by [97,136,153], non-oﬃcial mar-
kets are still popular amongst Android users as these markets provide an extensive
variety of applications otherwise not oﬀered by Google Play - the oﬃcial market.
Hence, there still remains a need to protect Android users from rogue applications
present on non-oﬃcial markets against any misuse of user devices or theft of the
personal information of users.
In this section, I present some anti-malware methodologies for the Android plat-
form that have been proposed in the current literature.
Wu et al. [143] developed a malware detection framework using a broad set of
features, including required permissions, which were extracted via the static method
and stored in binary vector form. K-Means and Expectation-Maximization algorithms
were then applied to generate clusters illustrating the distribution of clean and ma-
licious features. To perform classiﬁcation, the k-Nearest Neighbor (k-NN) and Na¨ıve
Bayes (NB) classiﬁers were used and a classiﬁcation accuracy of 98% was achieved.
The methodology proposed by Sanz et al. [109] is based on features comprised
solely of required permissions. Working with a dataset comprising 1811 clean and 249
malicious applications, the authors observed that only one Android permission was
suﬃcient to convert a clean application into a malicious one. The authors evaluated
their classiﬁcation technique with diﬀerent types of classiﬁers, topped with k-fold
cross-validation. The highest classiﬁcation accuracy was given by the Random Forest
(RF) algorithm - 86%.
In [65], Huang et al. built and evaluated a permission-based malware detector.
Their dataset comprised of 124, 769 clean and 480 malicious applications. The feature
vectors included required permissions extracted from the AndroidManifest.xml ﬁles
amongst a set of other application-related features. Four classiﬁcation algorithms were
applied and the highest accuracy was 81%. The authors pointed out that a limitation
to their proposed method was that the dataset used was highly imbalanced.
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Whilst most of the techniques are only applicable after the (malicious) application
has been installed, Teuﬂ et al. [124] applied a non-traditional approach towards mal-
ware detection by proposing a technique that can detect malware before installation.
The feature set comprised of metadata, including required permissions, which were
extracted from the application market. Semantic pattern transformation techniques
were applied to generate signatures which were then used to detect the presence of
malware on application markets.
Manilyzer, a tool proposed by Feldman et al. [40], extracts static information from
the AndroidManifext.xml ﬁle of an Android application and automatically generates
the feature vectors for malware classiﬁcation. The feature set considered included
required permissions and the classiﬁcation algorithms used were NB, k-NN, C4.5
Decision Tree and Support Vector Machine. The classiﬁers were applied to a dataset of
307 malware and 310 clean Android applications. The highest accuracy produced by
the proposed methodology was 90%, with false positives and false negatives averaging
around 10%.
All the above related work incorporated required permissions as part of the feature
vectors. However, there are other classiﬁcation frameworks [21,68,142,147] that take
into account additional types of features, including the sequence of API calls, data
ﬂow graphs and control ﬂow graphs, as well as characteristics that could help the
detection and classiﬁcation of Android malware.
In the next section, I provide further details on my proposed classiﬁcation algo-
rithm, including a description of the selection of features.
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4.3 Android Permission Pattern Classiﬁcation
4.3.1 Permission Pattern Selection
In Chapter 3, I proposed the CPPM algorithm as a feature representation method
to extrapolate meaningful permission patterns for any given dataset. I also consid-
ered required and used permissions as part of the patterns because such permissions
capture both the static and dynamic characteristics of an application. Based on the
empirical results, four types of permission patterns were generated: MSRPP, MSUPP,
CRPP and CUPP - as described in Section 3.6.
For the purpose of malware identiﬁcation, I retain only the permission patterns
from MSRPP and MSUPP as they are only present in the malware dataset and can
be expected, therefore, to contribute towards distinguishing clean applications from
malicious ones. The CRPP and CUPP patterns are discarded in this chapter as they
are present in both clean and malware datasets, and could ultimately confuse the
classiﬁer into outputting high false positives and false negatives. In Table 4.1, I list
the number of selected patterns to be used as features for my proposed classiﬁcation
algorithm. In order to have a better understanding of how informative and useful the
patterns are during the classiﬁcation phase, I select those patterns generated with
support values of 30%, 40% and 50% for MSRPP and MSUPP, respectively.
Table 4.1: Number of permission patterns selected
Type of Permission Patterns Number of Permission Patterns
Support0.3 Support0.4 Support0.5
MSRPP 185 52 23
MSUPP 33 7 0
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 depict the breakdown of the selected MSRPP and MSUPP
patterns. In these Figures, the term ‘Level i’ refers to a permission pattern set
containing i permissions. These patterns were generated using the CPPM algorithm
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and the four sub-datasets, as described in Sections 3.5.1 and 3.5.2.
According to the ﬁgures, no singleton subsets and no subsets with more than four
permissions occur as patterns (see Appendix A.2 for the full list). This observation
conﬁrms that individual permissions and patterns with more than four permissions
carry low support values compared to those from Level 2, 3 and 4, and ultimately are
not signiﬁcant when representing characteristics of an application.
Figure 4.1: Breakdown of selected MSRPP patterns
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Figure 4.2: Breakdown of selected MSUPP patterns
To evaluate my proposed classiﬁcation algorithm, I apply the same dataset used
in Chapter 3. The malware dataset includes 1227 applications and 1350 applications
in the clean dataset. In the next part of this section, I introduce the classiﬁcation
framework and describe the proposed classiﬁcation algorithm.
4.3.2 Permission Pattern Classiﬁer Algorithm
In this subsection, I describe the Permission Pattern Classiﬁer (PPC) to per-
form Android malware detection using the MSRPP and MSUPP patterns. Figure 4.3
illustrates the overall classiﬁcation process. In the Feature Extraction and Represen-
tation phase, the CPPM algorithm (Chapter 3) is applied to generate the MSRPP
and MSUPP patterns. The patterns are then used for the prediction phase.
71
Figure 4.3: Overview of PPC Framework
Generally, the traditional malware classiﬁcation methodologies use binary feature
vectors, such as Decision Trees [40] and Random Forest [111] that are applied to
existing machine learning classiﬁers. For instance, given:
M = {a1, a2, ..., aN} (4.3.1)
where M is a malware dataset comprising of N Android malicious applications ai,
then the global list of features, F , extracted from the malware dataset is represented
by
F = {p1, p2, ..., pt} (4.3.2)
where t is total number of features. A feature vector for an element ai ofM is denoted
as follows:
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Fai = {pai1 , pai2 , ..., pait }where paij =
⎧⎨
⎩
0, if pj is not present in ai
1, if pj is present in ai
(4.3.3)
Such a feature representation method is eﬃcient for malware classiﬁcation based
on singletons, rather than on larger subsets of F . Furthermore, the larger the number
of features, the higher the computational complexity and risk of including additional
unnecessary information in the classiﬁers. To include feature representation based
on subsets of F while maintaining low computational complexity, I propose PPC, a
linear classiﬁer based on the Boosting and Perceptron algorithms, which are described
in the subsection below.
4.3.2.1 Boosting Algorithm
Schapire [112, 114] proposed the Boosting algorithm as a method to convert a weak
learning classiﬁer into one that achieves high accuracy. Instead of aiming for a single,
highly accurate prediction rule, Schapire’s method considered a set of rough rules
that are moderately accurate and which are generated by the weak learning classiﬁer.
The Boosting algorithm begins by calling the weak learning algorithm repeatedly
and feeds it a diﬀerent subset of training examples on each repetition. In turn, the
weak learning classiﬁer generates a weak prediction rule on each iteration and after a
number of rounds, the boosting algorithm combines the weak prediction rules into one
single prediction rule. Schapire’s empirical results demonstrated that the combination
of weak prediction rules produced higher accuracy than any individual weak rules.
Algorithm 1 summarizes the above explanation.
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Algorithm 1: Overview of Boosting Algorithm
Data: Given: (x1, y1),...,(xm, ym) where permission pattern xi ∈ X and yi ∈
{1,-1} represents a class label, m is the number of samples in the
dataset, and is a ﬁxed integer ≥ 1 and T is a positive integer bound.
1 Initialize distribution, D1(i) =
1
m
for i = 1, ...,m to assign a weight to each m;
2 for t = 1, 2,...,T rounds: do
• Train Weak Learner algorithm using distribution, Dt
• Find weak prediction rule:
ht : X −→ {1,−1} with error rate, αt designed to avoid overweighting
correctly classiﬁed of X
• Update:
Dt+1(i) =
Dt(i)
Zt
×
⎧⎨
⎩
e−αt, if yi = ht(xi)
eαt, if yi = ht(xi)
,
where Zt is a normalization constant so that the right-hand side sums to 1
3 Output ﬁnal classiﬁer: H(x) = sign (
∑T
t=1 αt ht (x))
The boosting algorithm is the main underlying classiﬁer for my proposed malware
prediction method, PPC. It takes as input the patterns from MSRPP and uses their
corresponding support values as the weights. The algorithm will generate a weak
prediction rule for each round, t and output the ﬁnal classiﬁer, H(x), by combining
all the rules after T rounds.
4.3.2.2 Perceptron Algorithm
As mentioned in Section 4.3.2.1, the Boosting algorithm requires a weak learning
algorithm to generate weak prediction rules. As a choice of a weak learning algorithm,
I make use of the Perceptron algorithm that was proposed by Frank Rosenblatt [106].
Perceptron can be applied for supervised classiﬁcation, that is, the algorithm learns
from training data and is then tested on testing data. It is also apt for handling
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binary classes (in this case, malware and cleanware) that are linearly separable. The
main idea of the algorithm is to divide the two classes by a linear separator, which
is a (n − 1)-dimensional hyperplane in a n-dimensional space, and generate a weak
prediction rule as follows:
Given (x1, y1),...,(xm, ym) where instance xi ∈ X and yi ∈ {1,-1} represents a class
label, the weak learning classiﬁer will generate a weak prediction rule by computing
a series of weights, wi (in my case, the support value of the permission pattern), so
that if
m∑
i=1
wixi > 0, (4.3.4)
return 1 otherwise −1, as shown in Algorithm 2.
4.3.2.3 Permission Pattern Classiﬁer
The MSRPP and MSUPP patterns are used as features for Algorithm 2 which runs
in polynomial time. I explain the algorithm using only the MSRPPs as an example,
however, the same procedure applies when working with MSUPPs. Each feature, xi
in X for the set of MSRPPs is assigned the support value calculated in Section 3.5.1
as a weight. This ensures that the features with high support values are given priority
over the ones with low support. PPC randomly selects a set of training samples, Dt to
input into the weak learning algorithm, WeakLearner, which then generates the weak
prediction rule ht with error rate εt. For the next iteration, the distribution Dt+1(i)
is computed and selected as shown by Line 13. The purpose of αt is to ensure that
incorrectly classiﬁed samples are given more importance in the next iteration and Zt
is a constant such that
∑m
i=1Dt+1(i) = 1 so that the training error can be reduced
rapidly. The new distribution is then used as input to WeakLearner to output a new
weak prediction rule. The steps from Lines 3-13 are repeated for T = 10 rounds.
Generally, T is chosen as a relatively small number as the algorithm will overﬁt if run
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for too many rounds. At the end of the algorithm, the ﬁnal prediction is calculated
by combining all the weak prediction rules.
Algorithm 2: Permission Pattern Classiﬁer (PPC)
Require: Set of MSRPP (or MSUPP), X = {x1, .., xm}
Experimental Dataset (from Chapter 3), D = {1, ..., n}
Class labels, yi ∈ {1,-1}
Weak learning algorithm, WeakLearner
Integer T , specifying number of iterations
Ensure: Each xi in X is assigned a support value as its initial weight, wi
1: for t = 1,2,3,..,T rounds do
2: Randomly select distribution, Dt from D
3: Call WeakLearner. Given distribution Dt with instances x1, ..., xm ∈ X do:
4: total ← ∑mi=1wixi
5: if total > 0 then
6: return 1
7: else
8: return -1
9: end if
10: Generate hypothesis, ht : x → {1,-1} with error rate, t = FP+FNTP+TN+FP+FN
11: Construct D(t+1):
12: Given Dt and ht
13: Dt+1(i) =
Dt(i)
Zt
×
⎧⎨
⎩
e−αt , if yi = ht(xi)
eαt , if yi = ht(xi)
where Zt is a normalization constant
so that the right-hand side sums to 1, αt =
t
1−t and t = Pri∼Dt [ht(xi) = yi]
is the probability that under distribution Dt, the predicted class ht(xi) does
not equal to the true class yi
14: end for
15: return Final classiﬁer: Hfinal = sign (
∑T
t=1 αt ht (x)), where sign will predict
whether x is malicious (-ve) or clean (+ve)
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4.4 Experimental Evaluation
In Section 4.3, I introduced my proposed classiﬁer, PPC, to perform malware classiﬁ-
cation using the patterns from MSRPP and MSUPP. Given the nature of the permis-
sion patterns generated in Chapter 3, I argued in Section 4.3.1 that the conventional
feature vector representation will not be suitable for permission patterns. To evalu-
ate both the classiﬁer and the signiﬁcance of the selected patterns from MSRPP and
MSUPP, I built a generic classiﬁcation framework and used a selected set of classiﬁ-
cation algorithms from WEKA1 to compare against the performance of my proposed
classiﬁer, PPC.
4.4.1 Comparative Classiﬁcation Model
Figure 4.4 illustrates the framework for the comparative classiﬁcation model (CCM).
The framework depicts the following phases: feature extraction, feature represen-
tation, training and testing of classiﬁers. I selected ﬁve popularly used classiﬁers,
according to current literature, from the WEKA library. They are Na¨ıve Bayes
(NB), Instance-Based 1 (IB1), Decision Table (DT), Random Forest (RF) and J48.
Adaboost [113] was added to these base classiﬁers to improve their performance. Ad-
ditionally, I applied a 10-fold cross validation during the classiﬁcation process in order
to avoid overﬁtting.
The diﬀerent phases involved in CCM can be summarized in the following steps:
• Step 1 : Extract Required and Used permissions.
• Step 2 : Generate global Required permission list, Freq and Used permission
list Fused, according to Equation 4.3.2.
1http://www.cs.waikato.ac.nz/ml/weka/
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• Step 3 : For each sample in the malware and clean datasets, check the occurrence
of each permission from Freq and create a feature vector for each sample, as
shown in Equation 4.3.3.
• Step 4 : Split both the malware and clean datasets into 10 parts.
• Step 5 : For each dataset, use 9 parts to build the training set and remaining 1
part for the testing set.
• Step 6 : For each dataset, select WEKA classiﬁers and apply training set.
• Step 7 : Evaluate using testing set
• Step 8 : Repeat Steps 3-7 with the global Used permission list, Fused.
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Figure 4.4: Overview of CCM Framework
4.4.2 Experimental Results
In this section, I elaborate on the empirical results. I begin by introducing and
describing the metrics used to assess the performance of the classiﬁers.
The classiﬁcation work presented in this thesis uses a 2-class label, 1 (also referred
to as Positive P) and −1 (also referred to as Negative N). As mentioned in Section 4.3
and 4.4.1, the classiﬁcation process includes two phases: the training (learning) phase
and the testing (evaluating) phase. The classiﬁers trained during the learning phase
assign a class to each sample from the testing set; some assignments could be correct
while other might possibly be wrong. To interpret the classiﬁcation results, I count
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the number of True Positive (TP), True Negative (TN), False Positive (FP) (samples
that were originally negative but later classiﬁed as positive) and False Negative (FN)
(samples that were originally positive but later classiﬁed as negative) - as shown in
Table 4.2. Given the above information, the following formulae [39] can be applied
to calculate:
Accuracy = (TP+TN)
(P+N)
Precision = TP
(TP+FP )
Recall = TP
(TP+FN)
Accuracy, usually expressed in percentage, refers to the overall correctness of the
classiﬁer and is calculated as the sum of correct classiﬁcations, that is, (TP + TN),
divided by the total number of classiﬁcations. The accuracy results for the PPC and
CCM models are shown in Table 4.2. Precision is a measure of accuracy given that
a speciﬁc class has been predicted and Recall measures the ability of a classiﬁer to
select instances of a certain class from a dataset. The Precision and Recall results
are illustrated in Figures 4.5 and 4.6.
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Figure 4.5: Precision and Recall for Required Permissions
Figure 4.6: Precision and Recall for Used Permissions
4.5 Discussion
In this section, I present the empirical results and provide an analysis by elaborating
on the performance of the CCM and PPC frameworks. I then introduce the reasons
for the ineﬃciency of smartphone antivirus applications, specially in relation to the
privacy of users’ personal information.
4.5.1 Experimental Results
As shown in Table 4.2, the highest accuracy (96%) in the CCM framework was pro-
duced by the Random Forest classiﬁer, and the lowest accuracy (92%) was produced
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by the Na¨ıve Bayes classiﬁer. These classiﬁers only used features comprising indi-
vidual required permissions and the binary feature vectors were used as input for
the WEKA classiﬁers. The FP rate was on average 3%, thus implying that 3% of
the samples were wrongly classiﬁed as positive. On the other hand, it was observed
that an average of 4% of the samples were false negatives; that is, wrongly classiﬁed
as negatives. The Precision and Recall values for all ﬁve classiﬁers were similar, as
shown in Figure 4.5. Generally, the prediction of classiﬁers was 95% precise and the
Recall value, 96%.
The classiﬁcation accuracy for binary feature vectors comprising of used permis-
sions was slightly lower than that of required permissions - as noted in the second
half of Table 4.2. However, both used and required permissions had the same clas-
siﬁer generating the lowest accuracy (Na¨ıve Bayes). Random Forest and J48 both
produced the highest accuracy (93%) using the set of used permissions as features.
Overall, the FP rate was an average of 5% and the FN rate was an average of 8%. One
reason for slightly higher false positives and false negatives for used permissions could
be the diﬀerence in the number of used and required permissions extracted from the
clean and malicious datasets. This conﬁrms the observation that applications often
request more required permissions than they actually need (used permissions). As for
Precision and Recall, all ﬁve WEKA selected classiﬁers had similar values except for
a 0.04 diﬀerence for IB1, Random Forest and J48 - as illustrated in Figure 4.6.
In addition to outperforming each of the ﬁve WEKA classiﬁers, the PPC algo-
rithm also generated consistent values for Precise and Recall, as illustrated in Fig-
ures 4.5 and 4.6. This demonstrates that while the proposed algorithm may not have
achieved 100% classiﬁcation accuracy, which may be partly due to the small number
of patterns used as input, it did consistently predict the same class, thus conﬁrming
that the underlying methodology of the classiﬁer is suitable for permission pattern
classiﬁcation.
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4.5.2 Analysis of Results
I proposed the PPC algorithm as a methodology for taking permission patterns as
input to identify malware from clean applications. I began by selecting the MSRPP
patterns with support values greater than 30%, 40% and 50%, and used them as input
to the proposed classiﬁer. The selected MSRPPs with support values greater than
30% produced comparable accuracy (97%) with the best WEKA classiﬁers (96%).
It also generated low false positives and false negatives. On the other hand, the
selected MSUPPs did not perform well during the prediction phase as shown by the
low accuracies in Table 4.2. This led me to conjecture that the patterns comprising
used permissions may be ignored when identifying malware as they do not seem to
add any useful information to the classiﬁer. Additionally, I also highlight the fact
that the results in Chapters 3 and 4 are based on a single dataset and may not be
indicative of results obtainable from other datasets.
Although I had initially expected used permissions to be important in detecting
malware, my experiments in fact showed that this does not appear to be the case.
On the other hand, the required permission patterns were very useful and critical
to the performance of PPC. As listed in Table 3.6 from Section 3.6, my CPPM
algorithm generated more patterns for required permissions compared to that of used
permissions. Based on the accuracy (97%) produced by MSRPPs, I argue that these
permission patterns may carry meaningful information additional to the features used
by the WEKA classiﬁers.
Furthermore, due to an exponential increase in Android malware, antivirus com-
panies cannot aﬀord to perform in-depth analysis on every suspicious application.
The permission patterns generated by the CPPM algorithm can be used for triage in
ﬁrst determining with high probability whether a newly detected application is clean,
malicious, or highly suspicious and in need of further investigation. This capability
does not exist for the features used by the WEKA classiﬁers.
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The MSRPP and MSUPP patterns (from Sections 3.6.1 and 3.6.2) are speciﬁc to
the malware dataset only and can therefore be used to diﬀerentiate between clean and
malicious applications during the triage process. On the other hand, the contrasting
permission patterns, CRPP and CUPP (from Sections 3.6.3 and 3.6.4) can be applied
to identify highly suspicious applications. If an application has a permission pattern
which appears in both clean and malicious datasets, the support value of that pattern
can be used to determine if the application is highly present in the clean or malicious
dataset.
4.5.3 Observations about Privacy Implications
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 deal with smartphone application security, in particular, An-
droid malware identiﬁcation. In Chapter 3, I proposed a novel feature representation
method to generate contrasting permission patterns. I discovered that the contrast-
ing permission patterns (as shown in Tables 3.15 and 3.16) appear frequently in the
malware dataset. In Chapter 4, I proposed a linear classiﬁer that used the permission
patterns as features in order to identify malware.
By late 2012, there was a shift in the antivirus industry’s perception of smart-
phone security. Given the nature of the smartphone ecosystem and the thousands
of applications available for use, it was no longer suﬃcient to only be able to detect
malicious applications. It became vital to protect the personal information stored on
the device and accessed by applications. Lookout was one of the ﬁrst antivirus com-
panies to incorporate privacy controls in its smartphone antivirus application [131].
This further conﬁrmed that application privacy is deemed by the industry to be as
important as application security; however achieving application privacy does pose a
challenging research problem.
In the remainder of this thesis, I investigate users’ privacy by studying
the causes and impact of information leaks by clean applications.
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4.6 Summary
In this chapter, I presented a linear classiﬁer, PPC, which is capable of using the
MSRPP and MSUPP patterns to perform malware prediction. I identiﬁed a set of
permission patterns that are unique to the malware dataset only and can be used
to identify Android malware with accuracy comparable to the best generic classiﬁers
from WEKA. Whilst the classiﬁcation accuracies for used permission patterns were
not favorable, the Precision and Recall values conﬁrm that the PPC algorithm can
consistently generate the same prediction rule. Theoretical analysis and empirical
results thus demonstrated that the proposed classiﬁer is able to handle permission
patterns for malware identiﬁcation. Additionally, the required and used permissions
can be used to perform preliminary triage during malware detection. I also remind
the reader of the fact that the results in Chapters 3 and 4 are based on a single dataset
and may not be indicative of results obtained from other datasets. Application of my
method to more datasets is required in future work. In the next chapter, I investigate
the privacy implications of information leaks by clean applications.
Chapter 5
Smartphone Application Privacy
5.1 Introduction
For a long time, privacy was included under the umbrella of the term security. During
the PC era, privacy was not much of a concern as a majority of the most commonly
used software was released by major software companies, thus centralizing all eﬀorts to
protect unwarranted disclosure and misuse of users’ personal information. A famous
illustration by Peter Steiner published in 19931, with the caption: “On the Internet,
nobody knows you’re a dog” portrayed the idea of preserving a user’s identify on the
Internet; however, the same no longer applies in today’s world.
The proliferation of the smartphone has changed the landscape of personal in-
formation privacy. It is no longer a matter of being able to diﬀerentiate between
clean and malicious applications, but also, whether or not a legitimate application is
misusing users’ personal information without their knowledge.
5.1.1 Deﬁnition of Privacy
While many deﬁnitions of privacy have been proposed, broadly, privacy can be deﬁned
as “a state in which one is not observed or disturbed by other people”. For the purpose
of my work, I focus on privacy in the context of users’ personal information accessed
1http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2397604,00.asp
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by smartphone applications. Therefore, I refer to privacy as the non-disclosure of
user’s personal information without their consent.
5.1.2 Privacy versus Security
There is an on-going debate regarding the dichotomy of privacy and security, specif-
ically regarding the usage of personal information by smartphone applications. I
consider privacy as unauthorised access and disclosure of personal information, while
security refers to the protection of hardware and software from malicious attacks.
Current anti-malware techniques are not equipped to detect unauthorised access or
misuse of users’ information by clean applications, and this increases the importance
of providing privacy controls on the smartphone platform.
5.2 Smartphone Application Privacy
5.2.1 Importance of Application Privacy
The usage of smartphones has increased exponentially in the last three years with
smartphones currently outselling PCs and laptops. These highly powered devices
allow users to communicate and do business without being restricted to a physical
location. In order to have the convenience of carrying out such tasks anywhere, users
have to provide an extensive set of personal information in order for the device to
function properly. As such, smartphones are considered to be more personal than PCs
and laptops. This in turn has caused the commercial value of personal information
to grow exponentially [34, 46].
While privacy mechanisms are available on the PC platform, they do not port
well onto that of the smartphone. On the PC, most of the communication takes
place via the Internet and thus, it has been suﬃcient to protect web browsers from
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privacy invasions. One such example is the ‘Do Not Track’2 option oﬀered by browsers
that allows users to choose whether they would like third-parties to track their online
activities. This type of privacy mechanism has yet to propagate across the smartphone
OS.
Other important aspect of application privacy is the inter-operability of applica-
tions on the smartphone. In order to provide a better user experience, smartphone
platforms allow applications to share data amongst each other so that the device owner
is not repeatedly prompted for the same information. This functionality puts users’
personal information at further risk as users are unaware of which applications are
implicitly gaining access to their conﬁdential information. Several papers [15, 64, 76]
have investigated the implementation of privacy policies to allow users to control
access to their information.
In the next subsection, I brieﬂy describe the two main vectors that facilitate
breaches of privacy.
5.2.2 Avenues for Privacy Breaches
Advertising - Generally, the business model that underpins many online services is
one that allows the consumer to take advantage of services free of charge while
the cost of providing these services is ﬁnanced by advertising revenues. There-
fore, while users do not as a rule pay in monetary terms, they do contribute
personal information about themselves. Since smartphone users are often at-
tracted to free applications, these expose them to a high risk of having their
information recorded by advertising companies.
Location Information - While smartphone applications can legitimately request
access to users’ location information, companies have a keen interest in such data
as it is useful for targeted advertising, as shown in [62]. Shops and restaurants
2http://donottrack.us/
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in the vicinity of a smartphone user may SMS them a discount coupon to entice
them to purchase something.
5.3 Related Work
In this section, I present some of the existing work about location- and advertising-
based privacy protection for smartphone users.
Gibler et al. [52] proposed AndroidLeaks, a tool which makes use of static analysis
to automate the discovery of potential leaks of sensitive information. The authors
focused on tracking private information ﬂow in Android applications by initially cre-
ating a permission map. The map included the relationships between Android API
calls and the permissions they required to execute applications. This information
was then used to identify sources (Java code that accesses personal data) and sinks
(Java code that facilitates the communication of personal data to external parties).
As a next step, the tool generates call graphs to determine the potential occurrence
of information leaks. Gibler et al. considered four types of leaks: (i) device unique
identiﬁers, (ii) information related to user location (iii) access to WiFi networks and
(iv) recorded audio. AndroidLeaks was evaluated on a dataset of 24, 350 applications
where 7, 414 were found to have the capability to leak information. Additionally, 65%
of the total phone data-related leaks were caused by advertising libraries.
Beresford et al. [16] addressed the issue of personal information leaks by proposing
a modiﬁed version of the Android platform called MockDroid. The proposed method
oﬀers Android users the power to decide whether they want an application to access
their personal information during run-time. If they choose to decline, MockDroid
will then supply fake data to the applications without breaching the users’ privacy.
This technique ensures that the application functionalities are not compromised while
allowing the users to still use it. The authors evaluated their work on a dataset com-
prising of 23 applications, collected from Google Play. The applications were split
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into two categories, Internet and local, depending on whether or not they required
access to remote data to function properly. The empirical results showed that the
applications were able to execute successfully when provided with faked location and
Internet information. One downside of the proposed framework is its practicality
amongst novice users as they are required to have a good understanding of the mod-
iﬁed Android platform.
The work of Henne et al. [63] addresses a similar problem to that presented in [16].
The proposed methodology allows Android users to restrict the accuracy of location
information that is supplied to applications. The authors used the existing Android
OS and applied obfuscation algorithms to prevent disclosure of users’ location infor-
mation. The framework’s conﬁguration is done via the Settings application and can
be applied to all applications installed on the device. There are three components
involved in this methodology - modelling of location privacy algorithms, application
of conﬁgured algorithms to location requests and extension of the Settings application
to allow users to apply customised settings for each application requesting location
information. The authors successfully implemented their proposal; however, empir-
ical results showed that users might experience a minimal delay if they choose to
obfuscate their location information during application run-time.
In [38], Fawaz et al. proposed a diﬀerent implementation of the tool proposed
in [63]. The new framework, called Location Privacy Guardian, provides client-side
privacy protection. Instead of simply obfuscating all location information as in [63],
the authors allowed the users to choose whether they prefer to share, completely
block or anonymize their location information on a per-application basis. However,
if the new methodology deduces that it is not safe to release the user’s location, it
automatically replaces the information with fake data instead. The tool was evaluated
on 180 smartphone users and the authors pointed out that privacy protection was
achieved at the expense of a tolerable loss in application functionality.
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Agarwal and Hall [3] designed a framework that allowed iOS users to mask their
private information thus permitting them to send anonymized data to third-parties.
The authors used a technique referred to as crowdsourcing to allow real users to con-
tribute towards building a knowledge base of privacy recommendations. The privacy
recommendations were then tested on a dataset of 10, 000 most popular applications.
The proposed framework was able to successfully provide recommendations resulting
in improved privacy for 97.1% of the applications in the experimental dataset
Egele et al. [33] took a proactive approach towards detection of personal infor-
mation leaks in iPhone applications and proposed a tool, PiOS, which can statically
detect any data leaks in an application. The authors explained that PiOS can auto-
matically generate control ﬂow graphs which are then used to identify any information
leaks to external sources. To evaluate their tool, a dataset of 1, 400 iPhone applica-
tions was used. Egele et al. observed that the two most common information leaks
were the unique device identiﬁer (leaked by 195 applications) and location information
(leaked by 36 applications).
The aforementioned work focused on location privacy for Android users. The re-
search community has also put forward new methodologies that address non-disclosure
of personal information via advertising libraries. I brieﬂy mention some of the current
literature.
Grace et al. [60] collected and studied 100, 000 applications from the oﬃcial An-
droid market. The authors developed a static tool, AdRisk, to extract and analyze
advertising libraries from the applications in the dataset. The main observation was
that most advertising libraries collect some form of personal information, which could
lead to potential misuse. They found that one particular advertising library, used by
4, 190 applications in the dataset, allowed a variety of personal information to be
directly accessible to the advertisers. Moreover, it was observed that the users were
exposed to further risk when advertising libraries downloaded additional code during
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runtime from remote servers and executed it while the host application was running.
Stevens et al. [119] extended the study presented in [60] by analyzing the simi-
larities and diﬀerences of in-browser and in-application advertisements. The authors
began by analyzing privacy concerns unique to Android advertising providers com-
pared to in-browser advertising. They investigated the third-party libraries of 13
advertising companies with the aim of understanding which permissions are required
by the libraries and subsequent potential leaks of personal information. On the other,
Leontiadis et al. [75] focused on a market-aware privacy protection framework which
aimed to achieve equilibrium between the application developer’s revenue and user’s
privacy. The authors noted that the misuse of personal information by advertising
libraries was highly driven by the revenue generated from targeted advertising; thus,
rigid privacy protection mechanisms could lead to the breakdown of the application
advertising ecosystem. As a solution, Leontiadis et al. proposed a feedback control
loop that adjusted the level of privacy protection based on the revenue generated
from the in-application advertisements.
5.4 Research Challenges
On the PC platform, malware detection and classiﬁcation is of predominant concern.
However, the nature of the smartphone business model has led researchers to shift
from primarily focusing on malware propagation to considering the privacy threats on
smartphone applications. Smartphone users are mainly attracted to free applications.
The hidden cost of downloading these applications is the risk of having users’ personal
information leaked to external parties without their knowledge.
In this section, I present the two main research challenges considered in the re-
mainder of this thesis. I used the Android platform to evaluate my proposed method-
ologies.
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(i) Causes and Impact of Personal Information Leaks
From the literature review, I observed that while several proposed methodologies
investigated the detection of information leaks using either static or dynamic
analysis, there has been no attempt at detection by applying both static and
dynamic methods which may provide a better understanding of the causes of
leaks in applications.
In my proposed method, I selected a subset of clean applications from the dataset
used in Chapters 3 and 4 to investigate the causes and impact of personal
information leaks. The methodology I used includes dynamic execution, reverse-
engineering techniques and static analysis of the applications in a sandboxed
environment.
(ii) Prevention of Personal Information Leaks
The Android platform allows its users to opt in and out of tracking via advertis-
ing libraries and location services. The empirical results from my work dealing
with (i) led me to examine the eﬃcacy of built-in tracking settings provided by
smartphones. By doing so, I aim to have a better understanding of the privacy
protection provided by the smartphone platform owners.
To conduct my investigation, I used a dataset of Android applications down-
loaded from the oﬃcial market and deployed a man-in-the-middle attack to
intercept real-time traﬃc to and from smartphone applications.
5.5 Summary
In this chapter, I introduced the context of smartphone application privacy. I began
with a general deﬁnition of privacy and explained its importance in the smartphone
ecosystem. I then mentioned the two major avenues for privacy breaches and the
related work in this area. I concluded by outlining the shortcomings of the existing
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work which led to the statements of research questions investigated in this thesis. For
each research question, I brieﬂy stated my proposed methodologies, which address
the research challenges considered in Chapters 6 and 7.
Chapter 6
Understanding Information Leaks
6.1 Introduction
A major challenge in the development and provision of smartphone applications has
been the business model [32]; however, this now seems to be solved by means of
advertising revenue. Application developers earn revenue from in-application adver-
tisements and are thus encouraged to market their application free of charge; in fact,
the more advertising libraries they embed in their applications, the higher the rev-
enue. However, embedded advertisements connect to the operating system level and
are diﬃcult to remove once the application is installed.
Google oﬀers an advertisement Software Development Kit (SDK) that allows An-
droid developers to add advertisements into their applications to generate revenue [8].
Once an Android user clicks on an advertisement, the system exposes a web browser,
and the web server might then invoke collection of the IMEI code identifying the
mobile device; such a web server may also invoke the IMSI number found in the
Subscriber Identiﬁcation Module (SIM) card. Researchers [5, 35, 98] have found ap-
plications in the applications markets which send the phone identiﬁer and SIM card
serial number to developers without the knowledge of the mobile user.
Android applications are available on both the oﬃcial and non-oﬃcial application
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markets. The oﬃcial market, Google Play, vets new applications by conducting a
cloud-based malware detection, which regularly tests the applications to make sure
they do not contain malicious binaries. In contrast, the applications available on the
non-oﬃcial markets are managed by individuals and businesses and are not checked
to determine if they are clean. While downloading applications from the non-oﬃcial
markets therefore represents a known threat to users, the attraction is that they oﬀer
unique applications not available elsewhere [86]. The numbers of applications avail-
able and the numbers downloaded from both markets are increasing at exponential
rates [7, 96]
While it is no surprise that malicious applications are capable of stealing or leak-
ing device information to third-parties without user permission, it is disturbing that
applications classiﬁed as non-malicious do so. Additionally, one might hypothesize
that applications from the non-oﬃcial markets would be more likely to leak conﬁden-
tial data than those from the oﬃcial market. In order to test this hypothesis, the aim
of my experimental work is to examine a set of Android applications, all identiﬁed
as being clean, to conﬁrm if they leak any data identifying the device or its user. I,
therefore, formulate the following research questions:
1. Given a set of non-malicious applications, what are the causes of information
leaks?
2. In the event of an information leak, is it possible to detect what data is leaked,
how, why, and where it is leaked to?
To facilitate the diﬀerentiation between types of applications, I deﬁne the following
terms, which I will frequently refer to in this chapter:
• An application is malicious if it is specially designed to harm a smartphone
or the application running on the device. Such behaviour is usually identiﬁed
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by antivirus software products using techniques such as application behavioural
signature matching.
• An application is clean if it has not been identiﬁed as malicious by antivirus
engines.
• An application is leaky if, unknown to the user (by this I mean no alerts appear
at the instant a leak takes place), it sends information related to the user’s
device or data stored on the hardware to external parties (such as advertising or
analytics companies). Given that leaky applications are not formally classiﬁed
as malware by antivirus companies, we can assume that a leaky application may
take the form of either a clean or a malicious application.
6.2 Related Work
The Android platform uses a permission mechanism to control access to restricted
resources on the smartphone. These permissions are generally deﬁned in the Android-
Manifest.xml ﬁle and require the user to accept them upon application installation.
In [43], Felt et al. investigated the eﬀectiveness of install-time permission systems
in Android applications. They demonstrated that such permissions can be advanta-
geous compared to the traditional user-based permissions system; for example, the
install-time permission system ensures that a vulnerable application, present in the
host system, will not aﬀect the functionalities of other applications, whilst in the case
of a traditional user-based permissions system, all applications are treated equally.
However, the authors also found that users are so frequently presented with warning
messages about permission requests that they are inclined to be careless about the use
of those permissions once granted. I demonstrate, in my work, that application de-
velopers are similarly careless about permissions since they are driven by the revenue
earned from in-application advertising.
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Felt et al. [41] developed a tool, Stowaway, to detect over-privileged applications;
these are applications which have more permissions than are actually required to
execute. They manually generated a permission map for the entire Android system,
which deﬁned the relationship between an API call and the permissions it required
for execution. Stowaway included a static analysis component, which took as input
an application, disassembled and parsed it through the Java classes to collect the API
calls deﬁned in each method. The tool then compared the API call with the permission
map to check if the correct permission had been assigned. I note that Stowaway is an
eﬃcient tool which ensures that application developers do not request unnecessary
permissions for their applications. However, the tool cannot diﬀerentiate between the
permissions that can cause data leaks and those required for the execution of the
application.
As stated in Section 6.1, in-application advertising is a major source of revenue
for application developers. The service is provided by advertising companies such as
AdMob [125] which distribute pre-packaged advertising libraries to be embedded in
existing applications in order to allow the developers to earn revenue. Fundamentally,
advertising libraries inherit the same permissions granted to their host applications.
Nevertheless, application developers also have the possibility of including additional
permissions, which can be used to enhance targeted-advertising, thereby generating
more revenue. Unfortunately, unnecessary permissions can inadvertently introduce
vulnerabilities within the functionalities of the application; for example, causing data
to leak through advertisements.
Shekhar et al. [117] investigated the idea of splitting the host application and ad-
vertising into separate processes. In this case, advertising libraries would no longer be
able to inherit the same permissions as the host application. The proposed method-
ology also prevented malicious applications from being able to generate fraudulent
clicks in order to steal revenues from application developers. In their work, the
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authors examined the extent to which applications used their permissions only for
advertising purposes. The results showed that permissions such as INTERNET and
READ PHONE STATE were popularly used for advertising; this observation agrees with
the results from my experiment.
Pearce et al. [98] studied the separation of the host application’s privileges from
that of the embedded advertising library. In order to eﬀect this, they introduced a
new set of API calls and permissions to be used only within advertising libraries.
The authors claimed that this change in the Android framework would not require
application developers to embed advertising libraries anymore; instead, the new set
of API calls and permissions would be used to instruct the applications to fetch the
advertisements from certain sites. This new framework eliminated the need for an
application to request unnecessary permissions during install-time in order to ensure
that advertising libraries were functioning as intended.
Grace et al. [60] focused on the potential privacy and security risks posed by
advertising libraries. They collected a dataset of 100, 000 applications from the oﬃcial
market and manually extracted the AndroidManifest.xml ﬁles in order to separate the
applications that used the INTERNET permission. They then manually investigated
the set of approximately 52, 000 applications with INTERNET permission to determine
if the advertising libraries requested dangerous permissions and to establish their
impact on the related API calls. (This is in contrast to my work, where, as explained
in Section 6.3, I execute the applications in the dataset and then, by examining the
log ﬁles and AndroidManifest.xml ﬁles, I am able to deduce if an application leaked
device-related information via advertising libraries.)
Additionally, the work by [24, 52, 70, 83] applied static analysis to identify data
leaks in Android applications. In [52], Gibler et al. proposed a framework to detect
leaks of personal information. They started by generating a permission map, which
included information about API calls and the related permissions they require in
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order to execute; the map also contained information about potential sources of leaks.
Next, they used the decompiled version of an application to generate a call graph. The
authors iterated repeatedly to cover all possible execution paths of the application
and recorded the instances where external methods invoke restricted information; this
enabled them to identify potential leaks as well as their types.
In the work of Chan et al. [24], the authors parsed the AndroidManifest.xml ﬁles to
collect the requested permissions and then identiﬁed components, such as activity and
broadcast receiver, that are potential sources of data leaks. They then applied inter-
procedural control ﬂow searching for each component and followed the information
ﬂow to conﬁrm if the leaks actually occurred.
The work by both Mann and Starostin [83] and Kim et al. [70] investigated the
occurrence of data leaks within the Dalvik bytecode implementation. The authors
began by generating a reduced set of execution instructions in order to capture the
relevant information ﬂow paths. Based on this reduced set, the authors then manually
traversed each application, written in bytecode, to identify potential sources of leaks.
While the authors of [24, 31, 70, 83] identiﬁed leaks, and what information was
leaked, I go further and determine how the leaks occur and the destinations of the
leaked data. In my work, I reverse engineer the application package ﬁles and statically
analyse the Java version of the applications in order to determine the occurrence of
a leak and its possible cause(s). Moreover, I further support my investigation by
dynamically executing the applications from the experimental dataset in a sandbox to
monitor and record the behaviours between an application and the operating system
during run-time, thus identifying the leaked information as well as its destination.
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6.3 Detection of Information Leaks
6.3.1 Dataset
In Chapter 3, I introduced a clean dataset consisting of 1350 Android applications.
For the purpose of the experimental work in this chapter, I selected a subset of 123
out of the 1350 applications and limited my selection only to applications from the
Financial and Games categories, as described in Table 6.1. Financial and games ap-
plications are of particular interest to this study since they are often used in conjunc-
tion with sensitive data and may be a target of attackers. I reiterate the assumption,
mentioned in Section 6.1, that I do not include (pre-classiﬁed) malicious applications
in the dataset as one can expect these applications to leak, depending on the ex-
tent of the harmful actions they have been instructed to carry out. Hence, they are
of no interest for my purposes. Additionally, I only chose those applications which
include the INTERNET permission; this decision was made based on the related work
of [60,75,119] which demonstrated that the INTERNET permission is highly used in free
applications and is also one of the main facilitators of information leaks. Additional
information about the 123 clean applications can be found in Appendix B.1.
Table 6.1: Experimental Dataset
Application Market Number of Applications/Category
Google Play 49 Finance and 24 Games
SlideME 50 Finance
Total 123 applications
6.3.2 Experimental Framework
I begin with the experimental architecture by describing how I apply the diﬀerent
phases of my methodology on the entire set of 123 applications collected. First, I
perform a dynamic analysis to identify any leaky applications in the dataset. I then
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proceed to the static analysis stage where I extract the AndroidManifest.xml ﬁles
to look at the permissions requested by the applications; the collected permissions
are used later to determine their impact on leaky applications. Additionally, I also
decompile the application ﬁles (.apk) so that I can examine the advertising libraries
embedded in the application Java code and thus have a better understanding of
the eﬀect of those libraries on the general execution of the application. Once the
above steps are completed, I conduct a further analysis on the leaky applications to
determine the cause of the leak and the destination of the leaked information. These
steps are depicted in Figure 6.1.
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6.3.2.1 Experimental Set-up
In this subsection, I expand on the setup of the virtual environment where the dy-
namic execution of the applications takes place. I also explain the diﬀerent types of
behaviours recorded during application run-time.
We used a research laptop, which is equipped with Intel (i7) CPU 2.7 GHZ, 8 GB
of DDR3 RAM and 720 GB hard disk on Windows 7. We then install the virtual
machine, VMware Workstation build-591240, which hosts an Ubuntu 11.10 32-bit
operating system. Next, we set up the Android Emulator, along with DroidBox [72],
described in Section 6.3.2.2, and disable all interactions between the virtual and local
hosts in order to build a safe environment in which to run the applications and record
the behavioral execution steps.
As illustrated in Figure 6.1, we generate the MD5, SHA1 and SHA256 hashes for
all applications, using the tool, HashMyFiles1. We chose HashMyFiles since it is able
to take more than one application at a time (in fact, our entire set of 123) and give
the output in a few seconds, thus saving experimental time as described in Figure 6.2.
Matching the hash values with the ones computed by DroidBox after the completion
of the execution phase is a key step as it ensures that the code has not been modiﬁed
during execution. The hash values pre- and post-execution were identical; hence we
can conclude that no modiﬁcations were made to the code during run-time. Next, we
move to the dynamic analysis and execute our set of 123 applications in the sandbox
environment. We had to decide on a cut-oﬀ time at which to end the execution
process. Other research work showed that ﬁve minutes [27] or even one minute [14]
is enough to execute each application and be able to collect suﬃcient behaviours
to conduct further analysis. We therefore chose the average, opting to run each
application for three minutes as we believe that, based on the above work, this cut-oﬀ
time would generate an adequate amount of behaviour for analysis. Nevertheless,
1http://www.nirsoft.net/utils/hash\_my_files.html
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restricting the execution time to a ﬁxed period is always problematic in this type of
experiment as some applications may need hours or even days to expose all features
of the execution; malicious applications are particularly good at avoiding detection
by waiting for long periods of time before exhibiting their behaviour. However, all
of our applications are clean and so unlikely to be deliberately avoiding detection by
suppressing behaviour.
During the execution, DroidBox records several types of system operations in
the log ﬁles. We are interested in the following as these have been shown to be
related to leaks [68]: read and write operations, open network connections, enforced
and bypassed permissions, information leaks, sending SMS and making phone calls.
Finally, after executing the entire dataset, we import the log ﬁles to our local machine
and start the static analysis.
6.3.2.2 DroidBox: Dynamic Analysis
Figure 6.2: Architecture of DroidBox
Figure 6.2 demonstrates the architecture of Droidbox showing the several phases
during the analysis of an Android application. First, the samples are stored in the
windows host as an .apk or .jar extension. Then, Droidbox performs a static analysis
to unzip the samples by using Androguard2; Droidbox relies on Monkeyrunner 3 to
install and run each application in the dataset, without any human interaction, by
2https://code.google.com/p/androguard/
3http://developer.android.com/tools/help/MonkeyRunner.html
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sending random commands and events from an API to the sample. After the sam-
ple is installed, the modiﬁed system records the requested APIs and then compares
each operation with the corresponding AndroidManifest.xml ﬁle to check whether the
application bypasses permissions. Droidbox continues to run and track the sample
until the analyser triggers an outcome. Subsequently, logcat (a logging mechanism
embedded in the Emulator) is applied for the duration of running the application
in the sandbox; the log displays the following: (i) each operation, (ii) level, (iii)
process identiﬁcation, (iv) time, and (v) date of execution. The Droidbox system
then pipelines the log output from an emulator to Python script in order to allow an
analyser to read the log ﬁle from the host operating system.
Each log ﬁle begins with the following information: the name of the Android
package and three types of hash values - MD5, SHA1 and SHA256. The hashes are
computed at the end of the execution and they help to ensure that the application
code has not been modiﬁed during run-time. The main body of the log ﬁle includes
details of the following format:
[Section]
[Operation]
[Timestamp] {log data}
where the Section tag captures information related to ﬁle operations, cryptographic
functions, network-related activities, broadcast receivers, enforced and bypassed per-
missions, information leaks, sent SMS and phone calls. As for the Operation tag,
it relates to the types of operations being performed, such as read from or write to
ﬁle, encrypt or decrypt data and lastly, open, read or write network activities. The
timestamp denotes the time the data was logged and is relative to the starting time
of the analysis.
In my experimental work, I place particular focus on the portion of the log ﬁle
where the information leakage is recorded, as my aim is to better understand how
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data leaks work. First, I introduce and deﬁne the terms taint tag, taint source
and taint sink in order to explain how DroidBox can intercept a leak. DroidBox is
equipped with a list of pre-determined sources of information (also known as taint
sources) such as network and databases that will be monitored during execution in
order to intercept information outﬂow; taint sinks are used to ﬁlter and monitor this
information. Whenever a piece of information is parsed through the taint source, it is
assigned a taint tag in order to diﬀerentiate it from clean data. Any tainted data (that
is, those marked with a tag) which pass through a taint sink and are about to leave
the device, will trigger an alert, thus informing the emulator about the occurrence of
a leak.
6.3.2.3 Static Analysis
I conduct a static analysis on the set of 123 applications in order to view the list of
permissions requested by extracting the AndroidManifest.xml ﬁles. I also decompile
the applications to identify whether advertising libraries were embedded in them.
I begin by extracting the AndroidManifest.xml ﬁles using the publicly available
tool, Apktool4, to identify the permissions requested by each application. I then
parse the ﬁles, look for the <uses-permission> tag and record the declared per-
missions. This process helps us to: ﬁrstly, ensure that the application includes the
INTERNET permission, as this was a pre-requisite deﬁned in the data collection phase,
Section 6.3.1; and secondly, ﬁnd out if the application requested additional permis-
sions by analysing the individual AndroidManifest.xml ﬁle. It should be noted that
Android developers can deﬁne their own permissions to protect their applications
from being exploited; however, we focus only on the set of permissions deﬁned in the
oﬃcial documentation5.
Moreover, in order to have a better understanding of the in-application advertising
4https://code.google.com/p/android-apktool
5http://developer.android.com/reference/android/Manifest.permission.html
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libraries, I use the tool, dex2jar 6, to decompile the application package ﬁles into .jar
format, which is easily readable by a Java decompiler. I then search for the advertising
libraries by browsing for the namespaces. For example: com.google.ads deﬁnes the
classes required to implement advertisements from Google Ads. Similarly, I identify
the various advertising libraries used by the other applications in the dataset, as
illustrated in Figure 6.1.
6.4 Experimental Results
6.4.1 Permission Usage & Advertising Libraries
Permission Usage. While the INTERNET permission was legitimately requested for
most applications in our dataset, I observed that six applications which were collected
from the oﬃcial market bypassed it. Moreover, although these six applications did
not explicitly request the INTERNET permission during install-time, all of them had the
READ_PHONE_STATE permission deﬁned in their AndroidManifest.xml ﬁle. This leads
me to suspect that the INTERNET permission together with the TelephoneManager
class (provided in the Android oﬃcial documentation7) could eventually result in
leaking device-related information, such as the IMEI and IMSI.
Advertising Libraries. During the static analysis phase, I examined the decom-
piled version of the APKs. I found that, as illustrated in Figure 6.3, Google Ads was
the most popular advertising library implemented by most Android developers. In
fact, 80% of the applications in the dataset included one or more advertising libraries
and all the advertising libraries used the INTERNET permission to communicate with
the advertisers.
6https://code.google.com/p/dex2jar/
7http://developer.android.com/reference/android/telephony/TelephonyManager.html
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Figure 6.3: Distribution of advertising libraries embedded in 123 applications
6.4.2 Identiﬁcation of Leaky Applications
In order to determine if an application leaked during the dynamic analysis, I parse
the log ﬁles and search for the section where the leak is recorded, as illustrated in
Figure 6.4. DroidBox keeps track of ﬁve types of information when documenting a
leak in the log ﬁle. These include:
• Source of the leak (also referred to as sink)
• Destination of the leak
• Port number through which the information is sent to an external party
• Name of the taint tag
• HTML-encoded data which is leaked through the GET command
It can be seen from the excerpt of the log ﬁle, as shown in Figure 6.4, that My
Tax Refund application from the Finance category leaked the IMSI to an external
server with address intuitandroidtaxstatprod.122.2o7.net via the network sink.
Similarly, I browsed through the 123 log ﬁles which were collected from the dynamic
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analysis, described in Section 6.3.2.2, and searched for the information leakage section
to identify the presence of leaky applications. In the end, I found a total of 13
applications which leaked device-related information, such as IMEI and IMSI, to
external networks.
Figure 6.4: Excerpt of a log ﬁle, showing section where leak is recorded
6.4.3 Determine Causes of Leaks
Once it was conﬁrmed that 13 out of the 123 applications from the dataset leak
information to external parties, I proceeded to conduct further analysis of the An-
droidManifest.xml ﬁles to have a better understanding of the events that triggered
the leaks.
I begin by examining the individual AndroidManifest.xml ﬁle for each leaky ap-
plication to determine the list of permissions that were requested. Table 6.3 shows
the distribution of permissions across the set of 13 applications under considera-
tion; ‘’ denotes a request that was made for a particular permission. It should
be noted, at ﬁrsthand, that all 13 leaky applications include both the INTERNET and
READ_PHONE_STATE permissions and all 13 applications leaked either the IMSI or IMEI
information to advertising networks. However, combination of these two permissions
is suﬃcient to render an application vulnerable, as noted in [119], but out of the 123
applications, 36 applications (with advertising libraries) included both the INTERNET
and READ_PHONE_STATE permissions. It may be the case that the three minute cut-oﬀ
used as execution time did not permit the remaining 23 applications to execute the
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code that could potentially lead to leaks. Next, I analyse the classes deﬁned within
the decompiled version of each application generated in the static analysis stage, as
explained in Section 6.3.2.3. I use the destination addresses, recorded under the in-
formation leakage section within the log ﬁles, to search through the Java classes and
compare the namespace to conﬁrm if the application developer has made use of any
external in-application libraries. This led me to observe that all 13 of the identiﬁed
leaky applications had third-party advertising libraries embedded in their respective
Java packages. Furthermore, the design of the Android security framework does not
permit the operating system to diﬀerentiate between the permissions required by an
application and those needed by an advertising library [98, 117]. Consequently, any
in-application advertising library will, by default, inherit the same permissions re-
quested for an application and eventually accelerate the occurrence of information
leaks.
Table 6.2: Permission Index
Permission ID Permission
P1 ACCESS COARSE LOCATION
P2 ACCESS FINE STATE
P3 ACCESS NETWORK STATE
P4 ACCESS WIFI STATE
P5 INTERNET
P6 GLOBAL SEARCH
P7 READ PHONE STATE
P8 SYSTEM ALERT˙WINDOW
P9 VIBRATE
P10 WAKE LOCK
P11 WRITE EXTERNAL STORAGE
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Table 6.3: Permissions requested by 13 leaky applications
Application Name Permission
P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11
1. My Tax Refund   
2. iStockManager   
3. Sudoku    
4. Solitaire     
5. Crazy Bike Racing Motor     
6. Drage Racing    
7. Sketch N Draw   
8. Connector    
9. Finance Central     
10. Mint.com Personal Finance    
11. Stock Analyst Free      
12. Symbol Lookup      
13. XpenseLite    
6.5 Discussion
Generally, it is well-known that application developers earn revenue from in-application
advertisements, providing them with the incentive to market their applications free
of charge. In fact, the more advertising libraries they embed in their applications, the
higher the revenue. It is also worth mentioning that each advertiser has their own
set of advertising libraries which can be obtained after signing up with an advertis-
ing company. Application developers do not have to fully comprehend the advertising
code as they only need to follow the instructions given by the advertising companies to
successfully include advertisements in their applications; therefore sensitive informa-
tion can unknowingly be leaked through the advertising libraries. In Appendix B.2,
I provide a step-by-step explanation on how the advertising library extracts unique
device information and sends it back to the advertiser’s server.
Additionally, upon further analysis, I found that nine out of those 13 leaky appli-
cations included on average two additional third-party advertising libraries, excluding
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the one through which they leaked. Moreover, I also found a total of nine advertis-
ing libraries embedded in one leaky application which is classiﬁed under the Games
category and up to as many as three advertising libraries included, at one time, in a
leaky application from the Finance category.
I extended my investigation into the 13 leaky applications to discover that seven
and six leaky applications were from Google Play and SlideMe, respectively. In Ta-
bles 6.4 & 6.5, I provide the category, application name, information leaked and how
many times it was leaked, and the destination of the leak.
Table 6.4: Analysis of 7 leaky applications found in the oﬃcial market
Category Application Name Detected Leak Leak Destination
Finance
My Tax Refund
IMSI intuitandroidtaxstatprod.122.2o7.net
(3 times) (hosted by Omniture)
iStockManager
IMEI my.mobfox.com
(4 times) (hosted by MobFox)
Games
Sudoku
IMEI ads2.greystripe.com
(5 times) (hosted by GreyStripe)
ads.mp.mydas.mobi
(hosted by Millennial Media)
androidsdk.ads.mp.mydas.mobi
(hosted by Millennial Media)
Solitaire
IMEI ads2.greystripe.com
(3 times) (hosted by GreyStripe)
service.sponsorpay.com
(hosted by SponsorPay)
Crazy Bike Racing Motor
IMEI www.umeng.com
(2 times) (hosted by Umeng)
Drage Racing
IMEI data.ﬂurry.com
(1 time) (hosted by Flurry)
Sketch n Draw
IMEI ads.mp.mydas.mobi
(3 times) (hosted by Millennial Media)
androidsdk.ads.mp.mydas.mobi
(hosted by Millennial Media)
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Table 6.5: 6 Leaky applications found in the non-oﬃcial market
Category Application Name Detected Leak Leak Destination
Finance
Connector
IMEI wv.inner-active.mobi
(5 times) (hosted by Inneractive)
Finance Central
IMEI ads.mp.mydas.mobi
(7 times) (hosted by Millennial Media)
androidsdk.ads.mp.mydas.mobi
(hosted by Millennial Media)
Mint.com Personal Finance
IMSI ci.intuit.com
(1 time) (hosted by Omniture)
Stock Analyst Free
IMEI my.mobfox.com
(2 times) (hosted by MobFox)
Symbol Lookup
IMEI my.mobfox.com
(2 times) (hosted by MobFox)
XpenseLite
IMEI ads.mp.mydas.mobi
(6 times) (hosted by Millennial Media)
androidsdk.ads.mp.mydas.mobi
(hosted by Millennial Media)
6.6 Summary
I have demonstrated that, without the knowledge of the user, applications considered
to be clean can leak data about the device to a third-party. My analysis of those
applications which leak, described how and why information is leaked and its des-
tination. Clean applications, irrespective of whether they are collected from oﬃcial
or non-oﬃcial markets, were capable of leaking phone-related information without
the user’s knowledge. I also observed that third-party advertising libraries were the
principal cause of all the leaks that were recorded for the dataset. In order to obtain
revenue, embedded advertising libraries often required certain permissions not always
available in the application, and therefore such applications were made over-privileged
in order for the advertiser to obtain revenue; this usage of unnecessary permissions
facilitated the occurrence of leaks. While the authors were able to successfully imple-
ment their proposal, the empirical results showed that users will experience a minimal
delay during run-time if they choose to obfuscate their location information.
I thank our collaborators for contributing to this work. Patrik Lantz helped with
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the framework design and architecture of DroidBox (Section 6.3.2.2) and Moutaz
Alazab assisted with the dataset collection and execution (Section 6.3.1).
Chapter 7
Information Leaks via Tracking
Services
7.1 Introduction
In chapter 6, I presented a methodology to identify the causes of data leaks in Android
applications. The observation was that in-application advertising libraries were the
primary facilitators of leaks. More importantly, these data leaks took place without
the users’ knowledge because advertising libraries generally inherit the same set of
permissions as that of the host application.
In this chapter, I investigate the tracking services that are oﬀered as in-built
functionalities on the Android OS. Tracking services play a fundamental role in the
smartphone ecosystem. While their primary purpose is to provide a smartphone user
with the ability to regulate the extent of private information they share with external
parties, these services can also be misused by advertisers in order to boost revenue.
Several existing publications [32, 47, 88, 135] have shown that sensitive information,
such as device ID and user location, is often leaked via advertising libraries.
Moreover, the emergence of the ‘Bring Your Own Device’ (BYOD) trend is putting
additional pressure on companies to deal with the inﬂux of personal smartphones
connected to corporate networks, since protecting business intelligence from leaks to
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competitors is a priority. Thus, they must ensure that appropriate privacy and secu-
rity settings are maintained on the devices to prevent leakage of sensitive company
information. However, many mobile phone companies employ rewards programs as
an incentive to encourage users to allow phone companies to track their devices. For
instance, if the smartphone can identify a user’s location, the user can be sent infor-
mation about a favorite restaurant which is nearby [94]. In most cases, advertising
and location information complement each other as they help advertisers to collect
an abundance of information for targeted user proﬁling.
7.1.1 Problem Statement
For the purpose of my research, I test two types of tracking features available to
Android users who are given the option to control the following two tracking services:
(i) Location Services and (ii) Advertising. In (i), smartphone owners can either turn
on or turn oﬀ location tracking to prevent installed applications from discovering
their physical locations. As for advertising, users are allowed to either turn on or
limit tracking by advertising libraries embedded in the applications. I consider the
following questions:
• Do the On/Off settings for Location Services operate as described?
• Do the Advertising setting options operate as described?
• What kind of information is disclosed by the smartphone when location or
advertising are tracked?
• Do the applications continue to leak information when tracking services are
turned oﬀ?
I present a simple and eﬀective way to monitor traﬃc generated by tracking ser-
vices to and from the smartphone and external servers. To evaluate this work, I
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dynamically execute a set of applications collected from their respective oﬃcial mar-
kets. The empirical results indicate that even if the user disables or limits tracking
services on the smartphone, applications can by-pass those settings and, consequently,
leak private information to external parties.
7.2 Related Work
Pearce et al. [98] proposed a framework that can separate an advertising library
from its main application. In order to do this, a new advertising API and two addi-
tional permissions were introduced. The authors applied a method known as privilege
separation, which involved extracting the advertising component from the main func-
tionality component of the application. This ensured that the advertising library
did not inherit the same permissions assigned to an application. To evaluate their
proposal, the authors chose a dataset of 964 Android applications, out of which 473
applications included advertising libraries. Their empirical results showed that the
framework was successfully applied on 456 applications using advertising libraries.
The proposed methodology failed to work in the remaining 17 applications because
these applications included two permissions in their advertising libraries which were
not compatible with it.
In [117], Shekhar et al. presented their method for separating applications and
advertisements in the Android platform. The authors proposed a framework that can
take as input an application with embedded libraries and rewrite it so that the main
functionality of the application and the advertising libraries run as diﬀerent processes.
Shekhar et al. also veriﬁed that, in the rewritten version of the application, all the
permissions requested by the application were indeed required for the application to
function properly.
The authors of [60, 83, 119, 150] investigated the privacy implications of having
third-party advertising libraries embedded in applications. Their work is described
119
below.
Stevens et al. [119] performed a thorough analysis of third-party advertising li-
braries to have a better understanding of whether these libraries are unnecessarily ac-
cessing private information stored on a user’s smartphone. Additionally, the authors
presented several vulnerabilities that attackers can exploit whilst being connected on
the same network as the victim.
Grace et al. [60] presented a thorough study on the diﬀerent types of private
information that can be accessed by advertising libraries. They observed that some
third-party advertising libraries used unsafe mechanisms to retrieve and execute code
from the Internet. Consequently, this behavior rendered the user’s private information
vulnerable to external attacks that can be carried out via the Internet.
The authors of [83] and [150] proposed techniques that can be used to predict if
an application will leak private information when installed on the user’s device. They
presented their understanding of the diﬀerent avenues through which sensitive infor-
mation can be leaked to external entities. While the focus of Mann and Starostin [83]
was primarily on extending their knowledge of the Dalvik bytecode [127], Zhao and
Osorio [150] explored the implications of personal smartphones within a corporate
environment and how the use of vulnerable applications can impede business opera-
tions.
In their work, Han et al. [61] and Micinski et al. [84] addressed the concerns
surrounding illegal use of a user’s location information. Han et al. demonstrated that
a user’s location can be inferred by simply monitoring the accelerometers found in
smartphones. Furthermore, they claimed that no permissions are required in order
to access the information recorded by accelerometers, hence, making it diﬃcult to
detect the theft of this information. Micinski et al. [84] took a proactive approach
towards sharing a user’s location with third-parties. The authors investigated the
possibility of truncating any location-relevant information that is sent to external
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servers, without compromising the user’s experience while using the application.
7.3 Tracking Services on Android
Location Services and Advertising on Android 4.0 can be accessed as described in [57]
and [54], respectively.
For Location Services, users have the option to grant or completely block any
access to location-related information. As a result, users expect that the installed
applications will only use location information when Location Services is on. In order
to verify whether this is indeed the case, I monitor access by installed applications to
the following information: Media Access Control (MAC) address, Internet Protocol
(IP) address and Global Positioning System (GPS). MAC address refers to a unique
12-character identiﬁer assigned to a WiFi enabled device. As explained by Goodin
in [51], the MAC address can be used to reveal a user’s “precise location”. As for the
IP address and GPS coordinates, they can both be used to track a user’s physical
location, as described in [20] and [59].
On the other hand, tracking via Advertising on Android devices cannot be fully
disabled. By default, advertising libraries constantly track a user’s behaviour and
carry out targeted advertising. However, with the introduction of the ‘Google Set-
tings’ application [54], after downloading an application from the oﬃcial market, a
user can either opt in or out of having targeted advertisements delivered through
AdMob [53] - which is owned by Google. Ideally, when a user chooses to opt out,
the expected outcome is not to receive advertisements delivered by AdMob libraries.
In order to monitor advertising tracking, I observe access to the following informa-
tion: International Mobile Station Equipment Identity (IMEI), serial number of the
Android device (DeviceID) and the 64-bit number generated on the device’s ﬁrst
boot (AndroidID). These are three distinct identiﬁers that can be used to track a
device and subsequently, proﬁle a user’s behaviour. In Table 7.1, I list the keyword
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information that I will use to monitor tracking by Android applications.
Table 7.1: Keywords for Tracking Services on Android
Location Services Advertising
(i) MAC address (i) IMEI
(ii) IP address (ii) DeviceID
(iii) GPS (iii) AndroidID
7.4 Experimental Work
7.4.1 Case Study: Android Dataset
At the time this study was conducted, I considered the tracking settings on both
the Android and iOS platforms for comparative purposes. Since my thesis focuses
primarily on the Android OS, I present only the Android results in this chapter and
refer the reader to Appendix C for the iOS results.
Consequently, the motivation behind the dataset collection was driven by the
reason mentioned above and I collected only those applications that were developed
by the same application developer for both the Android and iOS platforms. It should
be noted that since application developer proﬁles cannot be publicly accessed on
the application markets, I manually checked the developer’s information for each
application (both from Android and iOS) before including it in the dataset.
I restricted the dataset collection to applications from the following four categories
as they have a large user base and the ramiﬁcations of information leaks are high:
Games, Social Networking, Finance and Business. For each category, I then se-
lected a set of the top free and the top paid applications. Each application was then
tested for cleanliness. If an application was found to be malicious, it was discarded.
As malware is expected to leak information and by-pass built-in tracking settings, it
is of no interest to consider such applications in this experiment. The ﬁnal dataset
included 102 Android applications collected from Google Play, as shown in Table 7.2.
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Table 7.2: Experimental Dataset
Category Number of Applications
Games 26
Social Networking 25
Finance 26
Business 25
Total 102 applications
7.4.2 Experimental Setup
After completing the dataset collection, I proceeded to set up the experimental en-
vironment. I used a Motorola Razr [82] to analyse the dataset and a traﬃc sniﬃng
tool, Mallory, to capture communication between device and server and vice versa.
Mallory [6] is an open-source mobile application assessment tool developed by the
security ﬁrm, Intrepidus Group [129]. I chose this tool as it is capable of intercepting
Secure Socket Layer (SSL) traﬃc and acts as a Man-in-The-Middle (MiTM) proxy,
hence facilitating the capture of real-time communication. Moreover, Mallory pro-
vided good granular control over the usage of the tool and manageability of the data
captured.
I set up Mallory within a Virtual Machine (VM), running on Ubuntu and allowed
the VM to connect to the Internet. In order to relay traﬃc between the smartphone
and Mallory, I established a communication channel using the Point-to-Point Tun-
neling Protocol [85]. As the smartphone and Mallory both shared the same Internet
connection, any Internet-based communication on the smartphone was captured by
Mallory, as illustrated in Figure 7.1. All traﬃc, including Client to Server (C2S)
and Server to Client (S2C), was recorded in a database, which was later exported for
further analysis.
In order to monitor private information sent out via tracking services, I ignored
any S2C traﬃc and focused only on C2S communications in my experiment. I started
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Figure 7.1: Experimental Framework
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by allowing the smartphones to use tracking services - that is, Location Services and
Advertising were both switched on. I then proceeded to do a clean install of each
application and executed it for a period of two minutes. Once the execution time
was over, I stopped Mallory from recording further traﬃc and killed the application
process on the smartphone. I repeated the same steps for each of the 102 Android
applications in the dataset.
In the second part of my experiment, I disabled Location Services and limited
Advertising tracking services on the Android, as explained in Section 7.3. I then
repeated similar operations as in the ﬁrst part of the experiment. I installed the 102
Android applications one by one on the smartphone, executed the applications for
two minutes and recorded only C2S traﬃc.
Once the experiment was concluded, I exported all traﬃc logs outside the VM
and searched for the keywords listed in Table 7.1.
7.5 Analysis of Results
For each category of application and each keyword, I generated a table to record
whether or not keyword information had been accessed by the applications in the
dataset during execution time. This overall information is presented in Figures 7.2
and 7.3 and in Tables 7.3 to 7.6.
In Table 7.3, I have presented the resulting data into two parts, Location Services
and Advertising. Under Location Services, as explained in Section 7.3, users have
the option to either turn on or turn oﬀ location tracking. When Location Services is
ON, I have the following outcomes: If the application accesses information about the
keyword(s) mentioned in the ﬁrst column of Table 7.1, I place a tick (); otherwise
a cross () is recorded. However, when Location Services is ‘OFF’, I expect that
applications are not able to access any location-related information. Hence, refers
to an application that did not use any location information while  indicates that
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Figure 7.2: Leaky Android Applications with Tracking OFF (all 4 categories)
Figure 7.3: Leaky Android Applications with Tracking OFF (split by each category)
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Table 7.3: Tracking Services in Android Games Applications
Application Name
Location Services Advertising
ON OFF ON Limited
1. Sonic Dash    
2. Pic Combo    
3. Temple Run    
4. Candy Crush    
5. 4 Pics 1 Word    
6. Megapolis    
7. Doodle Jump    
8. Subway Surfers    
9. Nimble Quest    
10. UNO & Friends    
11. Royal Revolt    
12. Lucky Wheel for Friends    
13. Tiny Troopers 2    
14. Smash it    
15. Where’s my Water    
16. Temple Run: OZ    
17. Angry Birds Star Wars    
18. Plants vs Zombies    
19. Wreck it Ralph    
20. Vector    
21. Where’s my Perry    
22. Bad Piggies    
23. Backﬂip Madness    
24. Slingshot Racing    
25. Plague    
26. Tetris    
location information was accessed.
Similarly, for Advertising, I have the ‘ON’ and ‘Limited’ options - as presented in
Table 7.3. When applications are allowed to track via advertisements, i.e. Advertising
is ‘ON’, I place a if the application accessed information about the keyword(s)
listed in the second column of Table 7.1; otherwise an  is recorded. However, when
Advertising is ‘Limited’, ameans that advertising libraries did not track smartphone
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Figure 7.4: Leaky Android Games Applications with Tracking OFF
users based on my pre-deﬁned keyword(s); whilst an  refers to the contrary.
Of the four categories, 6 out of the 7 Android applications that leaked the DeviceID
belonged to the Games category, as shown in Figure 7.2.
7.5.1 Information Leaks for Tracking OFF
Figures 7.2 and 7.4 present the number of applications that leaked information re-
lated to the list of keywords in Section 7.3. The y-axis denotes the total number
of applications and the x-axis refers to the types of information that are leaked.
In order to facilitate the interpretation of my experimental results, I combine the
items on the x-axis into two categories: (i) Dynamic and (ii) Static information.
Dynamic information refers to any meaningful data that are liable to changes due
to the user’s physical surrounding. In this case, I consider IP address and GPS as
dynamic information. Conversely, Static information refers to those keywords that
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Table 7.4: Tracking Services in Android Business Applications
Application Name
Location Services Advertising
ON OFF ON Limited
1. Flashlight    
2. Local Directories Aus    
3. Australia Post    
4. Career One    
5. Solution Recruitment    
6. Oﬃceworks    
7. IBM Sametime    
8. IBM Mobile Systems Remote    
9. SupplyChainBrain    
10. Alegeus Technologies Client Conference    
11. BMC Mobility for Incident Management    
12. MobileIron Mobile@ Work Client    
13. BMC Control-M Self Service    
14. Receipt Catcher    
15. Audio Memos - The Voice Recorder    
16. Normal Ringtones    
17. Secrets of Success    
18. XANGO Check it    
19. Active Shooter Action Plan    
20. Funding & Fundraising Ideas    
21. Nantucket Phone Book    
22. MyTMx Mobile    
23. INSolutions    
24. ATM Finder    
25. ScanTOPDF Mobile    
26. Arborist    
remain unchanged throughout the lifetime of the smartphone, such as MAC address,
IMEI, DeviceID and AndroidID.
From the empirical results, I found that the most leaked static information is
IMEI (75% of 102 applications) and AndroidID (27% of 102 applications) - as shown
in Figure 7.2. Figure 7.4 indicates that 6 out of the 7 Android applications leaking
the DeviceID, 22 of the 76 applications leaking the IMEI and 14 of the 28 applications
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Table 7.5: Tracking Services in Android Finance Applications
Application Name
Location Services Advertising
ON OFF ON Limited
1. PayPal    
2. CommBank    
3. CommBank Kaching    
4. ANZ goMoney    
5. NAB    
6. WestPac Mobile Banking    
7. TrackMySPEND    
8. St George Banking    
9. Citibank AU    
10. Bendigo Bank    
11. You Need a Budget    
12. CommSec    
13. ING DIRECT    
14. My Weekly Budget    
15. ISpend (Spending Monitor)    
16. cPro Craigslist client    
17. Pocket Expense Personal Finance    
18. My Funds - Indian Mutual Fund    
19. eBay & PayPal Fee Calculator    
20. FinPlanner    
21. safeX FSC-Ip    
22. Stock Watch: BSE/NSE    
23. StockWatch - Portfolio Tracking    
24. My currency Pro - Converter    
25. Budget Planner & Web Sync    
leaking the AndroidID were from Games.
As for the dynamic information, only 5% of the 102 Android applications leaked
the IP address and the GPS information was never read by the applications in the
dataset. I also noted that only the applications belonging to the Social Networking
category did not access any dynamic information.
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Table 7.6: Tracking Services in Android Social Networking Applications
Application Name
Location Services Advertising
ON OFF ON Limited
1. Kik Messenger    
2. Viber    
3. Skype    
4. Facebook Messenger    
5. Pinterest    
6. Snapchat    
7. Facebook    
8. Twitter    
9. Tumblr    
10. Keek    
11. LinkedIn    
12. Tango Text, Voice and Video    
13. InstaFollow    
14. WhatsApp Messenger    
15. TagsForLikes Pro    
16. Grindr Xtra    
17. Nimbuzz Messenger    
18. Tinychat    
19. Bubbly - Social Voice    
20. Dubbler - Share your voice    
21. TextPics    
22. Path    
23. KakaoAlbum    
24. Zello + Walkie Talkie    
25. Tom’s Messenger    
7.5.2 Comparison: Tracking ON versus Tracking OFF
I present in Table 7.7 the keyword information captured for Android applications. I
compare the number of applications that sent out private information when tracking
was turned on and oﬀ. It should be emphasized that the comparisons are based on a
small dataset.
In Table 7.7, I observed that the IMEI is the most leaked information by Android
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Table 7.7: Tracking On and Oﬀ in Android Applications
Keyword Business Finance Games Social Networking
ON OFF ON OFF ON OFF ON OFF
IP Address 2 2 1 1 1 1 0 0
GPS 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
MAC Address 2 1 0 0 1 1 0 0
IMEI 19 14 10 18 18 22 18 22
DeviceID 0 0 0 0 11 6 0 1
AndroidID 1 3 1 5 14 14 8 6
applications, irrespective of whether tracking is turned on or oﬀ. In fact, with the
exception of the applications from the Business category, the rest of the dataset
leaked the IMEI more often when tracking was turned oﬀ. Similarly, for the remaining
list of keywords, there was little diﬀerence in the number of applications that leaked
a particular keyword when tracking was enabled and disabled.
7.6 Discussion
The experimental results provide insights into the operability of the tracking services
on the Android platform. In this section, I present these insights, along with some
ideas for future research directions.
7.6.1 Dynamic Information
As described in Section 7.5, dynamic information used by tracking services is aﬀected
by the user’s physical location. Traditionally, advertisements are displayed through
in-application banners. However, I observed that in one particular Games application,
‘4 Pics 1 Word’, although Location Services was ‘OFF’, the device’s IP address was
sent out to the advertiser in order to display in-application high-deﬁnition videos -
which is simply another form of advertising. One could argue that such leakage of
dynamic information, which changes regularly, need not be of concern; however, as
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explained by Warren in [140], whilst a single piece of dynamic information is harmless
to the user’s privacy, a collection of such information can reveal the location history
of the user and could potentially be misused.
7.6.2 Static Information
DeviceID was the most leaked static information in smartphone applications. Gen-
erally, smartphone users tend to be cautious when downloading applications as they
do not want to install applications that would compromise their device and private
information. When a user agrees to grant access to the requested permissions by
an Android application, the underlying assumption is that only the application in
question will be given access to restricted resources, and these resources will not be
sent to other parties. However, in my experiment, I observed that over 80% of the
Android applications sent the IMEI information to the smartphone vendor’s server
without the user’s knowledge.
7.6.3 Tracking Services & SSL
Although the main focus of my work is to verify the tracking services settings em-
bedded within Android, I should point out that information leaks do not necessarily
only take place via such services. As observed by Fahl et al. [37], users who install
compromised SSL certiﬁcates are in fact providing a backdoor to attackers and sub-
sequently allowing them to sniﬀ any sensitive information that is sent to and from
the smartphone and external servers.
In my experiment, I noticed that nearly 95% of the 102 applications sent email
addresses and passwords in clear text, which is an indication that appropriate valida-
tion measures for SSL certiﬁcates are lacking. In some cases, applications did display
a warning message to the user who can easily ignore it and proceed to communicate
via the insecure channel.
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Traditionally, the SSL protocol is implemented to secure information transmitted
between a browser and a web server on the desktop platform. As an initial step, there
is an exchange of SSL certiﬁcates issued by a Certiﬁcate Authority (CA). Browsers
come with a pre-installed list of trusted CAs and will communicate with a web server
that has been issued a certiﬁcate from one of the CAs.
However, on the smartphone platform, applications can be either web- or client-
based. A Web-based application uses Web 2.0 technologies and can be displayed
on the in-built web browser. Client-based applications use the WebView class1 to
embed web content in the application. As smartphones are sold with a set of pre-
installed root certiﬁcates, it is easy to trick users to accept spoofed SSL certiﬁcates
on client-based applications.
7.6.4 SSL, DNS & DNSSec
The Domain Name System (DNS) is a query mechanism which links logical names,
for example www.google.com, to IP addresses, such as 74.125.131.105; this process is
known as ‘Domain Name Resolution’. DNS was initially proposed in the 1980s and
the details of its implementation are described in the standard Request For Comments
(RFC) 1035 [87]. The DNS process can be divided into four steps: (i) Delegation, (ii)
Zone File Management , (iii) Zone File Propagation and (iv) Resolving .
DNS Delegation follows an inverted tree structure, as depicted in Figure 7.5, and
is used for name resolution. The structure starts with the root and is represented by a
dot. Clients resolve names by following a chain of authoritative servers (also referred
to as name servers), starting from the Root, followed by the Top-Level Domain (TLD)
name servers, Second-Level Domain (SLD) name servers until the queried logical
name is found. For example, business.paypal.com is a sub-domain of the SLD
paypal.com, which in turn is a sub-domain of the generic TLD com, located under
1http://developer.android.com/reference/android/webkit/WebView.html
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the Root domain.
Figure 7.5: DNS Domain Structure
A zone may contain information about a domain and its sub-domains. Each piece
of information about the domain, such as Owner Name (www.paypal.com), Class IN
(Internet), Type A (IPv4 address) are contained in a Resource Record (RR), which
is recorded as a single line in a zone ﬁle. The set of all RRs associated with the same
owner name, class and type is called the Resource Records Set (RRSet). The primary
purpose of the zone ﬁle is to link a domain to an IP address. Zone File Management
is performed by DNS operators who are responsible for looking after particular zones.
The RR includes other information, including Time To Live (TTL), which indicates
the length of time it can be stored in cache and used for dissemination. This process
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is known as the Zone File Propagation. The entire process of answering a DNS query
is known as Resolving.
Since no authentication and integrity checks are done during resolving, it provides
a very convenient opportunity for attackers to divert traﬃc via their MiTM proxies
as DNS servers are unable to verify the correctness of incoming DNS data. This is
the main problem with the DNS set-up, for which Domain Name System Security
Extensions (DNSSec) was proposed as a solution.
In the rest of this section, I explore the application of DNSSec to protect DNS
servers and prevent MiTM attacks.
To compensate for the lack of security in DNS, DNSSec was implemented and
standardised by the Internet Engineering Task Force in 1997 [69]. DNSSec can be
considered to be a set of security extensions added to the existing DNS protocol and it
relies on the ‘chain of trust’. In fact, the extensions only aﬀect the Zone File (second
and third step) in the DNS process while the ﬁrst (Delegation) and last (Resolving)
steps remain unchanged. A comparison of DNS and DNSSec is provided in Table 7.8.
Table 7.8: Comparison of steps involved in DNS and DNSSec
DNS DNSSec
1. Delegation 1. Delegation
2. Zone File Management 2. Zone File Management
3. Zone File Propagation 3. Zone File Signing (RRSIG and DNSKEY)
4. Resolving 4. Zone File Propagation
5. Resolving
6. Verifying
DNSSec applies the concept of Public Key Cryptography to authenticate the origin
of data and data integrity, and to verify the ‘non-existence’ of a domain (also referred
to as authenticated denial of existence). For each domain, a key pair, consisting of
a public key and private key, is generated and provided by the zone administrator.
The private key is used to sign each RRSet in a zone ﬁle. As a result, a digital
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signature is computed and is referred to as the Resource Record Signature (RRSIG).
The public key, also known as DNSKEY, and its corresponding digital signature
(RRSIG DNSKEY) are also added to the zone ﬁle. Finally, the Next Secure (NSEC)
record together with its signature (RRSIG NSEC) are included to detect the ‘non-
existence’ of domain names. The above process is known as the Zone File Signing
and is listed as Step 3 in Table 7.8.
To verify the authenticity of the DNS data (Step 6 from Table 7.8), the DNSKEY
of the sub-domain is veriﬁed against a copy stored at the SLD. In turn, a copy of
the SLDs DNSKEY is veriﬁed at the TLD and the TLDs DNSKEY is veriﬁed by the
Root zone. This ‘chain of trust’ provides assurance that the signatures and keys are
correct and the DNS data is authentic.
In the event of an MiTM attack, the client application will be unable to verify
the DNS data from the MiTM proxy and the traﬃc will be interrupted because the
smartphone client will not accept traﬃc that has been rerouted from the MiTM proxy
which is controlled by the attacker.
7.7 Summary
In this chapter, I presented an experimental setup that can be used to monitor real-
time traﬃc for Android applications. This setup was used to determine how well
the tracking settings for location and advertising work on a sample of Android ap-
plications collected from the oﬃcial market. I identiﬁed the reasons for some of the
unexpected tracking that I discovered in my experiment and provided preventative
solution proposals to address them.
Chapter 8
Conclusion
This thesis investigated the ongoing challenge of ﬁnding new techniques to identify
and distinguish smartphone malware from clean applications. The research was ex-
tended further to study the causes and impact of privacy breach of users’ personal
information. In this chapter, I reiterate my research questions and summarize the
results and main contributions of my thesis. I also provide some ideas for future work.
8.1 Contributions
The following research questions have been proposed and addressed.
Research Question 1: “In order to distinguish malware from cleanware, how to
generate and use patterns for clean and malicious applications that comprise of
one or more features in order to incorporate characteristics that are extracted
both statically and dynamically?”
In Section 3.5 of Chapter 3, I proposed the CPPM algorithm which takes on
input required and used permissions that have been extracted using static and
dynamic methods, respectively. I evaluated the algorithm using the malware
dataset from the Malware Genome Project and a clean dataset that I collected.
According to the empirical results, CPPM generated four types of patterns:
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MSRPPs, MSUPPs, CRPPs and CUPPs. The ﬁrst two types of pattern appear
in the malware dataset only, while the last two are contrasting patterns that
highlight the diﬀerentiating characteristics between clean and malicious appli-
cations. CPPM applies a support-based pruning technique to ensure that only
meaningful patterns are retained. The ﬁnal set of contrasting patterns produced
included between two and four permissions.
Research Question 2: “Having identiﬁed such patterns, is it possible to build a
classiﬁer that is able to handle the information they provide in order to perform
classiﬁcation of cleanware and malware while maintaining high accuracy?”
In Chapter 4, I used the MSRPPs and MSUPPs generated by the CPPM al-
gorithm to conduct malware prediction. I proposed a classiﬁer, PPC, which
is based on the boosting and perceptron algorithms. Instead of aiming for one
strong prediction rule, the PPC algorithm uses a weak learning classiﬁer to gen-
erate weak prediction rules over a ﬁxed number of iterations. The set of weak
rules is then combined to output the ﬁnal prediction. I tested the proposed
classiﬁer using the dataset from Chapter 3 and the new technique produced an
accuracy of 97%, which is comparable to the best existing results. Addition-
ally, the features used by the classiﬁer can be easily updated by adjusting their
corresponding support values to accommodate new malware variants.
Research Question 3: “What are the causes of information leaks in clean appli-
cations and what is the extent of their impact?”
After addressing my second research question, I observed that the malware pre-
diction results did not capture clean applications that leaked users’ personal
information. To gain a better understanding of information leaks in clean ap-
plications, I collected a set of clean applications from the oﬃcial and non-oﬃcial
markets. I then conducted a dynamic analysis to uncover the sources of leaks
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and how often the leaks occur. Additionally, I performed a static analysis to
check (i) if there was any correlation in the permissions requested by leaky ap-
plications and (ii) the impact of third-party libraries embedded within these
applications. The experimental results showed that advertising libraries were
the principal cause of information leaks. Eighty percent (80%) of the exper-
imental dataset included one or more advertising libraries and seven and six
leaky applications were collected from the Google Play and non-oﬃcial mar-
kets, respectively.
Research Question 4: “How to prevent personal information leaks on smart-
phones?”
The empirical results from my third research question led me to test the eﬃcacy
of current built-in tracking settings on the smartphones, which are designed to
allow users to regulate dissemination of their personal information. I focused
my study on the tracking settings for Advertising and Location Services. I con-
ducted a man-in-the-middle attack to intercept traﬃc to and from the device
while the tracking settings were turned on and oﬀ. The experimental results
showed that the unique device identiﬁer (IMEI) information was the most leaked
information when the users chose not to have their device tracked by applica-
tions. Applications from the Games and Social Networking categories were
the primary causes of information leaks. Additionally, I observed that by de-
ploying a fake SSL certiﬁcate, an attacker could remotely intercept live traﬃc
from the victim’s smartphone. Therefore, I concluded my work by proposing a
list of measures for preventing personal information theft.
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8.2 Future Work
This section addresses future work that can be performed based on the research
presented in this thesis.
Increase Richness of Patterns - As mentioned in Section 2.3 of Chapter 2, there
are several types of signature- and behavioral-based information that can be
extracted from an application. In my proposed feature representation method
(Chapter 3), I used Android permissions as my choice of features to gener-
ate contrasting patterns for clean and malicious applications. Based on the
promising results presented in Section 3.6, additional features, such as tempo-
ral information (for example: execution time) and API calls, could be included
to increase the richness of the patterns and consequently, improve classiﬁcation
accuracy. As demonstrated in [67], the prediction results are likely to increase
when considering several types of information in the feature vector, instead of
a single type only.
Malware Family Classiﬁcation - In Chapter 4, I presented the PPC algorithm
which was applied to distinguish clean applications from malicious ones. As
future work, I plan to extend the use of PPC by performing malware family
classiﬁcation. Given the exponential increase in Android malware, it is vital
to not only distinguish between clean and malicious applications, but also cor-
rectly classify new malware variants under existing malware families or new
ones (applicable for zero-day malware). Therefore, it would be interesting to
consider an extensive malware dataset to generate patterns which are common
amongst malware variants belonging to the same family and contrasting pat-
terns for malicious applications from diﬀerent malware families. The patterns
would then be used to perform classiﬁcation.
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Extend Evaluation of PPC - To further consolidate the eﬃciency and perfor-
mance of my proposed classiﬁer, PPC, I would like to conduct an evaluation of
the new algorithm against existing antivirus engines for the smartphone plat-
form. Due to the resource-related constraints of the smartphone, antivirus
companies are constantly seeking new improved detection and classiﬁcation
techniques that can be easily deployed and maintained on a cloud-based in-
frastructure.
While this thesis provides a thorough report around the security mechanisms and
privacy controls for protecting users’ personal information, there are interesting and
challenging problems that remain to be solved. Malware propagation has always been
the choice of smartphone attack vector for criminals and, based on future predictions,
Android will remain the principal target of an ever-increasing smartphone malware
trend. In addition, the whistleblower and former NSA employee, Edward Snowden
has generated an interest amongst technology users who are now more aware of the
implications of privacy breaches and the potential misuse of their personal informa-
tion.
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Appendix A
CPPM Experimental Dataset
A.1 Description of Malware Families
I provide a brief description of the the malware families mentioned in Section 3.4.1.
ADRD - A trojan that extracts data such as IMEI/IMSI of the device and sends it
back to the C&C server, and awaits for further instructions.
AnserverBot - A trojan that aims to remotely control users’ smartphones and uses
obfuscation methods to avoid detection.
BaseBridge - A trojan that attempts to send premium-rate SMS messages.
BeanBot - A trojan that forwards device’s data to a remote server and sends out
premium-rate SMS messages from the infected device.
BgServ - A trojan that opens a backdoor and transmits information from the device
to a remote location.
Crusewin - A virus that monitors sending and receiving of SMS messages. When a
SMS message is sent or received, it sends the IMEI to a C&C server and awaits
for further commands.
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DroidCoupon - A trojan targeting smartphones running on Android 2.2 or older.
The infected device is transmits personal and system data and is controlled by
a C&C server.
DroidDeluxe - A rooting tool for Android smartphones, which executes and exploits
OS prior to version 2.3 by accessing low-level system data.
DroidDream - A trojan which is deployed through other host applications and aims
at extracting user’s personal data.
DroidKungFu - A trojan that attempts to root the device and collect device- and
user-related information.
FakeNetﬂix - A trojan that attempts to steal Netﬂix users’ personal account data.
FakePlayer - A trojan that camouﬂages itself to look like a media player applica-
tion and begins sending SMS messages to premium numbers without the users
knowledge.
GamblerSMS - A spyware designed to monitor SMS messages received and sent
from the device, and record outgoing phone calls.
Geinimi - A trojan incorporated in repackaged applications and designed to steal
data. It opens a backdoor and transmits information from the device to a
remote location.
GGTracker - A trojan for Android devices that ends the phone number to a remote
server to subscribe it to premium SMS services and blocks incoming messages
to avoid the notiﬁcation of this subscription.
GingerMaster - A non-self replicating trojan distributed via peer-to-peer networks
and designed to collect various information including the device identiﬁer, phone
number and then upload them to a remote server.
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GoldDream - A trojan that spys on SMS messages received by users as well as in-
coming/outgoing phone calls and then uploads them to a remote server without
user’s knowledge.
HippoSMS - A trojan that sends a SMS message to a premium number and deletes
the incoming SMS messages from pre-identiﬁed numbers.
Jifake - A trojan that sends SMS messages to premium numbers.
jSMSHider - A trojan designed to introduce a backdoor on Android smartphones.
KMin - A trojan that aﬀects mobile devices running the Android OS operating sys-
tem and attempts to send Android device data to a remote server for collection
by an attacker.
Lovetrap - A trojan that sends premium-rate SMS messages and then attempts to
block any conﬁrmation SMS messages the compromised device may receive from
the premium-rate number in an attempt to mask its activities
Nickyspy - A spyware designed to monitor user’s communications and receives at-
tack commands via SMS messages.
Pjapps - A trojan that has been embedded on third-party applications and opens a
back door on the compromised device
Plankton - A trojan that silently forwards information about the device to a remote
location and downloads additional ﬁles onto the device.
RogueLemon - A trojan capable of intercepting SMS messages and redirecting in-
formation gathered to a remote machine.
RogueSPPush - A trojan that uses SMS-based subscription system to sign-up the
users for certain services without their knowledge and consent, subsequently
causing the users ﬁnancial loss.
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SMSReplicator - A spyware that transmit incoming SMS messages to another
phone of the attacker’s choice.
SndApps - A trojan that uploads users personal information such as email accounts
as well as phone numbers to a remote server without users knowledge.
Spitmo - A malware deployed as an add-on and allows the attacker to modify bank-
ing transactions made by the victim.
Walkinwat - A trojan that modiﬁes certain permissions on the compromised device
that allows it to steal device related information.
YZHC - A virus that conducts a series of malicious actions such information retrival
and uploading messages to the Internet. It also tampers with the user’s browser
options while secretly connecting to the Internet to download unknown ﬁles.
zHash - A virus that installs a backdoor to provide root privileges for the attacker.
A.2 Complete List of Permission Patterns
In Section 3.6 of Chapter 3, I presented the Android permission patterns generated
by the proposed CPPM algorithm. Here, I provide the complete list of the permission
patterns obtained from the experimental work.
• Tables A.1 - A.4: Required permission patterns present in malware dataset only.
• Table A.5: Used permission patterns present in malware dataset only.
• Table A.6: Common required permission patterns present in both clean and
malicious datasets.
• Table A.7: Common used permission patterns present in both clean and mali-
cious datasets.
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Table A.1: Required Permission Patterns Unique to Malware Dataset (MSRPP1 -
MSRPP55)
Permission Pattern Support Pattern ID
pms0004, pms0007, pms0012 0.6309 MSRPP1
pms0004, pms0055 0.6194 MSRPP2
pms0007, pms0055 0.6048 MSRPP3
pms0004, pms0008, pms0012 0.6031 MSRPP4
pms0004, pms0007, pms0055 0.6031 MSRPP5
pms0004, pms0007, pms0008, pms0012 0.5999 MSRPP6
pms0007, pms0008, pms0012 0.5999 MSRPP7
pms0003, pms0004, pms0007, pms0008 0.5624 MSRPP8
pms0004, pms0008, pms0055 0.5624 MSRPP9
pms0008, pms0055 0.5624 MSRPP10
pms0004, pms0007, pms0008, pms0055 0.5542 MSRPP11
pms0007, pms0008, pms0055 0.5542 MSRPP12
pms0004, pms0007, pms0028 0.5453 MSRPP13
pms0004, pms0008, pms0028 0.5168 MSRPP14
pms0004, pms0056 0.5143 MSRPP15
pms0055, pms0056 0.5143 MSRPP16
pms0004, pms0055, pms0056 0.5127 MSRPP17
pms0004, pms0007, pms0008, pms0028 0.5111 MSRPP18
pms0007, pms0008, pms0028 0.5111 MSRPP19
pms0007, pms0056 0.5094 MSRPP20
pms0004, pms0007, pms0056 0.5078 MSRPP21
pms0007, pms0055, pms0056 0.5078 MSRPP22
pms0004, pms0007, pms0055, pms0056 0.5062 MSRPP23
pms0004, pms0008, pms0056 0.4964 MSRPP24
pms0008, pms0056 0.4964 MSRPP25
pms0004, pms0008, pms0055, pms0056 0.4956 MSRPP26
pms0008, pms0055, pms0056 0.4956 MSRPP27
pms0004, pms0007, pms0008, pms0056 0.4899 MSRPP28
pms0007, pms0008, pms0056 0.4899 MSRPP29
pms0007, pms0008, pms0055, pms0056 0.489 MSRPP30
pms0003, pms0004, pms0012 0.4638 MSRPP31
pms0003, pms0004, pms0007, pms0012 0.4605 MSRPP32
pms0003, pms0007, pms0012 0.4605 MSRPP33
pms0003, pms0004, pms0008, pms0012 0.4475 MSRPP34
pms0003, pms0008, pms0012 0.4475 MSRPP35
pms0003, pms0007, pms0008, pms0012 0.4442 MSRPP36
pms0004, pms0050 0.4312 MSRPP37
pms0004, pms0012, pms0028 0.4263 MSRPP38
pms0004, pms0007, pms0012, pms0028 0.4255 MSRPP39
pms0007, pms0012, pms0028 0.4255 MSRPP40
pms0007, pms0050 0.419 MSRPP41
pms0004, pms0008, pms0012, pms0028 0.4181 MSRPP42
pms0008, pms0012, pms0028 0.4181 MSRPP43
pms0007, pms0008, pms0012, pms0028 0.4173 MSRPP44
pms0004, pms0007, pms0050 0.4173 MSRPP45
pms0004, pms0012, pms0055 0.4092 MSRPP46
pms0012, pms0055 0.4092 MSRPP47
pms0004, pms0007, pms0012, pms0055 0.4051 MSRPP48
pms0004, pms0008, pms0012, pms0055 0.4051 MSRPP49
pms0007, pms0012, pms0055 0.4051 MSRPP50
pms0008, pms0012, pms0055 0.4051 MSRPP51
pms0007, pms0008, pms0012, pms0055 0.4018 MSRPP52
pms0004, pms0054 0.3945 MSRPP53
pms0003, pms0004, pms0055 0.3896 MSRPP54
pms0003, pms0055 0.3896 MSRPP55
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Table A.2: Required Permission Patterns Unique to Malware Dataset (MSRPP56 -
MSRPP110)
Permission Pattern Support Pattern ID
pms0003, pms0004, pms0007, pms0055 0.3823 MSRPP56
pms0003, pms0007, pms0055 0.3823 MSRPP57
pms0004, pms0012, pms0056 0.3815 MSRPP58
pms0012, pms0056 0.3815 MSRPP59
pms0004, pms0012, pms0055, pms0056 0.3807 MSRPP60
pms0012, pms0055, pms0056 0.3807 MSRPP61
pms0007, pms0054 0.3798 MSRPP62
pms0004, pms0008, pms0012, pms0056 0.379 MSRPP63
pms0008, pms0012, pms0056 0.379 MSRPP64
pms0004, pms0007, pms0012, pms0056 0.3782 MSRPP65
pms0008, pms0012, pms0055, pms0056 0.3782 MSRPP66
pms0004, pms0007, pms0054 0.3782 MSRPP67
pms0007, pms0012, pms0056 0.3782 MSRPP68
pms0007, pms0012, pms0055, pms0056 0.3774 MSRPP69
pms0007, pms0008, pms0012, pms0056 0.3758 MSRPP70
pms0050, pms0054 0.3701 MSRPP71
pms0003, pms0004, pms0028 0.366 MSRPP72
pms0004, pms0050, pms0054 0.3644 MSRPP73
pms0050, pms0055 0.3627 MSRPP74
pms0004, pms0050, pms0055 0.3611 MSRPP75
pms0003, pms0004, pms0007, pms0028 0.3603 MSRPP76
pms0003, pms0007, pms0028 0.3603 MSRPP77
pms0007, pms0050, pms0055 0.3595 MSRPP78
pms0004, pms0007, pms0050, pms0055 0.3578 MSRPP79
pms0004, pms0007, pms0049 0.3562 MSRPP80
pms0004, pms0028, pms0055 0.3554 MSRPP81
pms0028, pms0055 0.3554 MSRPP82
pms0004, pms0007, pms0014 0.3521 MSRPP83
pms0007, pms0050, pms0054 0.3521 MSRPP84
pms0003, pms0004, pms0008, pms0028 0.3513 MSRPP85
pms0003, pms0008, pms0028 0.3513 MSRPP86
pms0004, pms0007, pms0050, pms0054 0.3505 MSRPP87
pms0004, pms0006, pms0007, pms0008 0.3497 MSRPP88
pms0004, pms0007, pms0028, pms0055 0.3489 MSRPP89
pms0007, pms0028, pms0055 0.3489 MSRPP90
pms0003, pms0004, pms0008, pms0055 0.3481 MSRPP91
pms0003, pms0008, pms0055 0.3481 MSRPP92
pms0004, pms0008, pms0028, pms0055 0.3472 MSRPP93
pms0008, pms0028, pms0055 0.3472 MSRPP94
pms0003, pms0007, pms0008, pms0028 0.3464 MSRPP95
pms0007, pms0008, pms0028, pms0055 0.3415 MSRPP96
pms0003, pms0007, pms0008, pms0055 0.3407 MSRPP97
pms0004, pms0008, pms0050 0.3407 MSRPP98
pms0008, pms0050 0.3407 MSRPP99
pms0054, pms0055 0.3383 MSRPP100
pms0004, pms0007, pms0008, pms0050 0.3375 MSRPP101
pms0007, pms0008, pms0050 0.3375 MSRPP102
pms0004, pms0054, pms0055 0.3366 MSRPP103
pms0004, pms0033 0.3358 MSRPP104
pms0004, pms0007, pms0033 0.335 MSRPP105
pms0007, pms0033 0.335 MSRPP106
pms0004, pms0008, pms0054 0.3342 MSRPP107
pms0008, pms0054 0.3342 MSRPP108
pms0007, pms0054, pms0055 0.3326 MSRPP109
pms0004, pms0007, pms0054, pms0055 0.3309 MSRPP110
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Table A.3: Required Permission Patterns Unique to Malware Dataset (MSRPP111 -
MSRPP165)
Permission Pattern Support Pattern ID
pms0004, pms0007, pms0008, pms0054 0.3293 MSRPP111
pms0007, pms0008, pms0054 0.3293 MSRPP112
pms0004, pms0007, pms0010 0.3285 MSRPP113
pms0004, pms0006, pms0055 0.3277 MSRPP114
pms0006, pms0055 0.3277 MSRPP115
pms0014, pms0055 0.3269 MSRPP116
pms0004, pms0014, pms0055 0.3252 MSRPP117
pms0004, pms0006, pms0007, pms0055 0.3236 MSRPP118
pms0006, pms0007, pms0055 0.3236 MSRPP119
pms0004, pms0007, pms0033, pms0055 0.3228 MSRPP120
pms0004, pms0033, pms0055 0.3228 MSRPP121
pms0007, pms0033, pms0055 0.3228 MSRPP122
pms0033, pms0055 0.3228 MSRPP123
pms0007, pms0014, pms0055 0.3187 MSRPP124
pms0004, pms0008, pms0050, pms0055 0.3179 MSRPP125
pms0008, pms0050, pms0055 0.3179 MSRPP126
pms0004, pms0007, pms0014, pms0055 0.3171 MSRPP127
pms0004, pms0007, pms0033, pms0050 0.3163 MSRPP128
pms0004, pms0008, pms0054, pms0055 0.3163 MSRPP129
pms0004, pms0033, pms0050 0.3163 MSRPP130
pms0007, pms0033, pms0050 0.3163 MSRPP131
pms0008, pms0054, pms0055 0.3163 MSRPP132
pms0033, pms0050 0.3163 MSRPP133
pms0004, pms0008, pms0010 0.3155 MSRPP134
pms0004, pms0007, pms0008, pms0010 0.3146 MSRPP135
pms0004, pms0006, pms0008, pms0055 0.3146 MSRPP136
pms0007, pms0008, pms0050, pms0055 0.3146 MSRPP137
pms0007, pms0008, pms0010 0.3146 MSRPP138
pms0006, pms0008, pms0055 0.3146 MSRPP139
pms0050, pms0056 0.3138 MSRPP140
pms0003, pms0004, pms0055, pms0056 0.313 MSRPP141
pms0003, pms0004, pms0056 0.313 MSRPP142
pms0003, pms0055, pms0056 0.313 MSRPP143
pms0004, pms0038 0.313 MSRPP144
pms0003, pms0056 0.313 MSRPP145
pms0003, pms0004, pms0049 0.3122 MSRPP146
pms0004, pms0050, pms0056 0.3122 MSRPP147
pms0050, pms0055, pms0056 0.3122 MSRPP148
pms0006, pms0007, pms0008, pms0055 0.3114 MSRPP149
pms0007, pms0008, pms0054, pms0055 0.3114 MSRPP150
pms0004, pms0007, pms0038 0.3114 MSRPP151
pms0007, pms0038 0.3114 MSRPP152
pms0003, pms0004, pms0005, pms0007 0.3106 MSRPP153
pms0003, pms0004, pms0007, pms0049 0.3106 MSRPP154
pms0004, pms0008, pms0050, pms0054 0.3106 MSRPP155
pms0004, pms0050, pms0055, pms0056 0.3106 MSRPP156
pms0003, pms0007, pms0049 0.3106 MSRPP157
pms0008, pms0050, pms0054 0.3106 MSRPP158
pms0007, pms0050, pms0056 0.3106 MSRPP159
pms0004, pms0012, pms0038 0.3097 MSRPP160
pms0050, pms0054, pms0055 0.3097 MSRPP161
pms0012, pms0038 0.3097 MSRPP162
pms0004, pms0007, pms0050, pms0056 0.3089 MSRPP163
pms0007, pms0050, pms0055, pms0056 0.3089 MSRPP164
pms0004, pms0008, pms0049 0.3089 MSRPP165
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Table A.4: Required Permission Patterns Unique to Malware Dataset (MSRPP166 -
MSRPP185)
Permission Pattern Support Pattern ID
pms0004, pms0007, pms0012, pms0038 0.3081 MSRPP166
pms0004, pms0050, pms0054, pms0055 0.3081 MSRPP167
pms0007, pms0012, pms0038 0.3081 MSRPP168
pms0007, pms0008, pms0050, pms0054 0.3073 MSRPP169
pms0004, pms0033, pms0050, pms0055 0.3073 MSRPP170
pms0007, pms0033, pms0050, pms0055 0.3073 MSRPP171
pms0033, pms0050, pms0055 0.3073 MSRPP172
pms0007, pms0050, pms0054, pms0055 0.3065 MSRPP173
pms0003, pms0004, pms0007, pms0056 0.3065 MSRPP174
pms0003, pms0007, pms0055, pms0056 0.3065 MSRPP175
pms0003, pms0007, pms0056 0.3065 MSRPP176
pms0004, pms0006, pms0056 0.3032 MSRPP177
pms0006, pms0056 0.3032 MSRPP178
pms0004, pms0006, pms0055, pms0056 0.3024 MSRPP179
pms0006, pms0055, pms0056 0.3024 MSRPP180
pms0004, pms0006, pms0007, pms0056 0.3016 MSRPP181
pms0006, pms0007, pms0056 0.3016 MSRPP182
pms0004, pms0007, pms0008, pms0049 0.3008 MSRPP183
pms0006, pms0007, pms0055, pms0056 0.3008 MSRPP184
pms0007, pms0008, pms0049 0.3008 MSRPP185
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Table A.5: Used Permission Patterns Unique to Malware Dataset
Permission Pattern Support Pattern ID
pms0004, pms0007, pms0013 0.4687 MSUPP1
pms0004, pms0008, pms0013 0.432 MSUPP2
pms0004, pms0007, pms0008, pms0013 0.4312 MSUPP3
pms0007, pms0008, pms0013 0.4312 MSUPP4
pms0004, pms0006, pms0013 0.4149 MSUPP5
pms0004, pms0006, pms0007, pms0013 0.4133 MSUPP6
pms0006, pms0007, pms0013 0.4133 MSUPP7
pms0004, pms0006, pms0008, pms0013 0.3855 MSUPP8
pms0006, pms0007, pms0008, pms0013 0.3855 MSUPP9
pms0004, pms0007, pms0012 0.3855 MSUPP10
pms0006, pms0008, pms0013 0.3855 MSUPP11
pms0004, pms0007, pms0008, pms0012 0.3644 MSUPP12
pms0004, pms0008, pms0012 0.3644 MSUPP13
pms0007, pms0008, pms0012 0.3644 MSUPP14
pms0004, pms0007, pms0012, pms0013 0.3521 MSUPP15
pms0004, pms0012, pms0013 0.3521 MSUPP16
pms0007, pms0012, pms0013 0.3521 MSUPP17
pms0004, pms0006, pms0007, pms0012 0.3415 MSUPP18
pms0004, pms0006, pms0012 0.3415 MSUPP19
pms0006, pms0007, pms0012 0.3415 MSUPP20
pms0004, pms0050 0.3358 MSUPP21
pms0004, pms0008, pms0012, pms0013 0.3326 MSUPP22
pms0007, pms0008, pms0012, pms0013 0.3326 MSUPP23
pms0008, pms0012, pms0013 0.3326 MSUPP24
pms0004, pms0006, pms0008, pms0012 0.3318 MSUPP25
pms0006, pms0007, pms0008, pms0012 0.3318 MSUPP26
pms0006, pms0008, pms0012 0.3318 MSUPP27
pms0004, pms0007, pms0050 0.3236 MSUPP28
pms0007, pms0050 0.3236 MSUPP29
pms0004, pms0006, pms0012, pms0013 0.3171 MSUPP30
pms0006, pms0007, pms0012, pms0013 0.3171 MSUPP31
pms0006, pms0012, pms0013 0.3171 MSUPP32
pms0006, pms0008, pms0012, pms0013 0.3073 MSUPP33
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Table A.6: Contrasting Required Permission Patterns to both Clean and Malware
Datasets
Permission Pattern Support Diﬀerence Pattern ID
Clean Malware
pms0004, pms0007 0.3185 0.9308 −0.6123 CRPP1
pms0007 0.3245 0.934 −0.6095 CRPP2
pms0055 0.0142 0.6211 −0.6069 CRPP3
pms0007, pms0012 0.0358 0.6309 −0.5951 CRPP4
pms0004, pms0012 0.0611 0.6349 −0.5738 CRPP5
pms0012 0.0625 0.6349 −0.5724 CRPP6
pms0008, pms0012 0.0506 0.6031 −0.5525 CRPP7
pms0007, pms0008 0.2515 0.7906 −0.5391 CRPP8
pms0004, pms0007, pms0008 0.2515 0.7898 −0.5383 CRPP9
pms0007, pms0028 0.0306 0.5453 −0.5147 CRPP10
pms0003, pms0007 0.1429 0.6553 −0.5124 CRPP11
pms0003, pms0004, pms0007 0.1422 0.6545 −0.5123 CRPP12
pms0056 0.0097 0.5159 −0.5062 CRPP13
pms0004, pms0028 0.0499 0.5542 −0.5043 CRPP14
pms0028 0.0566 0.5542 −0.4976 CRPP15
pms0008, pms0028 0.0358 0.5168 −0.481 CRPP16
pms0003, pms0007, pms0008 0.125 0.5624 −0.4374 CRPP17
pms0003, pms0012 0.038 0.4638 −0.4258 CRPP18
pms0050 0.0261 0.4418 −0.4157 CRPP19
pms0012, pms0028 0.0157 0.4263 −0.4106 CRPP20
pms0054 0.0246 0.4002 −0.3756 CRPP21
pms0003, pms0004 0.2999 0.6675 −0.3676 CRPP22
pms0003 0.3088 0.6708 −0.362 CRPP23
pms0003, pms0004, pms0008 0.2225 0.5714 −0.3489 CRPP24
pms0003, pms0008 0.2233 0.5714 −0.3481 CRPP25
pms0003, pms0028 0.0276 0.366 −0.3384 CRPP26
pms0007, pms0014 0.035 0.3538 −0.3188 CRPP27
pms0004, pms0014 0.0484 0.3611 −0.3127 CRPP28
pms0014 0.0559 0.3635 −0.3076 CRPP29
pms0004, pms0006, pms0007 0.0678 0.3733 −0.3055 CRPP30
pms0006, pms0007 0.0692 0.3741 −0.3049 CRPP31
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Table A.7: Contrasting Used Permission Patterns in both Clean and Malware
Datasets
Permission Pattern Support Diﬀerence Pattern ID
Clean Malware
pms0004, pms0007 0.2977 0.9153 −0.6176 CUPP1
pms0007 0.3014 0.9169 −0.6155 CUPP2
pms0007, pms0008 0.2367 0.7719 −0.5352 CUPP3
pms0004, pms0007, pms0008 0.2367 0.7719 −0.5352 CUPP4
pms0004, pms0006, pms0007 0.2181 0.6512 −0.4331 CUPP5
pms0006, pms0007 0.2203 0.6529 −0.4326 CUPP6
pms0007, pms0013 0.0603 0.4687 −0.4084 CUPP7
pms0013 0.0759 0.476 −0.4001 CUPP8
pms0004, pms0013 0.0752 0.4711 −0.3959 CUPP9
pms0006, pms0007, pms0008 0.1816 0.5542 −0.3726 CUPP10
pms0004, pms0006, pms0007, pms0008 0.1816 0.5542 −0.3726 CUPP11
pms0008, pms0013 0.067 0.4328 −0.3658 CUPP12
pms0006, pms0013 0.0715 0.4181 −0.3466 CUPP13
pms0007, pms0012 0.0506 0.3855 −0.3349 CUPP14
pms0012, pms0013 0.0283 0.3521 −0.3238 CUPP15
pms0050 0.0268 0.3472 −0.3204 CUPP16
pms0004, pms0012 0.0707 0.3855 −0.3148 CUPP17
pms0012 0.0722 0.3855 −0.3133 CUPP18
pms0008, pms0012 0.0596 0.3644 −0.3048 CUPP19
Appendix B
Detection of Information Leaks
B.1 Description of experimental dataset
The dataset included:
49 Finance applications from Google Play: ApiDemos, aCurrency lite, NYSE
STOCKS LIVE WATCH, Stock Quote, Ministocks - Stocks Widget, Google
Finance and Bloomberg, MoneySmart Financial Calc, Bloomberg for Smart-
phone, Money Lover, Daily Money, Droid Wallet, Mortgage Calculator, Loan
Calc, Fifth Third Bank, EasyMoney - Expense Manager, Creditscore, Fidelity
Investments, Financial Calculators, Cash Droid, Google Finance, ADP HR &
Salaris Info, Gesture Tool, Tip N Split Tip Calculator, Higher One Mobile Bank-
ing app, TurboTax SnapTax, MyTaxRefund by TurboTax Free, Tip Calculator
by TradeFields, Balance and Budget, ABECU/AECU CU MobileAccess, City
National Mobile, 3Rivers Mobile, Pinnacle Financial Partners, Mint.com Per-
sonal Finance, My Money Manager, Naver, Portfolio Manager, PNC Mobile,
Quote Rocket Insurance, Regions Mobile, Rush Card, Check Book, Mortgage
Calculator and Rates, Exchange Rates, Fuel Calculator Mileage Free, Gesture-
Builder, ING DIRECT, metatrader5 and Oﬃce Calculator Free.
24 Games applications from Google Play: Hidden Ballons, Tiny Station, Whack
Your boss, Sudoku, Solitaire, Word search, mobilityware Solitaire, noshufou,
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Crazy bike Racing Motor, Drage Racing, Zombies Wave, Amazing Broken Dis-
play, copter, GameFly, blackjack, Chess, kayak, Sketchndraw, nyan, coloring-
book, ﬁalfree, tourality, plumber and moveitfree.
50 Finance applications from SlideME: under the ﬁnance category are: Finance
Central, Corporate, Finance News, Footprint, Swift Tip Calculator, Symbol
Lookup, Budget Manager, StockLite (V.1.4.9), Technical Stock Charting, mDroid,
Stock Analyst Free, InOut, Connector, I Spent Too Much Money, Anvestor, Tip
Split, Personal Financial Organizer, Tip Calculator, Pocket Books, Xpense Lite,
Stock Observer, Stock Watcher, Budget Helper, Media Budget, Stock Buzz,
Mobile Forex, Funky Expense, Moneybag, Cash Droid, American Stock Ex-
change, Simple Budget, Toshl, Till Budget Free, WorkIt Expenses, Debt Droid,
CashLog, Dividend Predictor, My Stock Ticker Lite, Best Deal, Wallet Man-
ager Lite, Housing Loan Calculator, Expense Notes, Tipped Oﬀ, Budget Droid,
honeyCombWalletManager, Pocket Budget, Go Dutch, Track Moneyand and
Pulse.
B.2 How do advertising libraries work?
The following steps demonstrate, through an examination of the Finance application
Mint.com Personal Finance (collected from Google Play) how an embedded adver-
tising library extracts the IMSI information and sends it to the advertising server:
Step 1: Locate the main entry point of the application in its AndroidManifest.xml
ﬁle. This information is stored within the Activity component, with the description
<android.intent.action.MAIN>. In this case, the .activity.MintLoginActivity
is the main activity that starts the application, see Figure B.1.
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Figure B.1: Identiﬁcation of main entry point
Step 2: Search for the Java class namedMintLoginActivity in the decompiled version
of the application package ﬁle. Notice that after the user has successfully logged in,
the application invokes the class MintOmnitureTrackingUtility, see Figure B.2.
Figure B.2: Locate MintOmnitureTrackingUtility class
Step 3: The MintOmnitureTrackingUtility class subsequently invokes the AppMeasurement
class which contains the method getDefaultVisitorID() whose purpose is to ex-
tract the IMSI using the getSubscriberId() method, see Figure B.3.
Figure B.3: Locate getSubscriberId() method
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Step 4: The advertising code also included the method send() which allowed the
application to leak the IMSI via the network, see Figure B.4.
Figure B.4: Locate send() method
Step 5: Below is an excerpt from the DroidBox log ﬁle generated during the dynamic
execution of the application. It can be seen that the application did indeed leak the
IMSI via Port 80 which is used for HTTP communications, see Figure B.5.
Figure B.5: Proof of information leak according to log ﬁle from DroidBox
Appendix C
Tracking Services
C.1 Tracking Services on iOS
Location Services on iOS 6.1 can be turned on/oﬀ as described in [126]. I apply the
same rationale presented in 7.3 and use a list of keywords to identify any illegitimate
access to location-related information.
With versions of iOS prior to 6.1, advertising companies were able to capture static
ID including the unique device identiﬁer (UDID) in order to identify and target the
device with advertising. However, with the introduction of iOS 6.1, Apple began to
discourage application developers from capturing and using the UDID for advertis-
ing purposes. As an alternative, Apple oﬀered a randomly generated ‘Identiﬁer For
Advertising’ (IFA) [29] allowing targeted advertising without the use of the UDID.
Since the IFA is a randomly generated value, I cannot monitor it during real-time
communication between smartphone and external servers. On the other hand, the
situation oﬀered us the opportunity to check if application developers had indeed
switched to use of the IFA, forgoing UDID capture. Thus, I monitor the static ID
on the iOS version 6.1 device, serial number and UDID, both to test the tracking
‘on/oﬀ’ features and to see whether UDID is still being used.
Table C.1 presents the keywords used in the context of my work in order to monitor
tracking on the iOS platform.
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Table C.1: Keywords for iOS
Location Services Advertising
(i) MAC address (i) Serial number
(ii) IP address (ii) UDID
(iii) GPS
C.2 Results
In Tables C.2 to C.5, I have presented the resulting data into two parts, Location
Services and Advertising. Under Location Services, as explained in Section C.1, users
have the option to either turn on or turn oﬀ location tracking. When Location Services
is ON, I have the following outcomes: If the application accesses information about the
keyword(s) mentioned in the ﬁrst column of Table C.1, I place a tick (); otherwise
a cross () is recorded. However, when Location Services is ‘OFF’, I expect that
applications are not able to access any location-related information. Hence, refers
to an application that did not use any location information while  indicates that
location information was accessed.
Similarly, for Advertising, I have the ‘ON’ and ‘OFF’ options - as presented in
Tables C.2 to C.5. When applications are allowed to track via advertisements, i.e.
Advertising is ‘ON’, I place a if the application accessed information about the
keyword(s) listed in the second column of Table C.1; otherwise an  is recorded.
However, when Advertising is ‘OFF’, a means that advertising libraries did not
track smartphone users based on my pre-deﬁned keyword(s); whilst an  refers to
the contrary.
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Table C.2: Tracking Services in iOS Games Applications
Application Name
Location Services Advertising
ON OFF ON OFF
1. Sonic Dash    
2. Pic Combo    
3. Temple Run    
4. Candy Crush    
5. 4 Pics 1 Word    
6. Megapolis    
7. Doodle Jump    
8. Subway Surfers    
9. Nimble Quest    
10. UNO & Friends    
11. Royal Revolt    
12. Lucky Wheel for Friends    
13. Tiny Troopers 2    
14. Smash it    
15. Where’s my Water    
16. Temple Run: OZ    
17. Angry Birds Star Wars    
18. Plants vs Zombies    
19. Wreck it Ralph    
20. Vector for iPhone    
21. Where’s my Perry    
22. Bad Piggies    
23. Backﬂip Madness    
24. Slingshot Racing    
25. Plague    
26. Tetris    
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Table C.3: Tracking Services in iOS Business Applications
Application Name
Location Services Advertising
ON OFF ON OFF
1. Flashlight    
2. Local Directories Aus    
3. Australia Post    
4. Career One    
5. Solution Recruitment    
6. Oﬃceworks    
7. IBM Sametime    
8. IBM Mobile Systems Remote    
9. SupplyChainBrain    
10. Alegeus Technologies Client Conference    
11. BMC Mobility for Incident Management    
12. MobileIron Mobile@ Work Client    
13. BMC Control-M Self Service    
14. Receipt Catcher    
15. Audio Memos - The Voice Recorder    
16. Normal Ringtones    
17. Secrets of Success    
18. XANGO Check it    
19. Active Shooter Action Plan    
20. Funding & Fundraising Ideas    
21. Nantucket Phone Book    
22. MyTMx Mobile    
23. INSolutions    
24. ATM Finder    
25. ScanTOPDF Mobile    
26. Arborist    
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Table C.4: Tracking Services in iOS Finance Applications
Application Name
Location Services Advertising
ON OFF ON OFF
1. PayPal    
2. CommBank    
3. CommBank Kaching    
4. ANZ goMoney    
5. NAB    
6. WestPac Mobile Banking    
7. TrackMySPEND    
8. St George Banking    
9. Citibank AU    
10. Bendigo Bank    
11. You Need a Budget    
12. CommSec    
13. ING DIRECT    
14. My Weekly Budget    
15. ISpend (Spending Monitor)    
16. cPro Craigslist client    
17. Pocket Expense Personal Finance    
18. My Funds - Indian Mutual Fund    
19. eBay & PayPal Fee Calculator    
20. FinPlanner    
21. safeX FSC-Ip    
22. Stock Watch: BSE/NSE    
23. StockWatch - Portfolio Tracking    
24. My currency Pro - Converter    
25. Budget Planner & Web Sync    
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Table C.5: Tracking Services in iOS Social Networking Applications
Application Name
Location Services Advertising
ON OFF ON OFF
1. Kik Messenger    
2. Viber    
3. Skype    
4. Facebook Messenger    
5. Pinterest    
6. Snapchat    
7. Facebook    
8. Twitter    
9. Tumblr    
10. Keek    
11. LinkedIn    
12. Tango Text, Voice and Video    
13. InstaFollow    
14. WhatsApp Messenger    
15. TagsForLikes Pro    
16. Grindr Xtra    
17. Nimbuzz Messenger    
18. Tinychat    
19. Bubbly - Social Voice    
20. Dubbler - Share your voice    
21. TextPics    
22. Path    
23. KakaoAlbum    
24. Zello + Walkie Talkie    
25. Tom’s Messenger    
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